From: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
To: Dan Aloni <dan@kernelim.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 0/5] RFC: Public key encryption of dmesg by the kernel
Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2018 22:57:55 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180118215755.GB17196@amd> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171230175804.7354-1-alonid@gmail.com>
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On Sat 2017-12-30 19:57:59, Dan Aloni wrote:
> From: Dan Aloni <dan@kernelim.com>
>
> Hi All,
>
> There has been a lot of progress in recent times regarding the removal
> of sensitive information from dmesg (pointers, etc.), so I figured - why
> not encrypt it all? However, I have not found any existing discussions
> or references regarding this technical direction.
>
> I am not sure that desktop and power users would like to have their
> kernel message encrypted, but there are scenarios such as in mobile
> devices, where only the developers, makers of devices, may actually
> benefit from access to kernel prints messages, and the users may be
> more protected from exploits.
Yes, we have "TiVo" problem in mobile space, but please no, don't make
it worse.
We should not make it easy for device makers to lock devices down from
their owners.
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-18 21:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-12-30 17:57 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/5] RFC: Public key encryption of dmesg by the kernel Dan Aloni
2017-12-30 17:58 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/5] crypto: fix memory leak in rsa-kcs1pad encryption Dan Aloni
2017-12-30 17:58 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/5] certs: allow in-kernel access of trusted keys Dan Aloni
2017-12-30 18:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Randy Dunlap
2017-12-30 17:58 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/5] kernel/printk: allow kmsg to be encrypted using public key encryption Dan Aloni
2017-12-30 20:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Randy Dunlap
2017-12-30 17:58 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/5] tools: add dmesg decryption program Dan Aloni
2017-12-30 20:20 ` [kernel-hardening] " Randy Dunlap
2017-12-30 17:58 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 5/5] docs: add dmesg encryption doc Dan Aloni
2017-12-30 19:14 ` Boris Lukashev
2017-12-30 19:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Randy Dunlap
2018-01-03 20:21 ` Dan Aloni
2018-01-03 20:45 ` Randy Dunlap
2017-12-30 21:42 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/5] RFC: Public key encryption of dmesg by the kernel Jann Horn
2018-01-03 20:41 ` Dan Aloni
2018-01-18 21:57 ` Pavel Machek [this message]
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