messages from 2015-12-10 19:38:38 to 2016-01-08 15:36:54 UTC [more...]
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 00/13] arm64: implement support for KASLR
2016-01-08 15:36 UTC (49+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 01/13] of/fdt: make memblock minimum physical address arch configurable
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 02/13] arm64: introduce KIMAGE_VADDR as the virtual base of the kernel region
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 03/13] arm64: use more granular reservations for static page table allocations
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 04/13] arm64: decouple early fixmap init from linear mapping
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 05/13] arm64: kvm: deal with kernel symbols outside of "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 06/13] arm64: move kernel image to base of vmalloc area
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 07/13] arm64: add support for module PLTs
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 08/13] arm64: use relative references in exception tables
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 09/13] arm64: avoid R_AARCH64_ABS64 relocations for Image header fields
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 10/13] arm64: avoid dynamic relocations in early boot code
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 11/13] arm64: allow kernel Image to be loaded anywhere in physical memory
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 12/13] arm64: add support for relocatable kernel
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 13/13] arm64: efi: invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to supply KASLR randomness
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 00/13] arm64: implement support for KASLR
[kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX
2016-01-08 14:07 UTC (42+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 1/7] mm/slab_common.c: Add common support for slab saniziation
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 2/7] slub: Add support for sanitization
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 3/7] slab: "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 4/7] slob: "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 5/7] mm: Mark several cases as SLAB_NO_SANITIZE
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 7/7] lkdtm: Add READ_AFTER_FREE test
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX
[kernel-hardening] Introduction and task request
2016-01-06 0:11 UTC (5+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] ARM: mm: flip priority of CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
2016-01-04 22:07 UTC (15+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 00/10] arm64: implement support for KASLR
2016-01-04 12:31 UTC (19+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 01/10] arm64: introduce KIMAGE_VADDR as the virtual base of the kernel region
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 02/10] arm64: use more granular reservations for static page table allocations
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 03/10] arm64: decouple early fixmap init from linear mapping
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 04/10] arm64: move kernel image to base of vmalloc area
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 05/10] arm64: add support for module PLTs
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 06/10] arm64: use relative references in exception tables
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 07/10] arm64: use assembly time constants for Image header fields
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 08/10] arm64: avoid dynamic relocations in early boot code
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 09/10] arm64: add support for relocatable kernel
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 10/10] arm64: efi: invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to supply KASLR randomness
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC PATCH 00/10] arm64: implement support for KASLR
[kernel-hardening] You guys are busy!
2015-12-23 21:23 UTC
[kernel-hardening] Introduction
2015-12-18 21:11 UTC (7+ messages)
[kernel-hardening][RFC PATCH v2 00/12] Add PAX_REFCOUNT overflow protection
2015-12-18 2:59 UTC (22+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening][RFC PATCH v2 01/12] x86: add PAX_REFCOUNT support
` [kernel-hardening][RFC PATCH v2 02/12] percpu_ref: decrease per-CPU refcount bias
` [kernel-hardening][RFC PATCH v2 03/12] kernel: opt out of PAX_REFCOUNT protection
` [kernel-hardening][RFC PATCH v2 04/12] mm: "
` [kernel-hardening][RFC PATCH v2 05/12] fs: "
` [kernel-hardening][RFC PATCH v2 06/12] net: "
` [kernel-hardening][RFC PATCH v2 07/12] security: "
` [kernel-hardening][RFC PATCH v2 08/12] drivers: opt out of PAX_REFCOUNT protection (1 of 2)
` [kernel-hardening][RFC PATCH v2 09/12] drivers: opt out of PAX_REFCOUNT protection (2 "
` [kernel-hardening][RFC PATCH v2 10/12] pax: opt out of PAX_REFCOUNT protection
` [kernel-hardening][RFC PATCH v2 11/12] security: add Kconfig options for PAX_REFCOUNT
` [kernel-hardening][RFC PATCH v2 12/12] lkdtm: add test for atomic_t underflow/overflow
[kernel-hardening][RFC PATCH 0/5] Add PAX_REFCOUNT overflow protection
2015-12-17 21:55 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening][RFC PATCH 1/5] x86: add PAX_REFCOUNT support
` [kernel-hardening][RFC PATCH 2/5] percpu_ref: decrease per-CPU refcount bias
` [kernel-hardening][RFC PATCH 4/5] security: add Kconfig options for PAX_REFCOUNT
` [kernel-hardening][RFC PATCH 5/5] lkdtm: add test for atomic_t underflow/overflow
[kernel-hardening][RFC PATCH v2 12/12] lkdtm: add test for atomic_t underflow/overflow
2015-12-17 20:34 UTC
[kernel-hardening] Looking at PAX_MEMORY_SANITIZE
2015-12-17 20:27 UTC (7+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] Project convention on configuration options
2015-12-13 16:36 UTC (12+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] Self Introduction
2015-12-12 11:40 UTC (22+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 0/8] introduce post-init read-only memory
2015-12-11 21:20 UTC (8+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 2/8] lib: add "on" and "off" to strtobool
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 8/8] x86, vdso: mark vDSO read-only after init
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 0/4] arm: Privileged no-access for LPAE
2015-12-11 17:21 UTC (2+ messages)
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