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From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] move RLIMIT_NPROC check from set_user() to do_execve_common()
Date: Thu, 14 Jul 2011 19:55:22 +0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110714155521.GA5024@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110714152233.GA30181@openwall.com>

Solar,

On Thu, Jul 14, 2011 at 19:22 +0400, Solar Designer wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 05:27:23PM +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> > +	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> > +
> > +	/*
> > +	 * We check for RLIMIT_NPROC in execve() instead of set_user() because
> > +	 * too many poorly written programs don't check setuid() return code.
> > +	 * The check in execve() does the same thing for programs doing
> > +	 * setuid()+execve(), but without similar security issues.
> > +	 */
> > +	if (atomic_read(&cred->user->processes) > rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) &&
> > +	    cred->user != INIT_USER) {
> > +		retval = -EAGAIN;
> > +		goto out_ret;
> > +	}
> 
> Is cred->user == NULL impossible here?  Somehow I had a check for NULL
> here in -ow patches (for older kernels), maybe out of paranoia or maybe
> for specific reasons (I don't recall).

It is not checked in copy_process(), which is the same kind of syscalls,
I don't see how it can be NULL here.

> > +++ b/kernel/sys.c
> > @@ -591,12 +591,6 @@ static int set_user(struct cred *new)
> >  	if (!new_user)
> >  		return -EAGAIN;
> >  
> > -	if (atomic_read(&new_user->processes) >= rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) &&
> > -			new_user != INIT_USER) {
> > -		free_uid(new_user);
> > -		return -EAGAIN;
> > -	}
> 
> So you're moving the check almost literally.  However, I think a similar
> check on fork() also checked "!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
> !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)", and I had this additional check/bypass
> included in -ow patches' execve().

Oh, right.  I also noted these cap checks while observing -ow and
-grsecurity patches, but somehow missed them now.  As you see, there
already was such inconsistency in setuid() case.  I don't know what is a
right way - either copy setuid's blind way or immitate fork's pedantic
checks.

However, I really don't see any need in CAP_SYS_ADMIN check - if it is
to be sure some core system process has not suffocated then it simply
should reset RLIMIT_NPROC and that's all.


Thanks,

-- 
Vasiliy

  reply	other threads:[~2011-07-14 15:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-06-12 13:09 [kernel-hardening] RLIMIT_NPROC check in set_user() Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-06 17:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-06 18:01   ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-06 18:59     ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-07  7:56       ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-07  8:19         ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-12 13:27           ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] move RLIMIT_NPROC check from set_user() to do_execve_common() Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-12 21:16             ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2011-07-12 23:14               ` NeilBrown
2011-07-13  6:31                 ` Solar Designer
2011-07-13  7:06                   ` NeilBrown
2011-07-13 20:46                     ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-14  0:11                       ` James Morris
2011-07-14  1:27                         ` NeilBrown
2011-07-14 15:06                           ` Solar Designer
2011-07-15  3:30                             ` NeilBrown
2011-07-15  5:35                               ` Willy Tarreau
2011-07-15  6:31                               ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-15  7:06                                 ` NeilBrown
2011-07-15  7:38                                   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-15 13:04                                     ` Solar Designer
2011-07-15 13:58                                     ` Stephen Smalley
2011-07-15 15:26                                       ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-15 19:54                                         ` Stephen Smalley
2011-07-21  4:09                                           ` NeilBrown
2011-07-21 12:48                                             ` Solar Designer
2011-07-21 18:21                                               ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-21 19:39                                                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Solar Designer
2011-07-25 17:14                                                   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-25 23:40                                                     ` Solar Designer
2011-07-26  0:47                                                       ` NeilBrown
2011-07-26  1:16                                                         ` Solar Designer
2011-07-26  4:11                                                           ` NeilBrown
2011-07-26 14:48                                                             ` [kernel-hardening] [patch v2] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-27  2:15                                                               ` [kernel-hardening] " NeilBrown
2011-07-29  7:07                                                                 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-29  8:06                                                               ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-29  8:11                                                                 ` [kernel-hardening] [patch v3] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-29  8:17                                                                   ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2011-07-24 14:32                                               ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] " Solar Designer
2011-07-24 18:02                                                 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-14  1:30                         ` [kernel-hardening] " KOSAKI Motohiro
2011-07-13  5:36             ` KOSAKI Motohiro
2011-07-14 15:22             ` [kernel-hardening] " Solar Designer
2011-07-14 15:55               ` Vasiliy Kulikov [this message]
2011-07-11 16:59       ` [kernel-hardening] RLIMIT_NPROC check in set_user() Solar Designer
2011-07-11 18:56         ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-13  9:48           ` Solar Designer
2011-07-14 14:15             ` Solar Designer
2011-07-14 14:27               ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-14 15:14                 ` Solar Designer
2011-07-14 16:31                   ` [kernel-hardening] compile time warnings in libc for setuid() unused result (was: RLIMIT_NPROC check in set_user()) Vasiliy Kulikov

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