messages from 2017-06-05 19:22:12 to 2017-06-10 02:59:10 UTC [more...]
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/6] Constant Time Memory Comparisons Are Important
2017-06-10 2:59 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/6] sunrpc: use constant time memory comparison for mac
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/6] net/ipv6: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/6] ccree: use constant time memory comparison for macs and tags
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] security/keys: use constant time memory comparison for macs
[kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 0/3] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership
2017-06-10 0:23 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 1/3] mm, x86: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 2/3] lkdtm: Add tests for XPFO
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 3/3] xpfo: add support for hugepages
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v2 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls
2017-06-09 23:00 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 0/4] ro protection for dynamic data
2017-06-09 18:56 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/4] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/4] Protectable Memory Allocator
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/4] Protectable Memory Allocator - Debug interface
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/4] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM
2017-06-09 13:44 UTC (15+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 1/1] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 0/1] "
[kernel-hardening] Patch for random mac address
2017-06-09 13:11 UTC (12+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/6] LSM: Security module blob management
2017-06-09 3:54 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/6] procfs-add-smack-subdir-to-attrs
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/6] LSM-manage-credential-security-blobs
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/6] LSM: Manage file security blobs
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] LSM: manage task "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 5/6] LSM: Infrastructure management of the remaining blobs
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 6/6] LSM: general but not extreme module stacking
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] random: default the warning to be on
2017-06-09 1:03 UTC
[kernel-hardening] hard link restrictions
2017-06-08 21:18 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes
2017-06-08 17:34 UTC (42+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 02/13] random: add synchronous API for the urandom pool
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 03/13] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 04/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 07/13] ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 08/13] cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 09/13] rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 10/13] net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 11/13] net/route: use get_random_int for random counter
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes
2017-06-08 12:02 UTC (41+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 01/13] random: add synchronous API for the urandom pool
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 02/13] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 03/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 05/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 06/13] iscsi: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 07/13] ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 08/13] cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 09/13] rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 10/13] net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 11/13] net/route: use get_random_int for random counter
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes
2017-06-07 23:26 UTC (14+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 02/13] random: add synchronous API for the urandom pool
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 03/13] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 04/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 07/13] ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 08/13] cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 09/13] rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 10/13] net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 11/13] net/route: use get_random_int for random counter
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes
2017-06-07 23:21 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] powerpc: Increase ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 1TB for 64-bit applications
2017-06-07 18:29 UTC (5+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] symlink/hardlink/FIFO restrictions
2017-06-07 12:06 UTC (6+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto
2017-06-07 10:12 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto
2017-06-07 7:31 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto
2017-06-06 21:31 UTC (3+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [RFC v5 PATCH 0/4] NOT FOR MERGE - ro protection for dynamic data
2017-06-06 18:24 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/4] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/4] Protectable Memory Allocator
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/4] Protectable Memory Allocator - Debug interface
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/4] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/5] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head
2017-06-06 16:24 UTC (23+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/5] Protectable Memory Allocator
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/5] Protectable Memory Allocator - Debug interface
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/5] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Stop the plagiarism
2017-06-06 13:05 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v2 0/8] get_random_bytes_wait family of APIs
2017-06-06 12:24 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v2 5/8] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/8] get_random_bytes_wait family of APIs
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3.18 01/33] Revert "stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canarys random range from 32 bits to 64 bits on 64-bit platforms"
2017-06-06 7:21 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
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