From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>, Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
lasse.collin@tukaani.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v8 0/4] x86/KASLR: Randomize virtual address separately
Date: Tue, 10 May 2016 10:19:11 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1462900755-20005-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
This is v8 of the last 3 patches from v7, with an additional clean-up for
the pagetable.c code. The rest of the series has landed in -tip.
The patches are:
- 1: Further clean up on pagetable.c.
- 2: Last part of Baoquan's decoupling the physical address and virtual
address randomization of kernel text.
- 3: Remove upper bound on physical address range.
- 4: Remove lower bound on physical address range.
Thanks for putting up with my attempts at this, and for all the review!
Things really do look much cleaner. :)
-Kees
v7->v8:
- extracted identity map initialization function to be part of the
called interface, renamed appropriately to initialize_identity_maps().
- added copyright to pagetable.c for clarity.
- shuffled initialization of mapping_info around again for good measure.
- refactored remaining patches to include call to initialize_identity_maps().
next reply other threads:[~2016-05-10 17:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-05-10 17:19 Kees Cook [this message]
2016-05-10 17:19 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v8 1/4] x86/KASLR: Clarify identity map interface Kees Cook
2016-05-10 17:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Borislav Petkov
2016-05-11 6:24 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-05-11 15:23 ` Kees Cook
2016-05-12 8:30 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-05-12 8:31 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-05-10 17:19 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v8 2/4] x86/KASLR: Randomize virtual address separately Kees Cook
2016-05-10 17:19 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v8 3/4] x86/KASLR: Add physical address randomization >4G Kees Cook
2016-05-10 17:19 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v8 4/4] x86/KASLR: Allow randomization below load address Kees Cook
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