From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>, Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
lasse.collin@tukaani.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 06/11] x86/KASLR: Return earliest overlap when avoiding regions
Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 15:13:51 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1462486436-3707-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1462486436-3707-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
In preparation for being able to detect where to split up contiguous
memory regions that overlap with memory regions to avoid, we need to
pass back what the earliest overlapping region was. This modifies the
overlap checker to return that information.
Based on a separate mem_min_overlap() implementation by Baoquan He.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
index dc9ffceb556b..391960e2cb08 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
@@ -246,15 +246,24 @@ static void mem_avoid_init(unsigned long input, unsigned long input_size,
#endif
}
-/* Does this memory vector overlap a known avoided area? */
-static bool mem_avoid_overlap(struct mem_vector *img)
+/*
+ * Does this memory vector overlap a known avoided area? If so, record the
+ * overlap region with the lowest address.
+ */
+static bool mem_avoid_overlap(struct mem_vector *img,
+ struct mem_vector *overlap)
{
int i;
struct setup_data *ptr;
+ unsigned long earliest = img->start + img->size;
+ bool is_overlapping = false;
for (i = 0; i < MEM_AVOID_MAX; i++) {
- if (mem_overlaps(img, &mem_avoid[i]))
- return true;
+ if (mem_overlaps(img, &mem_avoid[i]) &&
+ mem_avoid[i].start < earliest) {
+ *overlap = mem_avoid[i];
+ is_overlapping = true;
+ }
}
/* Avoid all entries in the setup_data linked list. */
@@ -265,13 +274,15 @@ static bool mem_avoid_overlap(struct mem_vector *img)
avoid.start = (unsigned long)ptr;
avoid.size = sizeof(*ptr) + ptr->len;
- if (mem_overlaps(img, &avoid))
- return true;
+ if (mem_overlaps(img, &avoid) && (avoid.start < earliest)) {
+ *overlap = avoid;
+ is_overlapping = true;
+ }
ptr = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)ptr->next;
}
- return false;
+ return is_overlapping;
}
static unsigned long slots[KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE / CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN];
@@ -328,7 +339,7 @@ static void process_e820_entry(struct e820entry *entry,
unsigned long minimum,
unsigned long image_size)
{
- struct mem_vector region, img;
+ struct mem_vector region, img, overlap;
/* Skip non-RAM entries. */
if (entry->type != E820_RAM)
@@ -367,7 +378,7 @@ static void process_e820_entry(struct e820entry *entry,
for (img.start = region.start, img.size = image_size ;
mem_contains(®ion, &img) ;
img.start += CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN) {
- if (mem_avoid_overlap(&img))
+ if (mem_avoid_overlap(&img, &overlap))
continue;
slots_append(img.start);
}
--
2.6.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-05-05 22:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-05-05 22:13 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 0/11] x86/KASLR: Randomize virtual address separately Kees Cook
2016-05-05 22:13 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 01/11] x86/boot: Clean up pointer casting Kees Cook
2016-05-05 22:13 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 02/11] x86/KASLR: Consolidate mem_avoid entries Kees Cook
2016-05-05 22:13 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 03/11] x86/boot: Split out kernel_ident_mapping_init Kees Cook
2016-05-05 22:13 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 04/11] x86/KASLR: Build identity mappings on demand Kees Cook
2016-05-06 7:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2016-05-06 17:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-05-05 22:13 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 05/11] x86/KASLR: Add slot_area to manage random_addr slots Kees Cook
2016-05-05 22:13 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2016-05-05 22:13 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 07/11] x86/KASLR: Add virtual address choosing function Kees Cook
2016-05-05 22:13 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 08/11] x86/KASLR: Clarify purpose of each get_random_long Kees Cook
2016-05-05 22:13 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 09/11] x86/KASLR: Randomize virtual address separately Kees Cook
2016-05-05 22:13 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 10/11] x86/KASLR: Add physical address randomization >4G Kees Cook
2016-05-06 8:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Baoquan He
2016-05-06 15:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-05-08 9:17 ` Baoquan He
2016-05-05 22:13 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 11/11] x86/KASLR: Allow randomization below load address Kees Cook
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