From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 07CE2C433E1 for ; Wed, 26 Aug 2020 19:40:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with SMTP id 4EEE22076C for ; Wed, 26 Aug 2020 19:40:47 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=chromium.org header.i=@chromium.org header.b="CCtjUjay" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 4EEE22076C Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=chromium.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=kernel-hardening-return-19666-kernel-hardening=archiver.kernel.org@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 28634 invoked by uid 550); 26 Aug 2020 19:40:40 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Received: (qmail 28613 invoked from network); 26 Aug 2020 19:40:39 -0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references:mime-version :content-disposition:in-reply-to; bh=OG8uhnCA9kG3csdFryFQgnoVrLmqM/Aisjk2iXjlTO4=; b=CCtjUjayr/qntPIykQMCTBeZZeCK50TmOXnltMMVDBp3CR9A65E334WHfJcIaB+qj5 lM0Ab5TQ23N8QqsdlltlQODO+OGXq6MmQcJBd+tA7A5w2hgKBd/HXsYX/JCZnPLsvU76 Fc4t/yR7DlFMji9jHEtdubrTqLh5q1Ob78A9U= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references :mime-version:content-disposition:in-reply-to; bh=OG8uhnCA9kG3csdFryFQgnoVrLmqM/Aisjk2iXjlTO4=; b=l9x+ztjS4vVBFux8DI260/Zs3TsiZFJmn0eWnCY9HS0ntrlFs3F8PzsDVrsmQDUTbu LAC26jppjWZAaJ2hXTOoxaMPnzSSUv0tJzxNU0v/XEJ0N0fOLO2jSCE7W9BOmWzaRwgl 0lUwniDjwZ8Bd3s09WcVDpAqCNJdHoTHS34m0TcTfcgPmCtWIDPKjSoyzVCE45L+Bx3p lHIlGJcMKGMIZWA/ThmscRuUKOpoCzRRcyOjOtXQpn5A1C/l6GBLdODAPouGdJJaH/7E 25AVJUbJArIbhLUs+Ohu25LY+loWfTobpu9ZveXs+AtIHVHGKLzUWwzdr/8nCqJnG4DM ruoA== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530zoWcmX0SAjw1cB/F56p4CtH7cSVpPfzzWeAw7R5DM9djxKlty 7J8+UJhmPkfxK3vWmIUB+tqkoA== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJwoFPtYUC9LMuzuxI/JkcSQzWHlHT55l/323/HECz8Y1hZ6XBGrFMmE05TvFRpD7eDwLUE2Aw== X-Received: by 2002:a63:516:: with SMTP id 22mr12143709pgf.316.1598470827209; Wed, 26 Aug 2020 12:40:27 -0700 (PDT) Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2020 12:40:24 -0700 From: Kees Cook To: Jens Axboe Cc: Stefano Garzarella , Christian Brauner , Jann Horn , Jeff Moyer , Linux FS Devel , Sargun Dhillon , Alexander Viro , Kernel Hardening , Stefan Hajnoczi , kernel list , Aleksa Sarai , io-uring Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/3] io_uring: add restrictions to support untrusted applications and guests Message-ID: <202008261237.904C1E6@keescook> References: <20200813153254.93731-1-sgarzare@redhat.com> <82061082-42c8-1e1c-1f36-6f42e7dd10cb@kernel.dk> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <82061082-42c8-1e1c-1f36-6f42e7dd10cb@kernel.dk> On Wed, Aug 26, 2020 at 10:47:36AM -0600, Jens Axboe wrote: > On 8/25/20 9:20 AM, Stefano Garzarella wrote: > > Hi Jens, > > this is a gentle ping. > > > > I'll respin, using memdup_user() for restriction registration. > > I'd like to get some feedback to see if I should change anything else. > > > > Do you think it's in good shape? > > As far as I'm concerned, this is fine. But I want to make sure that Kees > is happy with it, as he's the one that's been making noise on this front. Oop! Sorry, I didn't realize this was blocked on me. Once I saw how orthogonal io_uring was to "regular" process trees, I figured this series didn't need seccomp input. (I mean, I am still concerned about attack surface reduction, but that seems like a hard problem given io_uring's design -- it is, however, totally covered by the LSMs, so I'm satisfied from that perspective.) I'll go review... thanks for the poke. :) -- Kees Cook