messages from 2017-08-31 09:43:53 to 2017-09-20 14:09:46 UTC [more...]
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto
2017-09-20 14:09 UTC (20+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v3 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls
2017-09-20 11:27 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/5] stackprotector: ascii armor the stack canary
2017-09-20 11:18 UTC (5+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/3] x86/fpu: prevent leaking FPU registers via invalid FPU state
2017-09-20 3:18 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 1/3] x86/fpu: don't let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 2/3] x86/fpu: tighten validation of user-supplied xstate_header
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 3/3] x86/fpu: reinitialize FPU registers if restoring FPU state fails
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] x86/fpu: prevent leaking FPU registers via invalid FPU state
[kernel-hardening] [RFC] Restrict writes into untrusted FIFOs and regular files
2017-09-19 16:34 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 0/9] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM
2017-09-19 15:40 UTC (12+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 1/9] S.A.R.A. Documentation
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 2/9] S.A.R.A. framework creation
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 3/9] Creation of "check_vmflags" LSM hook
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 4/9] S.A.R.A. cred blob management
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 5/9] S.A.R.A. WX Protection
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 6/9] Creation of "pagefault_handler" LSM hook
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 7/9] Trampoline emulation
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 8/9] Allowing for stacking procattr support in S.A.R.A
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 9/9] S.A.R.A. WX Protection procattr interface
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 00/11] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership
2017-09-18 21:29 UTC (53+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 01/11] mm: add MAP_HUGETLB support to vm_mmap
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 02/11] x86: always set IF before oopsing from page fault
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 03/11] mm, x86: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 04/11] swiotlb: Map the buffer if it was unmapped by XPFO
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 05/11] arm64/mm: Add support for XPFO
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 06/11] xpfo: add primitives for mapping underlying memory
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 07/11] arm64/mm, xpfo: temporarily map dcache regions
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 08/11] arm64/mm: Add support for XPFO to swiotlb
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 09/11] arm64/mm: disable section/contiguous mappings if XPFO is enabled
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 10/11] mm: add a user_virt_to_phys symbol
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 11/11] lkdtm: Add test for XPFO
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v6 00/11] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership
[kernel-hardening] symlink/hardlink/FIFO restrictions
2017-09-14 1:00 UTC (7+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 00/29] implement KASLR for ARM
2017-09-12 6:51 UTC (83+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 01/29] net/core: work around section mismatch warning for ptp_classifier
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 02/29] asm-generic: add .data.rel.ro sections to __ro_after_init
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 03/29] ARM: assembler: introduce adr_l, ldr_l and str_l macros
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 04/29] ARM: head-common.S: use PC-relative insn sequence for __proc_info
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 05/29] ARM: head-common.S: use PC-relative insn sequence for idmap creation
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 06/29] ARM: head.S: use PC-relative insn sequence for secondary_data
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 07/29] ARM: kernel: use relative references for UP/SMP alternatives
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 08/29] ARM: head: use PC-relative insn sequence for __smp_alt
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 09/29] ARM: sleep.S: use PC-relative insn sequence for sleep_save_sp/mpidr_hash
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 10/29] ARM: head.S: use PC-relative insn sequences for __fixup_pv_table
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 11/29] ARM: head.S: use PC relative insn sequence to calculate PHYS_OFFSET
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 12/29] ARM: kvm: replace open coded VA->PA calculations with adr_l call
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 13/29] arm-soc: exynos: replace open coded VA->PA conversions
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 14/29] arm-soc: mvebu: replace open coded VA->PA conversion
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 15/29] arm-soc: various: replace open coded VA->PA calculation of pen_release
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 16/29] ARM: kernel: switch to relative exception tables
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 17/29] ARM: kernel: use relative phys-to-virt patch tables
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 18/29] arm-soc: tegra: make sleep asm code runtime relocatable
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 19/29] ARM: kernel: make vmlinux buildable as a PIE executable
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 20/29] ARM: kernel: use PC-relative symbol references in MMU switch code
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 21/29] ARM: kernel: use PC relative symbol references in suspend/resume code
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 22/29] ARM: mm: export default vmalloc base address
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 23/29] ARM: kernel: refer to swapper_pg_dir via its symbol
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 24/29] ARM: kernel: implement randomization of the kernel load address
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 25/29] ARM: decompressor: explicitly map decompressor binary cacheable
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 26/29] ARM: decompressor: add KASLR support
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 27/29] efi/libstub: add 'max' parameter to efi_random_alloc()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 28/29] efi/libstub: check for vmalloc= command line argument
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 29/29] efi/libstub: arm: implement KASLR
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 00/29] implement KASLR for ARM
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 00/20] Introduce struct layout randomization plugin
2017-09-07 22:55 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 07/20] randstruct: Whitelist big_key path struct overloading
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] ME and PSP
2017-09-07 4:30 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [coreboot] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 1/4] syscalls: Use CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION for addr_limit_user_check
2017-09-05 10:46 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 3/4] arm/syscalls: Optimize address limit check
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4] arm64: kernel: implement fast refcount checking
2017-09-03 10:16 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v7 00/10] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing
2017-09-02 13:19 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v7 08/10] bpf: Add a Landlock sandbox example
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 next 0/3] modules: automatic module loading restrictions
2017-09-02 6:31 UTC (10+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 next 1/3] modules:capabilities: allow __request_module() to take a capability argument
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 00/10] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership
2017-08-31 21:21 UTC (12+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 04/10] arm64: Add __flush_tlb_one()
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