messages from 2017-09-21 00:04:35 to 2017-10-07 23:44:53 UTC [more...]
[kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 0/6] add more kernel pointer filter options
2017-10-07 23:44 UTC (59+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 1/6] lib: vsprintf: additional kernel pointer filtering options
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 2/6] lib: vsprintf: whitelist stack traces
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 3/6] lib: vsprintf: physical address kernel pointer filtering options
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 4/6] lib: vsprintf: default kptr_restrict to the maximum value
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 5/6] lib: vsprintf: add "%paP", "%papP", and "%padP" specifiers
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 6/6] drivers: uio: un-restrict sysfs pointers for UIO
[kernel-hardening] x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
2017-10-06 10:39 UTC (37+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
2017-10-05 16:14 UTC (32+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 01/27] x86/crypto: Adapt assembly for PIE support
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 02/27] x86: Use symbol name on bug table "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 03/27] x86: Use symbol name in jump "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 04/27] x86: Add macro to get symbol address "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 05/27] x86: relocate_kernel - Adapt assembly "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 06/27] x86/entry/64: "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 07/27] x86: pm-trace - "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 08/27] x86/CPU: "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 09/27] x86/acpi: "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 10/27] x86/boot/64: "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 11/27] x86/power/64: "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 12/27] x86/paravirt: "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 13/27] x86/boot/64: Use _text in a global "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 14/27] x86/percpu: Adapt percpu "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 15/27] compiler: Option to default to hidden symbols
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 16/27] x86/relocs: Handle PIE relocations
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 17/27] xen: Adapt assembly for PIE support
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 18/27] kvm: "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 19/27] x86: Support global stack cookie
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 20/27] x86/ftrace: Adapt function tracing for PIE support
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 21/27] x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Fix address markers index on x86_64
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 22/27] x86/modules: Add option to start module section after kernel
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 23/27] x86/modules: Adapt module loading for PIE support
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 24/27] x86/mm: Make the x86 GOT read-only
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 25/27] x86/pie: Add option to build the kernel as PIE
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 26/27] x86/relocs: Add option to generate 64-bit relocations
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 27/27] x86/kaslr: Add option to extend KASLR range from 1GB to 3GB
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v4 0/3] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it
2017-10-05 12:31 UTC (8+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v4 1/3] gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v4 2/3] lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v4 3/3] doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH RFC v4 0/3] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/3] Makefile: Introduce CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO
2017-10-04 17:15 UTC (10+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/3] sh/boot: Add static stack-protector to pre-kernel
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/3] Makefile: Move stackprotector availability out of Kconfig
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/3] Makefile: Introduce CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] Makefile: Fix CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO to not enable SSP
2017-10-03 18:32 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4.13 106/110] x86/fpu: Dont let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
2017-10-03 12:30 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4.9 56/64] x86/fpu: Dont let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
2017-10-03 12:23 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4.4 30/41] x86/fpu: Dont let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
2017-10-03 12:21 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3.18 22/24] x86/fpu: Dont let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
2017-10-03 12:18 UTC
[kernel-hardening] Modular BIG_KEYS (was: Re: [PATCH v4] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto)
2017-10-03 9:04 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] x86/fpu: Don't let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
2017-10-02 18:58 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/2] capability controlled user-namespaces
2017-10-02 18:12 UTC (3+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] x86/fpu: Don't let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
2017-10-02 18:10 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] x86/fpu: Don't let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
2017-10-02 18:04 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [RFC] A method to prevent priviledge escalation
2017-09-30 22:00 UTC (4+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] userns: control capabilities of some user namespaces
2017-09-29 23:10 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] capability: introduce sysctl for controlled user-ns capability whitelist
2017-09-29 23:10 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v3 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls
2017-09-28 21:17 UTC (14+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 0/2] Restrict dangerous open in sticky directories
2017-09-26 15:13 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 1/2] Protected FIFOs and regular files
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 2/2] Protected O_CREAT open in sticky directory
[kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 0/9] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM
2017-09-26 14:25 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 1/3] x86/fpu: don't let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
2017-09-26 3:02 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [lkp-robot] [x86/fpu] 14e633085a: Kernel_panic-not_syncing:Attempted_to_kill_init!exitcode=
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 2/2] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto
2017-09-25 16:38 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 1/2] security/keys: properly zero out sensitive key material in big_key
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 0/3] x86/fpu: prevent leaking FPU registers via invalid FPU state
2017-09-23 18:28 UTC (12+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 1/3] x86/fpu: don't let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 2/3] x86/fpu: tighten validation of user-supplied xstate_header
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 3/3] x86/fpu: reinitialize FPU registers if restoring FPU state fails
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 0/3] x86/fpu: prevent leaking FPU registers via invalid FPU state
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] x86/fpu: Simplify fpu__activate_fpstate_read()
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 0/3] x86/fpu: prevent leaking FPU registers via invalid FPU state
2017-09-23 9:09 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 1/3] x86/fpu: don't let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 2/3] x86/fpu: tighten validation of user-supplied xstate_header
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 3/3] x86/fpu: reinitialize FPU registers if restoring FPU state fails
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 0/3] x86/fpu: prevent leaking FPU registers via invalid FPU state
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 3/3] x86/fpu: reinitialize FPU registers if restoring FPU state fails
2017-09-22 17:05 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 00/31] Hardened usercopy whitelisting
2017-09-22 2:54 UTC (14+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 01/31] usercopy: Prepare for "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 02/31] usercopy: Enforce slab cache usercopy region boundaries
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 03/31] usercopy: Mark kmalloc caches as usercopy caches
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 09/31] jfs: Define usercopy region in jfs_ip slab cache
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 10/31] befs: Define usercopy region in befs_inode_cache "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 00/11] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership
2017-09-21 1:37 UTC (19+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 03/11] mm, x86: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)
` [kernel-hardening] "
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