From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Date: Sat, 25 Feb 2017 01:56:48 -0800 From: Kees Cook Message-ID: <20170225095648.GA4917@beast> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] cgroups: censor kernel pointer in debug files To: Tejun Heo Cc: Li Zefan , Johannes Weiner , cgroups@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com List-ID: As found in grsecurity, this avoids exposing a kernel pointer through the cgroup debug entries. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- kernel/cgroup.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c index 53bbca7c4859..b794bcadefa4 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup.c @@ -6589,7 +6589,7 @@ static int cgroup_css_links_read(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) struct task_struct *task; int count = 0; - seq_printf(seq, "css_set %p\n", cset); + seq_printf(seq, "css_set %pK\n", cset); list_for_each_entry(task, &cset->tasks, cg_list) { if (count++ > MAX_TASKS_SHOWN_PER_CSS) -- 2.7.4 -- Kees Cook Pixel Security