From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.2 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8D43ACA9EB5 for ; Mon, 4 Nov 2019 12:40:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with SMTP id DA8CB222C1 for ; Mon, 4 Nov 2019 12:40:40 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org DA8CB222C1 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=arm.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=kernel-hardening-return-17257-kernel-hardening=archiver.kernel.org@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 16152 invoked by uid 550); 4 Nov 2019 12:40:35 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Received: (qmail 16128 invoked from network); 4 Nov 2019 12:40:34 -0000 Date: Mon, 4 Nov 2019 12:40:18 +0000 From: Mark Rutland To: Sami Tolvanen Cc: Will Deacon , Catalin Marinas , Steven Rostedt , Masami Hiramatsu , Ard Biesheuvel , Dave Martin , Kees Cook , Laura Abbott , Marc Zyngier , Nick Desaulniers , Jann Horn , Miguel Ojeda , Masahiro Yamada , clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 07/17] scs: add support for stack usage debugging Message-ID: <20191104124017.GD45140@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com> References: <20191018161033.261971-1-samitolvanen@google.com> <20191101221150.116536-1-samitolvanen@google.com> <20191101221150.116536-8-samitolvanen@google.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20191101221150.116536-8-samitolvanen@google.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.11.1+11 (2f07cb52) (2018-12-01) On Fri, Nov 01, 2019 at 03:11:40PM -0700, Sami Tolvanen wrote: > Implements CONFIG_DEBUG_STACK_USAGE for shadow stacks. When enabled, > also prints out the highest shadow stack usage per process. > > Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen > --- > kernel/scs.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/kernel/scs.c b/kernel/scs.c > index 7780fc4e29ac..67c43af627d1 100644 > --- a/kernel/scs.c > +++ b/kernel/scs.c > @@ -167,6 +167,44 @@ int scs_prepare(struct task_struct *tsk, int node) > return 0; > } > > +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_STACK_USAGE > +static inline unsigned long scs_used(struct task_struct *tsk) > +{ > + unsigned long *p = __scs_base(tsk); > + unsigned long *end = scs_magic(tsk); > + uintptr_t s = (uintptr_t)p; As previously, please use unsigned long for consistency. > + > + while (p < end && *p) > + p++; I think this is the only place where we legtimately access the shadow call stack directly. When using SCS and KASAN, are the compiler-generated accesses to the SCS instrumented? If not, it might make sense to make this: while (p < end && READ_ONCE_NOCKECK(*p)) ... and poison the allocation from KASAN's PoV, so that we can find unintentional accesses more easily. Mark. > + > + return (uintptr_t)p - s; > +} > + > +static void scs_check_usage(struct task_struct *tsk) > +{ > + static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock); > + static unsigned long highest; > + unsigned long used = scs_used(tsk); > + > + if (used <= highest) > + return; > + > + spin_lock(&lock); > + > + if (used > highest) { > + pr_info("%s: highest shadow stack usage %lu bytes\n", > + __func__, used); > + highest = used; > + } > + > + spin_unlock(&lock); > +} > +#else > +static inline void scs_check_usage(struct task_struct *tsk) > +{ > +} > +#endif > + > bool scs_corrupted(struct task_struct *tsk) > { > return *scs_magic(tsk) != SCS_END_MAGIC; > @@ -181,6 +219,7 @@ void scs_release(struct task_struct *tsk) > return; > > WARN_ON(scs_corrupted(tsk)); > + scs_check_usage(tsk); > > scs_account(tsk, -1); > task_set_scs(tsk, NULL); > -- > 2.24.0.rc1.363.gb1bccd3e3d-goog >