messages from 2018-01-30 01:02:39 to 2018-02-12 11:17:01 UTC [more...]
[RFC PATCH v15 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data
2018-02-12 11:17 UTC (15+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/6] genalloc: track beginning of allocations
` [PATCH 2/6] genalloc: selftest
` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct
` [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory
` [PATCH 5/6] Pmalloc: self-test
` [PATCH 6/6] Documentation for Pmalloc
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v7 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it
2018-02-11 21:35 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
` "
Updating wikis request
2018-02-11 13:31 UTC
[RFC PATCH v14 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data
2018-02-11 2:01 UTC (27+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/6] genalloc: track beginning of allocations
` [PATCH 2/6] genalloc: selftest
` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct
` [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory
` [PATCH 5/6] Pmalloc: self-test
` [PATCH 6/6] Documentation for Pmalloc
Hello world! Student interested in getting involved
2018-02-10 19:18 UTC
[RFC PATCH v12 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data
2018-02-10 3:37 UTC (23+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/6] genalloc: track beginning of allocations
` [PATCH 2/6] genalloc: selftest
` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct
` [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory
` [PATCH 5/6] Documentation for Pmalloc
` [PATCH 6/6] Pmalloc: self-test
[PATCH 4.9 53/92] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path
2018-02-09 13:39 UTC (15+ messages)
` [PATCH 4.9 54/92] x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away
` [PATCH 4.9 55/92] x86/asm: Move status from thread_struct to thread_info
` [PATCH 4.9 56/92] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec
` [PATCH 4.9 57/92] array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references
` [PATCH 4.9 58/92] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec
` [PATCH 4.9 59/92] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec
` [PATCH 4.9 60/92] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec
` [PATCH 4.9 61/92] x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end}
` [PATCH 4.9 62/92] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec
` [PATCH 4.9 63/92] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation
` [PATCH 4.9 64/92] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation
` [PATCH 4.9 65/92] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
` [PATCH 4.9 66/92] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params
` [PATCH 4.9 67/92] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
[kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH v11 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data
2018-02-09 11:17 UTC (19+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory
[RFC] Warn the user when they could overflow mapcount
2018-02-09 4:26 UTC (15+ messages)
` [RFC] Limit mappings to ten per page per process
Patch "x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree
2018-02-08 2:38 UTC
Patch "x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree
2018-02-08 2:38 UTC
Patch "x86/asm: Move 'status' from thread_struct to thread_info" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree
2018-02-08 2:38 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
2018-02-07 1:23 UTC (15+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation
` "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 00/12] ARMv8.3 pointer authentication userspace support
2018-02-06 12:39 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 05/12] arm64: Don't trap host pointer auth use to EL2
` "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 09/12] arm64/kvm: preserve host HCR_EL2 value
` "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 10/12] arm64/kvm: context-switch ptrauth registers
` "
[PATCH 2/2] GCC release 8 support for gcc-plugins
2018-02-06 1:07 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH 1/2] GCC release 8 support for gcc-plugins
2018-02-06 0:54 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH 4.15 29/60] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path
2018-02-05 18:23 UTC (15+ messages)
` [PATCH 4.15 30/60] x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away
` [PATCH 4.15 31/60] x86/asm: Move status from thread_struct to thread_info
` [PATCH 4.15 32/60] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec
` [PATCH 4.15 33/60] array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references
` [PATCH 4.15 34/60] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec
` [PATCH 4.15 35/60] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec
` [PATCH 4.15 36/60] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec
` [PATCH 4.15 37/60] x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end}
` [PATCH 4.15 38/60] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec
` [PATCH 4.15 39/60] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation
` [PATCH 4.15 40/60] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation
` [PATCH 4.15 41/60] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
` [PATCH 4.15 42/60] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params
` [PATCH 4.15 43/60] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
[PATCH 4.14 33/64] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path
2018-02-05 18:23 UTC (15+ messages)
` [PATCH 4.14 34/64] x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away
` [PATCH 4.14 35/64] x86/asm: Move status from thread_struct to thread_info
` [PATCH 4.14 36/64] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec
` [PATCH 4.14 37/64] array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references
` [PATCH 4.14 38/64] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec
` [PATCH 4.14 39/64] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec
` [PATCH 4.14 40/64] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec
` [PATCH 4.14 41/64] x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end}
` [PATCH 4.14 42/64] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec
` [PATCH 4.14 43/64] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation
` [PATCH 4.14 44/64] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation
` [PATCH 4.14 45/64] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
` [PATCH 4.14 46/64] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params
` [PATCH 4.14 47/64] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
Patch "x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree
2018-02-05 17:38 UTC
Patch "x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree
2018-02-05 17:38 UTC
Patch "x86/asm: Move 'status' from thread_struct to thread_info" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree
2018-02-05 17:38 UTC
Patch "x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree
2018-02-05 17:38 UTC
Patch "x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree
2018-02-05 17:38 UTC
Patch "x86/asm: Move 'status' from thread_struct to thread_info" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree
2018-02-05 17:38 UTC
[RFC PATCH v13 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data
2018-02-03 19:42 UTC (5+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/6] genalloc: track beginning of allocations
` [PATCH 2/6] genalloc: selftest
` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct
` [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 00/12] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti
2018-02-01 20:23 UTC (21+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 02/12] array_idx: sanitize speculative array de-references
` [kernel-hardening] "
` "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 04/12] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence
` [kernel-hardening] "
` "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 12/12] x86/spectre: report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
` [kernel-hardening] "
` "
[PATCH v6 00/13] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti
2018-01-31 15:42 UTC (14+ messages)
` [PATCH v6 05/13] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec
` [PATCH v6 06/13] x86, usercopy: replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end}
` [PATCH v6 07/13] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec
` [PATCH v6 08/13] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation
` [PATCH v6 09/13] x86: sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation
` [PATCH v6 10/13] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
` [PATCH v6 11/13] kvm, x86: update spectre-v1 mitigation
` [PATCH v6 12/13] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params
` [PATCH v6 13/13] x86/spectre: report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
[PATCH] kbuild/gcc-plugin: drop randomize_layout_hash.h from targets
2018-01-31 6:57 UTC
[LSF/MM TOPIC] Protectable Dynamically allocated Memory for both kernel and userspace
2018-01-30 13:57 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] leaking_addresses: add 32-bit support
2018-01-30 5:11 UTC (3+ messages)
` "
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