public inbox for kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
To: "Martin Schwidefsky" <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
	"Heiko Carstens" <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	"Thomas Garnier" <thgarnie@google.com>,
	"René Nyffenegger" <mail@renenyffenegger.ch>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Ard Biesheuvel" <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	"Nicolas Pitre" <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>,
	"Petr Mladek" <pmladek@suse.com>,
	"Sebastian Andrzej Siewior" <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
	"Sergey Senozhatsky" <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>,
	"Helge Deller" <deller@gmx.de>, "Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@kernel.org>,
	"John Stultz" <john.stultz@linaro.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Oleg Nesterov" <oleg@redhat.com>,
	"Stephen Smalley" <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	"Pavel Tikhomirov" <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Frederic Weisbecker" <fweisbec@gmail.com>,
	"Stanislav Kinsburskiy" <skinsbursky@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Dmitry Safonov" <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Josh Poimboeuf" <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	"Brian Gerst" <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	"Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@suse.com>,
	"Christian Borntraeger" <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
	"Fenghua Yu" <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	"He Chen" <he.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	"Russell King" <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	"Vladimir Murzin" <vladimir.murzin@arm.com>,
	"Will Deacon" <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	"Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	"Mark Rutland" <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	"James Morse" <james.morse@arm.com>,
	"David A . Long" <dave.long@linaro.org>,
	"Pratyush Anand" <panand@redhat.com>,
	"Laura Abbott" <labbott@redhat.com>,
	"Andre Przywara" <andre.przywara@arm.com>,
	"Chris Metcalf" <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 2/4] x86/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state
Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2017 16:04:59 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170311000501.46607-2-thgarnie@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170311000501.46607-1-thgarnie@google.com>

Implement specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state for user-mode
returns for x86.
---
Based on next-20170308
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                        |  1 +
 arch/x86/entry/common.c                 |  3 +++
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S               | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h | 11 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h        | 11 -----------
 5 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 005df7c825f5..6d48e18e6f09 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ config X86
 	select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_ACPI_PDC		if ACPI
 	select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_PARPORT
 	select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_SERIO
+	select ARCH_NO_SYSCALL_VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_NUMA_BALANCING	if X86_64
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
index 370c42c7f046..525edbb77f03 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <linux/context_tracking.h>
 #include <linux/user-return-notifier.h>
 #include <linux/uprobes.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
 
 #include <asm/desc.h>
 #include <asm/traps.h>
@@ -180,6 +181,8 @@ __visible inline void prepare_exit_to_usermode(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
 	u32 cached_flags;
 
+	verify_pre_usermode_state();
+
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) && WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled()))
 		local_irq_disable();
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index d2b2a2948ffe..04db589be466 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -218,6 +218,25 @@ entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath:
 	testl	$_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, TASK_TI_flags(%r11)
 	jnz	1f
 
+	/*
+	 * Check user-mode state on fast path return, the same check is done
+	 * under the slow path through syscall_return_slowpath.
+	 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
+	call	verify_pre_usermode_state
+#else
+	/*
+	 * Similar to set_fs(USER_DS) in verify_pre_usermode_state without a
+	 * warning.
+	 */
+	movq	PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %rax
+	movq	$TASK_SIZE_MAX, %rcx
+	cmp	%rcx, TASK_addr_limit(%rax)
+	jz	1f
+	movq	%rcx, TASK_addr_limit(%rax)
+1:
+#endif
+
 	LOCKDEP_SYS_EXIT
 	TRACE_IRQS_ON		/* user mode is traced as IRQs on */
 	movq	RIP(%rsp), %rcx
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
index 3a264200c62f..0fbbb79d058c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
@@ -76,4 +76,15 @@ typedef struct { pteval_t pte; } pte_t;
 
 #define EARLY_DYNAMIC_PAGE_TABLES	64
 
+/*
+ * User space process size. 47bits minus one guard page.  The guard
+ * page is necessary on Intel CPUs: if a SYSCALL instruction is at
+ * the highest possible canonical userspace address, then that
+ * syscall will enter the kernel with a non-canonical return
+ * address, and SYSRET will explode dangerously.  We avoid this
+ * particular problem by preventing anything from being mapped
+ * at the maximum canonical address.
+ */
+#define TASK_SIZE_MAX	((_AC(1, UL) << 47) - PAGE_SIZE)
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PGTABLE_64_DEFS_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index f385eca5407a..9bc99d37133e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -829,17 +829,6 @@ static inline void spin_lock_prefetch(const void *x)
 #define KSTK_ESP(task)		(task_pt_regs(task)->sp)
 
 #else
-/*
- * User space process size. 47bits minus one guard page.  The guard
- * page is necessary on Intel CPUs: if a SYSCALL instruction is at
- * the highest possible canonical userspace address, then that
- * syscall will enter the kernel with a non-canonical return
- * address, and SYSRET will explode dangerously.  We avoid this
- * particular problem by preventing anything from being mapped
- * at the maximum canonical address.
- */
-#define TASK_SIZE_MAX	((1UL << 47) - PAGE_SIZE)
-
 /* This decides where the kernel will search for a free chunk of vm
  * space during mmap's.
  */
-- 
2.12.0.246.ga2ecc84866-goog

  reply	other threads:[~2017-03-11  0:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-03-11  0:04 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall Thomas Garnier
2017-03-11  0:04 ` Thomas Garnier [this message]
2017-03-11  9:42   ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 2/4] x86/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state Ingo Molnar
2017-03-13 15:53     ` Thomas Garnier
2017-03-14  0:04     ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-03-14  9:40       ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-03-14 15:17         ` Thomas Garnier
2017-03-14 15:39           ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-03-14 16:29             ` Thomas Garnier
2017-03-14 16:44               ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-03-14 16:51                 ` Thomas Garnier
2017-03-14 17:53                   ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-03-15 17:43                     ` Thomas Garnier
2017-03-22 19:15                       ` Thomas Garnier
2017-03-22 20:21                         ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-03-22 20:41                           ` Thomas Garnier
2017-03-22 20:49                             ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-03-22 21:11                               ` Thomas Garnier
2017-03-14 16:30             ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-03-11  0:05 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 3/4] arm/syscalls: " Thomas Garnier
2017-03-11  0:05 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 4/4] arm64/syscalls: " Thomas Garnier

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20170311000501.46607-2-thgarnie@google.com \
    --to=thgarnie@google.com \
    --cc=JBeulich@suse.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=andre.przywara@arm.com \
    --cc=ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=bigeasy@linutronix.de \
    --cc=borntraeger@de.ibm.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=brgerst@gmail.com \
    --cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
    --cc=cmetcalf@mellanox.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
    --cc=dave.long@linaro.org \
    --cc=deller@gmx.de \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=dsafonov@virtuozzo.com \
    --cc=fenghua.yu@intel.com \
    --cc=fweisbec@gmail.com \
    --cc=he.chen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=james.morse@arm.com \
    --cc=john.stultz@linaro.org \
    --cc=jpoimboe@redhat.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
    --cc=labbott@redhat.com \
    --cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-s390@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux@armlinux.org.uk \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mail@renenyffenegger.ch \
    --cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
    --cc=mingo@kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=nicolas.pitre@linaro.org \
    --cc=oleg@redhat.com \
    --cc=panand@redhat.com \
    --cc=paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=pmladek@suse.com \
    --cc=ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com \
    --cc=riel@redhat.com \
    --cc=schwidefsky@de.ibm.com \
    --cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
    --cc=sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com \
    --cc=skinsbursky@virtuozzo.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
    --cc=vladimir.murzin@arm.com \
    --cc=will.deacon@arm.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox