From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: riel@redhat.com Date: Wed, 24 May 2017 11:57:50 -0400 Message-Id: <20170524155751.424-5-riel@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <20170524155751.424-1-riel@redhat.com> References: <20170524155751.424-1-riel@redhat.com> Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/5] arm64: ascii armor the arm64 boot init stack canary To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: danielmicay@gmail.com, tytso@mit.edu, keescook@chromium.org, hpa@zytor.com, luto@amacapital.net, mingo@kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, ysato@users.sourceforge.jp, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com List-ID: From: Rik van Riel Use the ascii-armor canary to prevent unterminated C string overflows from being able to successfully overwrite the canary, even if they somehow obtain the canary value. Inspired by execshield ascii-armor and Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree. Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel --- arch/arm64/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/stackprotector.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/stackprotector.h index fe5e287dc56b..b86a0865ddf1 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/stackprotector.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/stackprotector.h @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void) /* Try to get a semi random initial value. */ get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary)); canary ^= LINUX_VERSION_CODE; + canary &= CANARY_MASK; current->stack_canary = canary; __stack_chk_guard = current->stack_canary; -- 2.9.3