messages from 2016-01-11 13:18:55 to 2016-01-25 23:33:28 UTC [more...]
[kernel-hardening] For whoever's looking at memory santizing
2016-01-25 23:33 UTC (4+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/2] sysctl: allow CLONE_NEWUSER to be disabled
2016-01-25 22:34 UTC (30+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] sysctl: expand use of proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] sysctl: allow CLONE_NEWUSER to be disabled
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 0/2] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 0/3] Sanitization of buddy pages
2016-01-25 22:05 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 1/3] mm/debug-pagealloc.c: Split out page poisoning from debug page_alloc
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 2/3] mm/page_poison.c: Enable PAGE_POISONING as a separate option
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 3/3] mm/page_poisoning.c: Allow for zero poisoning
[kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 0/1] Adding previous syscall context to seccomp
2016-01-25 11:51 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 1/1] seccomp: provide information about the previous syscall
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 0/2] SROP Mitigation
2016-01-24 8:12 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 1/2] SROP Mitigation: Architecture independent code for signal cookies
2016-01-24 7:59 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 2/2] x86: SROP mitigation: implement "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 0/8] introduce post-init read-only memory
2016-01-23 9:49 UTC (18+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 1/8] asm-generic: consolidate mark_rodata_ro()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 2/8] lib: add "on" and "off" to strtobool
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 3/8] param: convert some "on"/"off" users "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 4/8] init: create cmdline param to disable readonly
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 5/8] x86: make CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA non-optional
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 6/8] introduce post-init read-only memory
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 7/8] lkdtm: verify that __ro_after_init works correctly
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 8/8] x86, vdso: mark vDSO read-only after init
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] status: GRKERNSEC_KSTACKOVERFLOW
2016-01-22 22:04 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 00/21] arm64: implement support for KASLR
2016-01-22 17:19 UTC (67+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 02/21] arm64: introduce KIMAGE_VADDR as the virtual base of the kernel region
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 03/21] arm64: pgtable: add dummy pud_index() and pmd_index() definitions
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 04/21] arm64: decouple early fixmap init from linear mapping
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 05/21] arm64: kvm: deal with kernel symbols outside of "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 06/21] arm64: pgtable: implement static [pte|pmd|pud]_offset variants
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 07/21] arm64: move kernel image to base of vmalloc area
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 08/21] arm64: add support for module PLTs
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 09/21] extable: add support for relative extables to search and sort routines
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 10/21] arm64: switch to relative exception tables
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 11/21] arm64: avoid R_AARCH64_ABS64 relocations for Image header fields
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 12/21] arm64: avoid dynamic relocations in early boot code
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 13/21] arm64: allow kernel Image to be loaded anywhere in physical memory
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 14/21] arm64: redefine SWAPPER_TABLE_SHIFT for use in asm code
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 14/21] arm64: [re]define SWAPPER_TABLE_[SHIFT|SIZE] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 15/21] arm64: split elf relocs into a separate header
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 16/21] scripts/sortextable: add support for ET_DYN binaries
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 17/21] arm64: add support for a relocatable kernel and KASLR
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 18/21] efi: stub: implement efi_get_random_bytes() based on EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 19/21] efi: stub: add implementation of efi_random_alloc()
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 20/21] efi: stub: use high allocation for converted command line
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 21/21] arm64: efi: invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to supply KASLR randomness
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 00/21] arm64: implement support for KASLR
[kernel-hardening] 2015 kernel CVEs
2016-01-21 18:46 UTC (26+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX
2016-01-21 15:39 UTC (11+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening][RFC PATCH v2 00/12] Add PAX_REFCOUNT overflow protection
2016-01-21 12:45 UTC (8+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] Understanding the JIT Hardening feature
2016-01-20 0:44 UTC (4+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] Still working on PAX_USERCOPY
2016-01-19 23:59 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Proposal for kernel self protection features
2016-01-19 23:08 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC] kernel/panic: place an upper limit on number of oopses
2016-01-17 3:58 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Self Introduction
2016-01-14 11:11 UTC (16+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] Introduction and task request
2016-01-12 3:15 UTC (8+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/2] Document and extend kernel.perf_event_paranoid
2016-01-11 15:23 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] Documentation,perf: Document the perf sysctls
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open
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