From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Tue, 23 May 2017 22:10:00 +0200 Message-Id: <20170523200904.090914704@linuxfoundation.org> In-Reply-To: <20170523200856.903752266@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20170523200856.903752266@linuxfoundation.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4.4 094/103] stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canarys random range from 32 bits to 64 bits on 64-bit platforms To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Daniel Micay , Arjan van de Ven , Rik van Riel , Kees Cook , Linus Torvalds , Peter Zijlstra , Thomas Gleixner , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Ingo Molnar List-ID: 4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Daniel Micay commit 5ea30e4e58040cfd6434c2f33dc3ea76e2c15b05 upstream. The stack canary is an 'unsigned long' and should be fully initialized to random data rather than only 32 bits of random data. Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven Acked-by: Rik van Riel Acked-by: Kees Cook Cc: Arjan van Ven Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170504133209.3053-1-danielmicay@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/fork.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_stru set_task_stack_end_magic(tsk); #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR - tsk->stack_canary = get_random_int(); + tsk->stack_canary = get_random_long(); #endif /*