[PATCH v6 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall

Kees Cook
2021-03-15T18:03:09Z

v6:
- rearrange jump_label and init_on_* changes (akpm)
- add slab init_on_* static branches (andreyknvl)
v5: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210309214301.678739-1-keescook@chromium.org/
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200622193146.2985288-1-keescook@chromium.org/
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200406231606.37619-1-keescook@chromium.org/
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200324203231.64324-1-keescook@chromium.org/
rfc: https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20190329081358.30497-1-elena.reshetova@intel.com/

Hi,

This is a continuation and refactoring of Elena's earlier effort to add
kernel stack base offset randomization. In the time since the earlier
discussions, two attacks[1][2] were made public that depended on stack
determinism, so we're no longer in the position of "this is a good idea
but we have no examples of attacks". :)

Earlier discussions also devolved into debates on entropy sources, which
is mostly a red herring, given the already low entropy available due
to stack size. Regardless, entropy can be changed/improved separately
from this series as needed.

Earlier discussions also got stuck debating how much syscall overhead
was too much, but this is also a red herring since the feature itself
needs to be selectable at boot with no cost for those that don't want it:
this is solved here with static branches.

So, here is the latest improved version, made as arch-agnostic as
possible, with usage added for x86 and arm64. It also includes some small
static branch clean ups, and addresses some surprise performance issues
due to the stack canary[3].

At the very least, the first two patches can land separately (already
Acked and Reviewed), since they're kind of "separate", but introduce
macros that are used in the core stack changes.

If I can get an Ack from an arm64 maintainer, I think this could all
land via -tip to make merging easiest.

Thanks!

-Kees

[1] https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2020/02/15/CVE-2019-18683.html
[2] https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/bitstream/10216/125357/2/374717.pdf
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202003281520.A9BFF461@keescook/

Kees Cook (6):
jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults
init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches
stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets

.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 +++++
Makefile | 4 ++
arch/Kconfig | 23 ++++++++++
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 5 +++
arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c | 10 +++++
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/x86/entry/common.c | 3 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h | 8 ++++
drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c | 17 ++++++++
drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c | 1 +
drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h | 1 +
include/linux/jump_label.h | 19 +++++++++
include/linux/mm.h | 10 +++--
include/linux/randomize_kstack.h | 42 +++++++++++++++++++
init/main.c | 23 ++++++++++
mm/page_alloc.c | 4 +-
mm/slab.h | 6 ++-
18 files changed, 181 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 include/linux/randomize_kstack.h

--
2.25.1