From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] move RLIMIT_NPROC check from set_user() to do_execve_common()
Date: Thu, 14 Jul 2011 19:55:22 +0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110714155521.GA5024@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110714152233.GA30181@openwall.com>
Solar,
On Thu, Jul 14, 2011 at 19:22 +0400, Solar Designer wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 05:27:23PM +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> > + const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * We check for RLIMIT_NPROC in execve() instead of set_user() because
> > + * too many poorly written programs don't check setuid() return code.
> > + * The check in execve() does the same thing for programs doing
> > + * setuid()+execve(), but without similar security issues.
> > + */
> > + if (atomic_read(&cred->user->processes) > rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) &&
> > + cred->user != INIT_USER) {
> > + retval = -EAGAIN;
> > + goto out_ret;
> > + }
>
> Is cred->user == NULL impossible here? Somehow I had a check for NULL
> here in -ow patches (for older kernels), maybe out of paranoia or maybe
> for specific reasons (I don't recall).
It is not checked in copy_process(), which is the same kind of syscalls,
I don't see how it can be NULL here.
> > +++ b/kernel/sys.c
> > @@ -591,12 +591,6 @@ static int set_user(struct cred *new)
> > if (!new_user)
> > return -EAGAIN;
> >
> > - if (atomic_read(&new_user->processes) >= rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) &&
> > - new_user != INIT_USER) {
> > - free_uid(new_user);
> > - return -EAGAIN;
> > - }
>
> So you're moving the check almost literally. However, I think a similar
> check on fork() also checked "!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
> !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)", and I had this additional check/bypass
> included in -ow patches' execve().
Oh, right. I also noted these cap checks while observing -ow and
-grsecurity patches, but somehow missed them now. As you see, there
already was such inconsistency in setuid() case. I don't know what is a
right way - either copy setuid's blind way or immitate fork's pedantic
checks.
However, I really don't see any need in CAP_SYS_ADMIN check - if it is
to be sure some core system process has not suffocated then it simply
should reset RLIMIT_NPROC and that's all.
Thanks,
--
Vasiliy
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-07-14 15:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-06-12 13:09 [kernel-hardening] RLIMIT_NPROC check in set_user() Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-06 17:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-06 18:01 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-06 18:59 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-07 7:56 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-07 8:19 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-12 13:27 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] move RLIMIT_NPROC check from set_user() to do_execve_common() Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-12 21:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2011-07-12 23:14 ` NeilBrown
2011-07-13 6:31 ` Solar Designer
2011-07-13 7:06 ` NeilBrown
2011-07-13 20:46 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-14 0:11 ` James Morris
2011-07-14 1:27 ` NeilBrown
2011-07-14 15:06 ` Solar Designer
2011-07-15 3:30 ` NeilBrown
2011-07-15 5:35 ` Willy Tarreau
2011-07-15 6:31 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-15 7:06 ` NeilBrown
2011-07-15 7:38 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-15 13:04 ` Solar Designer
2011-07-15 13:58 ` Stephen Smalley
2011-07-15 15:26 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-15 19:54 ` Stephen Smalley
2011-07-21 4:09 ` NeilBrown
2011-07-21 12:48 ` Solar Designer
2011-07-21 18:21 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-21 19:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Solar Designer
2011-07-25 17:14 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-25 23:40 ` Solar Designer
2011-07-26 0:47 ` NeilBrown
2011-07-26 1:16 ` Solar Designer
2011-07-26 4:11 ` NeilBrown
2011-07-26 14:48 ` [kernel-hardening] [patch v2] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-27 2:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " NeilBrown
2011-07-29 7:07 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-29 8:06 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-29 8:11 ` [kernel-hardening] [patch v3] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-29 8:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2011-07-24 14:32 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] " Solar Designer
2011-07-24 18:02 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-14 1:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " KOSAKI Motohiro
2011-07-13 5:36 ` KOSAKI Motohiro
2011-07-14 15:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Solar Designer
2011-07-14 15:55 ` Vasiliy Kulikov [this message]
2011-07-11 16:59 ` [kernel-hardening] RLIMIT_NPROC check in set_user() Solar Designer
2011-07-11 18:56 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-13 9:48 ` Solar Designer
2011-07-14 14:15 ` Solar Designer
2011-07-14 14:27 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-14 15:14 ` Solar Designer
2011-07-14 16:31 ` [kernel-hardening] compile time warnings in libc for setuid() unused result (was: RLIMIT_NPROC check in set_user()) Vasiliy Kulikov
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