messages from 2017-09-11 19:50:21 to 2017-10-02 07:14:36 UTC [more...]
[kernel-hardening] Modular BIG_KEYS (was: Re: [PATCH v4] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto)
2017-10-02 7:14 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 0/6] add more kernel pointer filter options
2017-10-01 0:11 UTC (8+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 1/6] lib: vsprintf: additional kernel pointer filtering options
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 2/6] lib: vsprintf: whitelist stack traces
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 3/6] lib: vsprintf: physical address kernel pointer filtering options
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 4/6] lib: vsprintf: default kptr_restrict to the maximum value
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 5/6] lib: vsprintf: add "%paP", "%papP", and "%padP" specifiers
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 6/6] drivers: uio: un-restrict sysfs pointers for UIO
[kernel-hardening] [RFC] A method to prevent priviledge escalation
2017-09-30 22:00 UTC (4+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] userns: control capabilities of some user namespaces
2017-09-29 23:10 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] capability: introduce sysctl for controlled user-ns capability whitelist
2017-09-29 23:10 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/2] capability controlled user-namespaces
2017-09-29 23:09 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v3 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls
2017-09-28 21:17 UTC (14+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 0/2] Restrict dangerous open in sticky directories
2017-09-26 15:13 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 1/2] Protected FIFOs and regular files
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 2/2] Protected O_CREAT open in sticky directory
[kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 0/9] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM
2017-09-26 14:25 UTC (11+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 3/9] Creation of "check_vmflags" LSM hook
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 4/9] S.A.R.A. cred blob management
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 5/9] S.A.R.A. WX Protection
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 6/9] Creation of "pagefault_handler" LSM hook
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 7/9] Trampoline emulation
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 8/9] Allowing for stacking procattr support in S.A.R.A
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 9/9] S.A.R.A. WX Protection procattr interface
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v3 0/9] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/3] x86/fpu: prevent leaking FPU registers via invalid FPU state
2017-09-26 3:02 UTC (11+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 1/3] x86/fpu: don't let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
` [kernel-hardening] [lkp-robot] [x86/fpu] 14e633085a: Kernel_panic-not_syncing:Attempted_to_kill_init!exitcode=
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 2/3] x86/fpu: tighten validation of user-supplied xstate_header
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 3/3] x86/fpu: reinitialize FPU registers if restoring FPU state fails
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] x86/fpu: prevent leaking FPU registers via invalid FPU state
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 1/2] security/keys: properly zero out sensitive key material in big_key
2017-09-25 16:38 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 2/2] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
2017-09-25 7:33 UTC (35+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 0/3] x86/fpu: prevent leaking FPU registers via invalid FPU state
2017-09-23 18:28 UTC (12+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 1/3] x86/fpu: don't let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 2/3] x86/fpu: tighten validation of user-supplied xstate_header
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 3/3] x86/fpu: reinitialize FPU registers if restoring FPU state fails
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 0/3] x86/fpu: prevent leaking FPU registers via invalid FPU state
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] x86/fpu: Simplify fpu__activate_fpstate_read()
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 0/3] x86/fpu: prevent leaking FPU registers via invalid FPU state
2017-09-23 9:09 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 1/3] x86/fpu: don't let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 2/3] x86/fpu: tighten validation of user-supplied xstate_header
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 3/3] x86/fpu: reinitialize FPU registers if restoring FPU state fails
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 0/3] x86/fpu: prevent leaking FPU registers via invalid FPU state
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 00/31] Hardened usercopy whitelisting
2017-09-22 2:54 UTC (43+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 01/31] usercopy: Prepare for "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 02/31] usercopy: Enforce slab cache usercopy region boundaries
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 03/31] usercopy: Mark kmalloc caches as usercopy caches
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 04/31] dcache: Define usercopy region in dentry_cache slab cache
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 05/31] vfs: Define usercopy region in names_cache slab caches
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 06/31] vfs: Copy struct mount.mnt_id to userspace using put_user()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 07/31] ext4: Define usercopy region in ext4_inode_cache slab cache
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 08/31] ext2: Define usercopy region in ext2_inode_cache "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 09/31] jfs: Define usercopy region in jfs_ip "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 10/31] befs: Define usercopy region in befs_inode_cache "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 11/31] exofs: Define usercopy region in exofs_inode_cache "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 12/31] orangefs: Define usercopy region in orangefs_inode_cache "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 13/31] ufs: Define usercopy region in ufs_inode_cache "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 14/31] vxfs: Define usercopy region in vxfs_inode "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 15/31] xfs: Define usercopy region in xfs_inode "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 16/31] cifs: Define usercopy region in cifs_request "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 17/31] scsi: Define usercopy region in scsi_sense_cache "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 18/31] net: Define usercopy region in struct proto "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 19/31] ip: Define usercopy region in IP "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 20/31] caif: Define usercopy region in caif "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 21/31] sctp: Define usercopy region in SCTP "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 22/31] sctp: Copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 23/31] net: Restrict unwhitelisted proto caches to size 0
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 24/31] fork: Define usercopy region in mm_struct slab caches
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 25/31] fork: Define usercopy region in thread_stack "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 26/31] fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 27/31] x86: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 28/31] arm64: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 29/31] arm: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 30/31] usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 31/31] lkdtm: Update usercopy tests for whitelisting
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 00/11] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership
2017-09-21 1:37 UTC (41+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 03/11] mm, x86: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 05/11] arm64/mm: Add support for XPFO
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 07/11] arm64/mm, xpfo: temporarily map dcache regions
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 10/11] mm: add a user_virt_to_phys symbol
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v6 00/11] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 00/10] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership
2017-09-20 23:25 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 03/10] swiotlb: Map the buffer if it was unmapped by XPFO
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/5] stackprotector: ascii armor the stack canary
2017-09-20 15:03 UTC (6+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto
2017-09-20 14:56 UTC (21+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC] Restrict writes into untrusted FIFOs and regular files
2017-09-19 16:34 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] symlink/hardlink/FIFO restrictions
2017-09-14 1:00 UTC (7+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 00/29] implement KASLR for ARM
2017-09-12 6:51 UTC (12+ messages)
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