From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2017 12:45:32 +0000 From: Mark Rutland Message-ID: <20170220124531.GH9003@leverpostej> References: <1487498660-16600-1-git-send-email-hoeun.ryu@gmail.com> <1487498660-16600-7-git-send-email-hoeun.ryu@gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC 7/7] arm64: map seperately rodata sections for __ro_mostly_after_init section To: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Hoeun Ryu , Kees Cook , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Laura Abbott , Kefeng Wang , Jeremy Linton , "linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org" List-ID: On Sun, Feb 19, 2017 at 11:35:51AM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > On 19 February 2017 at 10:04, Hoeun Ryu wrote: > > Map rodata sections seperately for the new __ro_mostly_after_init section. > > Attribute of memory for __ro_mostly_after_init section can be changed later > > so we need a dedicated vmalloced region for set_memory_rw/ro api. > While it is correct that you are splitting this into three separate > segments (otherwise we would not be able to change the permissions > later without risking splitting to occur), I think this leads to > unnecessary fragmentation. > > If there is demand for this feature (but you still need to make the > argument for that), I wonder if it wouldn't be sufficient, and much > more straightforward, to redefine the __ro_after_init semantics to > include the kind of subsystem registration and module init context you > are targeting, and implement some hooks to temporarily lift the > __ro_after_init r/o permission restrictions in a controlled manner. >>From a look over the series, I think this is just __write_rarely in disguise. I personally think that we should keep __write_rarely and __ro_after_init separate, the later being a strictly one-shot affair. I had some ideas [1] as to how we could implement __write_rarely without carving up the kernel mapping further (and keeping the RW permissions local to the thread needing it), but I have not had the time to look into that further. Thanks, Mark. [1] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/11/18/3