messages from 2018-01-21 20:15:38 to 2018-02-04 22:34:08 UTC [more...]
[RFC PATCH v14 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data
2018-02-04 22:34 UTC (11+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/6] genalloc: track beginning of allocations
` [PATCH 2/6] genalloc: selftest
` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct
` [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory
` [PATCH 5/6] Pmalloc: self-test
` [PATCH 6/6] Documentation for Pmalloc
[PATCH 2/2] GCC release 8 support for gcc-plugins
2018-02-04 17:34 UTC
[PATCH 1/2] GCC release 8 support for gcc-plugins
2018-02-04 17:01 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH v11 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data
2018-02-04 15:05 UTC (26+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/6] genalloc: track beginning of allocations
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/6] genalloc: selftest
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 5/6] Documentation for Pmalloc
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 6/6] Pmalloc: self-test
[RFC PATCH v13 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data
2018-02-03 19:42 UTC (5+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/6] genalloc: track beginning of allocations
` [PATCH 2/6] genalloc: selftest
` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct
` [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory
[RFC PATCH v12 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data
2018-02-03 16:13 UTC (18+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/6] genalloc: track beginning of allocations
` [PATCH 2/6] genalloc: selftest
` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct
` [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory
` [PATCH 5/6] Documentation for Pmalloc
` [PATCH 6/6] Pmalloc: self-test
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 00/12] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti
2018-02-01 20:23 UTC (42+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 01/12] Documentation: document array_idx
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 02/12] array_idx: sanitize speculative array de-references
` [kernel-hardening] "
` "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 03/12] x86: implement array_idx_mask
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 04/12] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence
` [kernel-hardening] "
` "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 05/12] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 06/12] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 07/12] x86: remove the syscall_64 fast-path
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 08/12] x86: sanitize sycall table de-references under speculation
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 09/12] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 10/12] kvm, x86: update spectre-v1 mitigation
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 11/12] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 12/12] x86/spectre: report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
` [kernel-hardening] "
` "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v5 00/12] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti
[PATCH v6 00/13] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti
2018-01-31 15:42 UTC (18+ messages)
` [PATCH v6 01/13] Documentation: document array_index_nospec
` [PATCH v6 02/13] array_index_nospec: sanitize speculative array de-references
` [PATCH v6 03/13] x86: implement array_index_mask_nospec
` [PATCH v6 04/13] x86: introduce barrier_nospec
` [PATCH v6 05/13] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec
` [PATCH v6 06/13] x86, usercopy: replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end}
` [PATCH v6 07/13] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec
` [PATCH v6 08/13] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation
` [PATCH v6 09/13] x86: sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation
` [PATCH v6 10/13] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
` [PATCH v6 11/13] kvm, x86: update spectre-v1 mitigation
` [PATCH v6 12/13] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params
` [PATCH v6 13/13] x86/spectre: report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
[PATCH] kbuild/gcc-plugin: drop randomize_layout_hash.h from targets
2018-01-31 6:57 UTC
[LSF/MM TOPIC] Protectable Dynamically allocated Memory for both kernel and userspace
2018-01-30 13:57 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] leaking_addresses: add 32-bit support
2018-01-30 5:11 UTC (3+ messages)
` "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] x86/retpoline/entry: Disable the entire SYSCALL64 fast path with retpolines on
2018-01-29 15:23 UTC (28+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
list name prefix
2018-01-29 15:21 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/3] x86/pti-ish syscall cleanups
2018-01-29 6:22 UTC (13+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/3] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/3] x86/asm: Move 'status' from thread_struct to thread_info
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/3] syscalls: Add a bit of documentation to __SYSCALL_DEFINE
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] fork: Allow stack to be wiped on fork
2018-01-26 22:31 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] cpu: do not leak vulnerabilities to unprivileged users
2018-01-26 19:07 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] A problem met when using crash with randomized kernel
2018-01-26 8:32 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
2018-01-25 22:37 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v7 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it
2018-01-25 15:13 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Write-once memory
2018-01-24 18:05 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [GIT PULL] spectre variant1 mitigations for 4.16
2018-01-24 14:47 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4.1 00/10] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti
2018-01-23 10:17 UTC (18+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4.1 01/10] Documentation: document array_ptr
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4.1 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4.1 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation
` [kernel-hardening] "
page: next (older) | prev (newer) | latest
- recent:[subjects (threaded)|topics (new)|topics (active)]
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).