messages from 2017-03-11 00:05:01 to 2017-03-31 15:34:14 UTC [more...]
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall
2017-03-31 15:34 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 2/4] x86/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 3/4] arm/syscalls: "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 4/4] arm64/syscalls: "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC 0/4] proc: support multiple separate proc instances per pidnamespace
2017-03-31 11:45 UTC (12+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC 1/4] proc: add proc_fs_info struct to store proc options
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC 2/4] proc: add helpers to set/get hidepid and gid mount options
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC 3/4] proc: support mounting new procfs instances inside same pid namespace
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC 4/4] proc: support flushing dcache entries of a task on multiple procfs mounts
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH RFC 0/4] proc: support multiple separate proc instances per pidnamespace
[kernel-hardening] [RFCv2] arm64: support HAVE_ARCH_RARE_WRITE and HAVE_ARCH_RARE_WRITE_MEMCPY
2017-03-31 9:25 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] x86/fpu: move FPU state into separate cache
2017-03-31 5:57 UTC (13+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 0/2] provide check for ro_after_init memory sections
2017-03-31 3:09 UTC (10+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 1/2] module: verify address is read-only
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 2/2] extable: "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 0/3] arm64: usercopy: Implement stack frame object validation
2017-03-30 19:54 UTC (8+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 3/3] arm64/uaccess: Add hardened usercopy check for bad stack accesses
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 0/3] arm64: usercopy: Implement stack frame object validation
[kernel-hardening] [RFC v2] Introduce rare_write() infrastructure
2017-03-30 17:02 UTC (21+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2][PATCH 01/11] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2][PATCH 02/11] lkdtm: add test for "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2][PATCH 03/11] net: switch sock_diag handlers to rare_write()
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2][PATCH 04/11] x86: Implement __arch_rare_write_begin/unmap()
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2][PATCH 05/11] ARM: mm: dump: Add domain to output
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2][PATCH 06/11] ARM: domains: Extract common USER domain init
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2][PATCH 07/11] ARM: mm: set DOMAIN_WR_RARE for rodata
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2][PATCH 08/11] ARM: Implement __arch_rare_write_begin/end()
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2][PATCH 09/11] list: add rare_write() list helpers
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2][PATCH 10/11] gcc-plugins: Add constify plugin
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2][PATCH 11/11] cgroups: force all struct cftype const
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v2] Introduce rare_write() infrastructure
[kernel-hardening] arch: arm: bpf: Converting cBPF to eBPF for arm 32 bit
2017-03-30 14:04 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 0/4] Introduce the initify gcc plugin
2017-03-30 11:04 UTC (14+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 1/4] gcc-plugins: Add "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 00/11] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing
2017-03-29 15:58 UTC (16+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 01/11] bpf: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 02/11] bpf,landlock: Define an eBPF program type for Landlock
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 03/11] bpf: Define handle_fs and add a new helper bpf_handle_fs_get_mode()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 04/11] landlock: Add LSM hooks related to filesystem
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 05/11] seccomp: Split put_seccomp_filter() with put_seccomp()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 06/11] seccomp,landlock: Handle Landlock events per process hierarchy
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 07/11] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 08/11] bpf: Add a Landlock sandbox example
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 09/11] seccomp: Enhance test_harness with an assert step mechanism
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 10/11] bpf,landlock: Add tests for Landlock
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 11/11] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH net-next v6 01/11] bpf: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier (fwd)
2017-03-29 15:14 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3] powerpc: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
2017-03-28 19:45 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [RFC] mm: enable sanitizing via CONFIG
2017-03-27 10:54 UTC (4+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 0/2] provide check for ro_after_init memory sections
2017-03-25 1:59 UTC (10+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 1/2] module: verify address is read-only
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 2/2] extable: "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] ARM: ptdump: Add domain to output
2017-03-24 22:56 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] lkdtm: add bad USER_DS test
2017-03-24 17:51 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] lkdtm: add bad USER_DS test
2017-03-24 17:46 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/4] efi: libstub enhancements for cmdline parsing and kaslr
2017-03-24 14:15 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/4] efi/libstub: fix harmless command line parsing bug
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/4] efi/libstub: unify command line param parsing
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/4] efi/libstub: arm/arm64: disable debug prints on 'quiet' cmdline arg
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/4] ef/libstub: arm/arm64: randomize the base of the UEFI rt services region
[kernel-hardening] Re: [lkp-robot] [refcount] 2bf8784489: kernel_BUG_at_lib/refcount.c
2017-03-24 2:45 UTC (2+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [ANNOUNCE] Linux Security Summit 2017 - CFP
2017-03-24 1:26 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall
2017-03-23 15:40 UTC (11+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 2/4] x86/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 3/4] arm/syscalls: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 4/4] arm64/syscalls: "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 00/11] arm64: mmu: avoid W+X mappings and re-enable PTE_CONT for kernel
2017-03-23 14:12 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3] refcount: add refcount_t API kernel-doc comments
2017-03-23 14:06 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 1/4] syscalls: Restore address limit after a syscall
2017-03-22 21:11 UTC (20+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 2/4] x86/syscalls: Specific usage of verify_pre_usermode_state
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 4/4] arm64/syscalls: "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/6] bug: further enhance use of BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
2017-03-22 19:55 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 5/6] notifiers: Use CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION() on checks
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 6/6] refcount: Check bad states with CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] gcc-plugins: update architecture list in documentation
2017-03-22 12:02 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH tip v2] x86/mm: Correct fixmap header usage on adaptable MODULES_END
2017-03-21 16:01 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 1/3] x86/mm: Adapt MODULES_END based on Fixmap section size
2017-03-17 7:34 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 2/3] x86: Remap GDT tables in the Fixmap section
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 3/3] x86: Make the GDT remapping read-only on 64-bit
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v7 1/3] x86/mm: Adapt MODULES_END based on Fixmap section size
[kernel-hardening] stackleak plugin port to upstream kernel
2017-03-14 21:43 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 1/5] irq: set {msi_domain,syscore}_ops as __ro_after_init
2017-03-14 19:24 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 3/5] pci: set msi_domain_ops "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 1/3] x86/mm: Adapt MODULES_END based on Fixmap section size
2017-03-13 19:24 UTC (12+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 2/3] x86: Remap GDT tables in the Fixmap section
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [Xen-devel] "
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