From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Reply-To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Sender: Vasiliy Kulikov Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2011 19:50:58 +0400 From: Vasiliy Kulikov Message-ID: <20110617155058.GB22588@albatros> References: <20110617152912.GA21885@albatros> <4DFB7605.9000909@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <4DFB7605.9000909@redhat.com> Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v1] security: introduce ptrace_task_access_check() To: Eric Paris Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com, "selinux@tycho.nsa.gov Stephen Smalley" , James Morris , Eric Paris , John Johansen , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com List-ID: On Fri, Jun 17, 2011 at 11:43 -0400, Eric Paris wrote: > >Please help me to figure out how such patch should be divided to be > >applied. I think about such scheme: > > > >1) add generic security/* functions. > >2-4) add ptrace_task_access_check() for SMACK, AppArmor and SELinux. > >5) change ptrace_access_check() in security ops and all LSMs to > > ptrace_task_access_check(). > > > >But I'd like to hear maintainers' oppinions not to put useless efforts. > > Not a real review, but I didn't instantly grok the need for the new > cap functions. It is needed because of capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE) and similar inside of ptrace_may_access() implementations. > So maybe that's it's own patch with it's own change > log. After that you should just add the 'parent' task to > ptrace_access_check() and fix all of the LSMs to handle the new > semantics at once. No need to rename the function or do a bunch of > seperate patchs. I thought it would represent function's semantic changes more strongly. > All of us LSM authors can just ACK our little part > and James can take the patch when everyone has their say. I think > that will make history the cleanest..... Great! It would be much simple for me too :) Thanks, -- Vasiliy Kulikov http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments