From: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Alex Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 0/2] draft of stack clearing for arm64
Date: Mon, 10 Jul 2017 15:04:41 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1499724283-30719-1-git-send-email-labbott@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2ade4e6b-fb40-091e-28eb-343a08925649@redhat.com>
I made an attempt at implementing stack clearing for arm64 using roughly
the same algorithm as x86. It passes some level of basic tests but it definitely
needs more careful review and thought ("submit early and often").
As an added follow up, self-protection.rst should also be updated with some
details about how stackleak actually works for people who want to follow on
for other arches.
Laura Abbott (2):
stackleak: Update for arm64
arm64: Clear the stack
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 3 ++
arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 3 ++
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 92 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 18 +++++++
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 3 +-
scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins | 5 +-
scripts/gcc-plugins/stackleak_plugin.c | 25 +++++++--
8 files changed, 143 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--
2.7.5
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-07-10 22:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-09 14:30 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v2 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls Alexander Popov
2017-06-09 17:28 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-09 23:00 ` Alexander Popov
2017-06-20 19:20 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-13 21:51 ` Laura Abbott
2017-06-20 11:20 ` Mark Rutland
2017-06-20 14:13 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-06-20 19:11 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-21 9:24 ` Mark Rutland
2017-06-21 15:54 ` Laura Abbott
2017-07-10 22:04 ` Laura Abbott [this message]
2017-07-10 22:04 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 1/2] stackleak: Update for arm64 Laura Abbott
2017-07-10 22:04 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack Laura Abbott
2017-07-11 19:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-07-11 20:04 ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-12 6:01 ` Alexander Popov
2017-07-14 20:51 ` Laura Abbott
2017-07-21 16:56 ` Alexander Popov
2017-07-22 0:23 ` Laura Abbott
2017-07-24 8:19 ` Alexander Popov
2017-07-25 3:34 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-18 8:07 ` Alexander Popov
2017-07-11 22:56 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/2] draft of stack clearing for arm64 Alexander Popov
2017-06-23 22:48 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH RFC v2 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls Tycho Andersen
2017-06-29 21:33 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-29 22:13 ` Tycho Andersen
2017-06-20 9:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Hector Martin "marcan"
2017-06-20 19:07 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-20 20:22 ` Hector Martin "marcan"
2017-06-20 19:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
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