messages from 2011-12-11 18:28:21 to 2012-02-24 00:56:13 UTC [more...]
[kernel-hardening] procfs: infoleaks and DAC permissions
2012-02-24 0:56 UTC (14+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v10 01/11] sk_run_filter: add support for custom load_pointer
2012-02-23 22:36 UTC (51+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v10 02/11] seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v10 03/11] asm/syscall.h: add syscall_get_arch
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v11 "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v10 04/11] arch/x86: add syscall_get_arch to syscall.h
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v10 05/11] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v10 06/11] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v10 07/11] signal, x86: add SIGSYS info and make it synchronous
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v10 08/11] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v10 09/11] ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP support
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v10 10/11] x86: Enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v10 11/11] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] fs: hardlink creation restriction cleanup
2012-02-22 19:10 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] fs: hardlink creation restriction cleanup
2012-02-22 18:55 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] fs: hardlink creation restrictions
2012-02-21 23:22 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Gmane archive, RSS feeds
2012-02-21 17:56 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] fs: hardlink creation restrictions
2012-02-20 8:22 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2012.2] fs: symlink restrictions on sticky directories
2012-02-19 12:31 UTC (8+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Add overflow protection to kref
2012-02-18 16:35 UTC (19+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [ubuntu-hardened] "
[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v8 1/8] sk_run_filter: add support for custom load_pointer
2012-02-17 4:51 UTC (36+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v8 5/8] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v9 "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v9 8/8] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] Yama: add PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY
2012-02-15 23:41 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v7 4/8] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
2012-02-11 20:33 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v10 0/2] security: Yama LSM
2012-02-09 22:36 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] security: create task_free security callback
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] security: Yama LSM
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v10 0/2] "
[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3] sysctl: control functionality of /proc/pid/mem
2012-01-31 19:22 UTC (4+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2012.1] fs: symlink restrictions on sticky directories
2012-01-06 18:44 UTC (21+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v9 0/2] security: Yama LSM
2011-12-21 20:18 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] security: create task_free security callback
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] security: Yama LSM
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v8 0/2] security: Yama LSM
2011-12-20 5:36 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] security: create task_free security callback
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] security: Yama LSM
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2011.2] fs: symlink restrictions on sticky directories
2011-12-15 7:06 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2011.3] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2011.2] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 -next] proc: fix task_struct memleak
2011-12-12 11:36 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH -next] proc: fix task_struct infoleak
2011-12-12 11:31 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
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