messages from 2018-07-20 21:41:53 to 2018-09-03 15:36:41 UTC [more...]
Redoing eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO) with isolated CPUs in mind (for KVM to isolate its guests per CPU)
2018-09-03 15:36 UTC (21+ messages)
"Hardened" tree on kernel.org?
2018-08-31 17:44 UTC
[PATCH v4 0/3] KASLR feature to randomize each loadable module
2018-08-30 18:24 UTC (6+ messages)
` [PATCH v4 1/3] vmalloc: Add __vmalloc_node_try_addr function
` [PATCH v4 2/3] x86/modules: Increase randomization for modules
` [PATCH v4 3/3] vmalloc: Add debugfs modfraginfo
[PATCH v3 0/7] x86: BUG() on #GP / kernel #PF in uaccess
2018-08-29 0:08 UTC (11+ messages)
` [PATCH v3 1/7] x86: refactor kprobes_fault() like kprobe_exceptions_notify()
` [PATCH v3 2/7] x86: inline kprobe_exceptions_notify() into do_general_protection()
` [PATCH v3 3/7] x86: stop calling fixup_exception() from kprobe_fault_handler()
` [PATCH v3 4/7] x86: introduce _ASM_EXTABLE_UA for uaccess fixups
` [PATCH v3 5/7] x86: plumb error code and fault address through to fault handlers
` [PATCH v3 6/7] x86: BUG() when uaccess helpers fault on kernel addresses
` [PATCH v3 7/7] lkdtm: test copy_to_user() on bad kernel pointer under KERNEL_DS
[PATCH v2 0/7] x86: BUG() on #GP / kernel #PF in uaccess
2018-08-28 11:36 UTC (17+ messages)
` [PATCH v2 1/7] x86: refactor kprobes_fault() like kprobe_exceptions_notify()
` [PATCH v2 2/7] x86: inline kprobe_exceptions_notify() into do_general_protection()
` [PATCH v2 3/7] x86: stop calling fixup_exception() from kprobe_fault_handler()
` [PATCH v2 4/7] x86: introduce _ASM_EXTABLE_UA for uaccess fixups
` [PATCH v2 5/7] x86: plumb error code and fault address through to fault handlers
` [PATCH v2 6/7] x86: BUG() when uaccess helpers fault on kernel addresses
` [PATCH v2 7/7] lkdtm: test copy_to_user() on bad kernel pointer under KERNEL_DS
[PATCH v4 0/5] LSM: Add and use a hook for side-channel safety checks
2018-08-24 23:17 UTC (7+ messages)
` [PATCH v4 1/5] LSM: Introduce a hook for side-channel danger
` [PATCH v4 2/5] X86: Support LSM determination of side-channel
` [PATCH v4 3/5] LSM: Security module checking for side-channel dangers
` [PATCH v4 4/5] Smack: Support determination of side-channel
` [PATCH v4 5/5] SELinux: Support SELinux "
[RFC PATCH 1/2] x86: WARN() when uaccess helpers fault on kernel addresses
2018-08-23 1:36 UTC (13+ messages)
` [RFC PATCH 2/2] lkdtm: test copy_to_user() on bad kernel pointer under KERNEL_DS
[PATCH RFC v3 0/5] LSM: Add and use a hook for side-channel safety checks
2018-08-22 17:48 UTC (12+ messages)
` [PATCH v3 1/5] LSM: Introduce a hook for side-channel danger
` [PATCH v3 2/5] X86: Support LSM determination of side-channel
` [PATCH v3 3/5] LSM: Security module checking for side-channel dangers
` [PATCH v3 4/5] Smack: Support determination of side-channel
` [PATCH v3 5/5] SELinux: Support SELinux "
[PATCH RFC v2 0/5] LSM: Add and use a hook for side-channel safety checks
2018-08-21 17:45 UTC (15+ messages)
` [PATCH RFC v2 1/5] LSM: Introduce a hook for side-channel danger
` [PATCH RFC v2 2/5] X86: Support LSM determination of side-channel vulnerability
` [PATCH RFC v2 3/5] LSM: Security module checking for side-channel dangers
` [PATCH RFC v2 4/5] Smack: Support determination of side-channel vulnerability
` [PATCH RFC v2 5/5] SELinux: Support SELinux "
[PATCH v15 0/7] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it
2018-08-21 16:20 UTC (10+ messages)
` [PATCH v15 1/7] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls
` [PATCH v15 2/7] gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK plugin for tracking the kernel stack
` [PATCH v15 3/7] lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK
` [PATCH v15 4/7] fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system
` [PATCH v15 5/7] doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature
` [PATCH v15 6/7] stackleak: Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing
` [PATCH v15 7/7] arm64: Drop unneeded stackleak_check_alloca()
[RFC/PoC PATCH 0/3] arm64: basic ROP mitigation
2018-08-20 6:30 UTC (24+ messages)
` [RFC/PoC PATCH 1/3] arm64: use wrapper macro for bl/blx instructions from asm code
` [RFC/PoC PATCH 2/3] gcc: plugins: add ROP shield plugin for arm64
` [RFC/PoC PATCH 3/3] arm64: enable ROP protection by clearing SP bit #55 across function returns
[PATCH RFC 0/5] LSM: Add and use a hook for side-channel safety checks
2018-08-16 14:22 UTC (9+ messages)
` [PATCH RFC 1/5] LSM: Introduce a hook for side-channel danger
` [PATCH RFC 2/5] X86: Support LSM determination of side-channel vulnerability
` [PATCH RFC 3/5] LSM: Security module checking for side-channel dangers
` [PATCH RFC 4/5] Smack: Support determination of side-channel vulnerability
` [PATCH RFC 5/5] SELinux: Support SELinux "
[PATCH v3 0/3] KASLR feature to randomize each loadable module
2018-08-16 7:15 UTC (6+ messages)
` [PATCH v3 1/3] vmalloc: Add __vmalloc_node_try_addr function
` [PATCH v3 2/3] x86/modules: Increase randomization for modules
` [PATCH v3 3/3] vmalloc: Add debugfs modfraginfo
[PATCH V2] riscv: Convert uses of REG_FMT to %p
2018-08-07 15:12 UTC (2+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 00/19] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
2018-08-06 21:40 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 14/19] [media] uvcvideo: "
` "
[PATCH] perf/core: Fix possible Spectre-v1 for perf_swevent_enabled
2018-07-31 16:29 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH] mac80211_hwsim: Fix possible Spectre-v1 for hwsim_world_regdom_custom
2018-07-31 14:10 UTC
[RFC] kconfig: add hardened defconfig helpers
2018-07-31 7:43 UTC (9+ messages)
[PATCH] tracing: do not leak kernel addresses
2018-07-30 14:35 UTC (17+ messages)
[PATCH v14 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it
2018-07-26 16:08 UTC (8+ messages)
` [PATCH v14 7/7] stackleak, sysctl: Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing
` [PATCH v14 7/7] stackleak: "
[PATCH v14 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it
2018-07-26 9:55 UTC (10+ messages)
` [PATCHv3 0/2] Stackleak for arm64
` [PATCHv3 1/2] arm64: Add stack information to on_accessible_stack
` [PATCHv3 2/2] arm64: Add support for STACKLEAK gcc plugin
Memory Read Only Enforcement: VMM assisted kernel rootkit mitigation for KVM V4
2018-07-25 9:36 UTC (5+ messages)
` [PATCH RFC V4 1/3] KVM: X86: Memory ROE documentation
` [PATCH RFC V4 2/3] KVM: X86: Adding arbitrary data pointer in kvm memslot iterator functions
` [PATCH RFC V4 3/3] KVM: X86: Adding skeleton for Memory ROE
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