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To: Bryce Johnson Cc: iwd@lists.linux.dev References: <3d09fed3-9728-43e4-840d-13052b5fbf6e@gmail.com> <4ab7e9b9-be27-402b-834c-3e71bd58a476@gmail.com> Content-Language: en-US From: James Prestwood In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Hi Bryce, On 1/30/26 9:21 AM, Bryce Johnson wrote: > Hi James, > > On Fri, Jan 30, 2026 at 8:07 AM James Prestwood wrote: >> Hi, >> >> On 1/30/26 7:01 AM, Bryce Johnson wrote: >>> Hi James >>> >>> On Fri, Jan 30, 2026 at 7:48 AM James Prestwood wrote: >>>> Hi Bryce, >>>> >>>> On 1/30/26 6:43 AM, Bryce Johnson wrote: >>>>> Hi All >>>>> We are working to get our product through wifi certification. Our >>>>> testing company mentioned there was several negative test cases that >>>>> were failing where IWD was connecting anyways because it would decide >>>>> on the security type based on the AP. Is there a way to force IWD to >>>>> use a security type that is different than the AP so it would fail the >>>>> connection? Can we disable WPA1-only connection or force WPA2 only >>>>> connection? >>>> There unfortunately isn't at the moment. We do have a "developer mode" >>>> by specifying "-E" to IWD and this seems like it would fall into that >>>> category, support would need to be added of course. >>>> >>>> But I'm somewhat confused (and maybe this is just poor test cases by >>>> WFA?), why would you need to certify that IWD fails when using a >>>> different security type than the AP? A client should not ever use a >>>> security type the AP doesn't advertise support for... This feels like >>>> its testing the AP, not IWD :) >>>> >>> I'm was requesting what test case fails and if I could get a copy of >>> it. The only thing I can think of is that they want to disable WPA1 >>> for example and show that the device won't connect to a WPA1 only AP. >>> Or maybe for a product you only want to connect WPA3 and fail and not >>> connect or not allow the AP to downgrade the connection. >> Yeah I'd be interested in the test case. >>> Maybe it would make sense to allow a blacklist of protocols you won't >>> allow IWD to use? For our product we wouldn't allow open or WEP >>> connections for example (but we perform that check outside of IWD). >> IWD already won't connect to a WEP network, so we're ok there. You may >> be able to coax out some behavior with the following options: >> >> main.conf >> >> [General].ManagementFrameProtection >> >> network profile: >> >> [Settings].TransitionDisable >> >> [Settings].DisabledTransitionModes >> >> Anyways, lets hope you can get the test case. Shouldn't be too hard to >> add some support for specific test/dev type requirements. > Here were the test cases > For test case 10153_1: The test bed AP beacons with no security. The > test case requires the STAUT to connect with WPA2-PSK only. Because > of the mismatch of security protocols, the connection will fail. > > For test case 10165_1: The test bed AP advertises at WPA2-Personal > only. The test case requires the STAUT to connect with WPA3-Personal. > Because of the mismatch of security protocols, the connection will > also fail. Both of these are pretty ridiculous. They want to test that a client chooses an incompatible security type than what the AP advertises.... what?!? I know these are coming from the WFA, and not you... Its just rather annoying that they're so adapted to using wpa_supplicant which you can force to do stupid things like this. And the fact they wrote test cases around that is just sad. I guess the only option if these are strictly required is to add some config option to the profiles that restrict what security types can be used. > > I got the PDFs of the test cases I can share offlist as well. 10153_1 > looks like it would not connect, but apparently hung up on the setting > the STAUT to WPA2-PSK only. So it looks like I need a way to restrict > IWD from using other security types for these tests. If you have any > suggestions on a good way to do this, let me know. > > Thanks > Bryce