messages from 2016-06-17 20:00:44 to 2016-06-26 21:55:33 UTC [more...]
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 00/29] virtually mapped stacks and thread_info cleanup
2016-06-26 21:55 UTC (12+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 01/29] bluetooth: Switch SMP to crypto_cipher_encrypt_one()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 02/29] rxrpc: Avoid using stack memory in SG lists in rxkad
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 03/29] x86/mm/hotplug: Don't remove PGD entries in remove_pagetable()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 04/29] x86/cpa: In populate_pgd, don't set the pgd entry until it's populated
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 05/29] x86/mm: Remove kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd() and efi_cleanup_page_tables()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 06/29] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in KiB instead of number of stacks
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 07/29] mm: Fix memcg stack accounting for sub-page stacks
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 08/29] dma-api: Teach the "DMA-from-stack" check about vmapped stacks
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 09/29] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 10/29] x86/die: Don't try to recover from an OOPS on a non-default stack
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 11/29] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 00/16] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core)
2016-06-26 16:59 UTC (28+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 01/16] bluetooth: Switch SMP to crypto_cipher_encrypt_one()
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 02/16] rxrpc: Avoid using stack memory in SG lists in rxkad
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 03/16] x86/mm/hotplug: Don't remove PGD entries in remove_pagetable()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 04/16] x86/cpa: In populate_pgd, don't set the pgd entry until it's populated
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 05/16] x86/mm: Remove kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd() and efi_cleanup_page_tables()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 06/16] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in KiB instead of number of stacks
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 07/16] mm: Fix memcg stack accounting for sub-page stacks
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 08/16] dma-api: Teach the "DMA-from-stack" check about vmapped stacks
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 09/16] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 10/16] x86/die: Don't try to recover from an OOPS on a non-default stack
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 11/16] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 12/16] x86/dumpstack: When dumping stack bytes due to OOPS, start with regs->sp
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 13/16] x86/dumpstack: Try harder to get a call trace on stack overflow
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 14/16] x86/dumpstack/64: Handle faults when printing the "Stack:" part of an OOPS
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 15/16] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 16/16] x86/mm: Improve stack-overflow #PF handling
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] Add support for complex gcc plugins that don't fit in a single file
2016-06-26 15:38 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] Automate make rule generation for gcc plugin objects
2016-06-26 15:36 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] powerpc/kernel: Disable the latent entropy plugin unconditionally
2016-06-26 15:34 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [RFC] reference count hardening via kref: another attempt
2016-06-26 4:07 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC] kref: pin objects with dangerously high reference count
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC] reference count hardening via kref: another attempt
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core)
2016-06-26 1:23 UTC (85+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 01/13] x86/mm/hotplug: Don't remove PGD entries in remove_pagetable()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 02/13] x86/cpa: In populate_pgd, don't set the pgd entry until it's populated
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 03/13] x86/mm: Remove kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd() and efi_cleanup_page_tables()
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 04/13] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in KiB instead of number of stacks
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 05/13] mm: Fix memcg stack accounting for sub-page stacks
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 07/13] x86/die: Don't try to recover from an OOPS on a non-default stack
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 08/13] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 09/13] x86/dumpstack: When dumping stack bytes due to OOPS, start with regs->sp
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 10/13] x86/dumpstack: Try harder to get a call trace on stack overflow
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 11/13] x86/dumpstack/64: Handle faults when printing the "Stack:" part of an OOPS
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 12/13] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 13/13] x86/mm: Improve stack-overflow #PF handling
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core)
[kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH v2 0/4] mm: Hardened usercopy
2016-06-24 20:59 UTC (11+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/4] mm: disallow user copy to/from separately allocated pages
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH v2 "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 0/9] x86/mm: memory area address KASLR
2016-06-24 20:40 UTC (25+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 1/9] x86/mm: Refactor KASLR entropy functions
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 2/9] x86/mm: Update physical mapping variable names (x86_64)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 3/9] x86/mm: PUD VA support for physical mapping (x86_64)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 4/9] x86/mm: Separate variable for trampoline PGD (x86_64)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 5/9] x86/mm: Implement ASLR for kernel memory regions (x86_64)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 6/9] x86/mm: Enable KASLR for physical mapping memory region (x86_64)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 7/9] x86/mm: Enable KASLR for vmalloc "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 8/9] x86/mm: Enable KASLR for vmemmap "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 9/9] x86/mm: Memory hotplug support for KASLR memory randomization (x86_64)
` [kernel-hardening] devicetree random-seed properties, was: "Re: [PATCH v7 0/9] x86/mm: memory area address KASLR"
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 0/4] Introduce the latent_entropy gcc plugin
2016-06-21 18:40 UTC (8+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 1/4] Add support for passing gcc plugin arguments
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 2/4] Add the latent_entropy gcc plugin
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 3/4] Mark functions with the latent_entropy attribute
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 4/4] Add the extra_latent_entropy kernel parameter
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 0/4] Introduce the latent_entropy gcc plugin
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core)
2016-06-21 17:01 UTC (25+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 03/13] x86/cpa: Warn if kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd is used inappropriately
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 04/13] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in KiB instead of number of stacks
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 05/13] mm: Move memcg stack accounting to account_kernel_stack
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 08/13] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 09/13] x86/dumpstack: When dumping stack bytes due to OOPS, start with regs->sp
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 10/13] x86/dumpstack: Try harder to get a call trace on stack overflow
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 11/13] x86/dumpstack/64: Handle faults when printing the "Stack:" part of an OOPS
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 12/13] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 13/13] x86/mm: Improve stack-overflow #PF handling
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core)
2016-06-20 7:07 UTC (8+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH] gcc-plugins: abort builds cleanly when not supported
2016-06-19 18:44 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] latent_entropy: provide userspace visibility
2016-06-18 18:03 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] kbuild: no gcc-plugins during cc-option tests
2016-06-18 18:01 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/2] Document and extend kernel.perf_event_paranoid
2016-06-18 0:51 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open
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