From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.4 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_MED,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 73BC6C4CECC for ; Mon, 27 Apr 2020 20:46:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with SMTP id C8B672070B for ; Mon, 27 Apr 2020 20:46:13 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com header.i=@google.com header.b="vr00ZiG5" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org C8B672070B Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=reject dis=none) header.from=google.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=kernel-hardening-return-18658-kernel-hardening=archiver.kernel.org@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 28525 invoked by uid 550); 27 Apr 2020 20:46:06 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Received: (qmail 28502 invoked from network); 27 Apr 2020 20:46:05 -0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references:mime-version :content-disposition:in-reply-to; bh=Bcag0IOMjkeMKf6Qdaig8RmUgJulOZ6Dwcg/kc7mWuw=; b=vr00ZiG50BbHCZgiGhKzUig8ebmcxwNyAuSZDS9Fy9++/+lBSJLPHB5VE0jqKA8VVp g5hGQKYr39R1dLfLNK2DxhYc//BK+yuzOcm5KbUsvU99ovE352pXh2+A8+7w7icg/xqJ RQwcjXxsQigIv1hDNScho2GwzEDFZfzHHQaRH/4pVYxLOayrJSWaOEVPwPB4xxrhdIoU RiQO1uExeEqZgKgR01+xq+u4cWEz7Wt1sbzS+NfXx7/JhBbJnsVGfWrstDJ129Ge1XMZ SuSTWs1W3SCWz53yl1fhzUC1dT7hlEqmdxcZgxuyk4Ah4zyhUKRpkoeUu5rKpqLSHkg7 Q6QA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references :mime-version:content-disposition:in-reply-to; bh=Bcag0IOMjkeMKf6Qdaig8RmUgJulOZ6Dwcg/kc7mWuw=; b=iKJJBpL+d0qNUotKNXnd1yIrN52IX+bX2gcGYHfvCF/6Ma9y5BspkhzasRG9CyktKO wNWN0mOfi4cGZmErTtuBDqL4eb4LxYq1MAQE3MGUTBYgs679W8FWJNP2cmSYVj7MB4Gr 5cyIIHU8nmUIPBb+kU0ZyjKXGHAbso+97oXkbn6DhOi3BoGr4IJ6HDfMSZpeLSgQ7ALV R1zN3G7y3tDZrJxgpmcyO5VH4xmBXbLJ92v8IvI3WU2ZaUuRUZA5LrTC6udubnxlehdW m29Clyaf9zYiWYJ+NZYac0gmTZgGmk7nZ2wrUgWBFhJwVqa6kA1sFd2nXlHuB3FTATDI FyUw== X-Gm-Message-State: AGi0PuZuZ80gDfAGoxGS4B+NjFRK8GzmeZS2OTSAcVj+Efq5YUtjj0vN kCpWSFXgP15UMAuaSMOH8vvtEw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APiQypIdmfjwcDuAuA2SB4pP8kr68I93NPWhf6BxSPVcCeqZMEvirYIWHKdGIJ3TN8iKQ9IKNzr4sA== X-Received: by 2002:aa7:9218:: with SMTP id 24mr25789630pfo.312.1588020353394; Mon, 27 Apr 2020 13:45:53 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2020 13:45:46 -0700 From: Sami Tolvanen To: Will Deacon Cc: Kees Cook , Catalin Marinas , James Morse , Steven Rostedt , Ard Biesheuvel , Mark Rutland , Masahiro Yamada , Michal Marek , Ingo Molnar , Peter Zijlstra , Juri Lelli , Vincent Guittot , Dave Martin , Laura Abbott , Marc Zyngier , Masami Hiramatsu , Nick Desaulniers , Jann Horn , Miguel Ojeda , clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 01/12] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS) Message-ID: <20200427204546.GA80713@google.com> References: <20191018161033.261971-1-samitolvanen@google.com> <20200416161245.148813-1-samitolvanen@google.com> <20200416161245.148813-2-samitolvanen@google.com> <20200420171727.GB24386@willie-the-truck> <20200420211830.GA5081@google.com> <20200422173938.GA3069@willie-the-truck> <20200422235134.GA211149@google.com> <202004231121.A13FDA100@keescook> <20200424112113.GC21141@willie-the-truck> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20200424112113.GC21141@willie-the-truck> On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 12:21:14PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote: > Also, since you mentioned the lack of redzoning, isn't it a bit dodgy > allocating blindly out of the kmem_cache? It means we don't have a redzone > or a guard page, so if you can trigger something like a recursion bug then > could you scribble past the SCS before the main stack overflows? Would this > clobber somebody else's SCS? I agree that allocating from a kmem_cache isn't ideal for safety. It's a compromise to reduce memory overhead. > The vmap version that I asked Sami to drop > is at least better in this regard, although the guard page is at the wrong > end of the stack and we just hope that the allocation below us didn't pass > VM_NO_GUARD. Looks like the same story for vmap stack :/ SCS grows up and the guard page is after the allocation, so how is it at the wrong end? Am I missing something here? > If we split the pointer in two (base, offset) then we could leave the > base live in the thread_info, not require alignment of the stacks (which > may allow for unconditional redzoning?) and then just update the offset > value on context switch, which could be trivially checked as part of the > existing stack overflow checking on kernel entry. I sent out v13 with split pointers, but I'm not sure it's convenient to add an overflow check to kernel_ventry where the VMAP_STACK check is done. I suppose I could add a check to kernel_entry after we load x18 from tsk. Thoughts? Sami