messages from 2013-04-04 21:00:03 to 2013-09-27 08:34:35 UTC [more...]
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/12] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred
2013-09-27 8:34 UTC (18+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 01/12] procfs: add proc_same_open_cred() to check if the cred have changed
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 02/12] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 03/12] procfs: Document the proposed solution to protect procfs entries
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 04/12] seq_file: Make seq_file able to access the file's opener cred
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 05/12] seq_file: set the seq_file->f_cred during seq_open()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 06/12] procfs: make /proc/*/stack 0400
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 07/12] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/stack
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 08/12] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/personality
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 09/12] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/stat
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 10/12] procfs: move PROC_BLOCK_SIZE declaration up to make it visible
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 11/12] procfs: improve permission checks on /proc/*/syscall
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 12/12] user_ns: seq_file: use the user_ns that is embedded in the f_cred struct
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality}
2013-09-12 1:23 UTC (21+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/pagemap
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality}
[kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC] KPortReserve : kernel version of portreserve utility
2013-08-11 2:50 UTC (4+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [ANNOUNCE] Linux Security Summit 2013 - CFP
2013-06-12 16:45 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 0/6] kernel ASLR
2013-04-29 19:15 UTC (22+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/6] x86: kaslr: move ELF relocation handling to C
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/6] x86: kaslr: move CPU flags out of cpucheck
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/6] x86: kaslr: return location from decompress_kernel
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] x86: kaslr: select random base offset
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 5/6] x86: kaslr: select memory region from e820 maps
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 6/6] x86: kaslr: report kernel offset on panic
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 0/6] kernel ASLR
2013-04-26 18:53 UTC (13+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/6] x86: kaslr: move ELF relocation handling to C
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/6] x86: kaslr: move CPU flags out of cpucheck
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/6] x86: kaslr: return location from decompress_kernel
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] x86: kaslr: select random base offset
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 5/6] x86: kaslr: select memory region from e820 maps
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 6/6] x86: kaslr: report kernel offset on panic
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 0/6] kernel ASLR
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] x86: kaslr: move ELF relocation handling to C
2013-04-22 17:59 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/6] kernel ASLR
2013-04-16 22:39 UTC (35+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/6] x86: relocs: generalize Elf structure names
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/6] x86: relocs: consolidate processing logic
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/6] x86: relocs: add 64-bit ELF support to relocs tool
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] x86: relocs: build separate 32/64-bit tools
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 5/6] x86: kaslr: routines to choose random base offset
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 6/6] x86: kaslr: relocate base offset at boot
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] kernel ASLR
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/3] kernel ASLR
2013-04-11 21:28 UTC (53+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/3] x86: routines to choose random kernel base offset
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/3] x86: build reloc tool for both 64 and 32 bit
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/3] x86: kernel base offset ASLR
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 0/3] kernel ASLR
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3] x86: use a read-only IDT alias on all CPUs
2013-04-11 13:03 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] x86: make IDT read-only
2013-04-10 18:28 UTC (32+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Readonly GDT
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [Xen-devel] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] x86: use fixed read-only IDT
2013-04-10 0:29 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Security vulnerability tools
2013-04-08 5:37 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
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