From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: SF Markus Elfring Date: Mon, 08 Jan 2018 07:25:16 +0000 Subject: Re: [PATCH] atm/clip: Use seq_puts() in svc_addr() Message-Id: <66a18243-90fc-73c6-200a-fbbfa782d501@users.sourceforge.net> List-Id: References: <97636808-1d9f-d196-ebce-fbd2505c50e2@users.sourceforge.net> In-Reply-To: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable To: Andy Shevchenko , netdev Cc: Bhumika Goyal , "David S. Miller" , David Windsor , Elena Reshetova , Hans Liljestrand , Johannes Berg , Kees Cook , Roopa Prabhu , LKML , kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org >> @@ -708,11 +708,11 @@ static void svc_addr(struct seq_file *seq, struct = sockaddr_atmsvc *addr) >> static int e164[] =3D { 1, 8, 4, 6, 1, 0 }; >> >> if (*addr->sas_addr.pub) { >> - seq_printf(seq, "%s", addr->sas_addr.pub); >> + seq_puts(seq, addr->sas_addr.pub); >=20 > Which opens a lot of security concerns. How? - The passed string is just copied into a buffer finally, isn't it? > Never do this again. Why do you not like such a small source code transformation at the moment? > P.S. I'm wondering what would be first, I am curious on how communication difficulties can be adjusted. > Markus starts looking into the actual code, I inspected the original source code to some degree. https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/tree/fs= /seq_file.c?id=895c0dde398510a5b5ded60e5064c11b94bd30ca#n682 https://elixir.free-electrons.com/linux/v4.15-rc6/source/fs/seq_file.c#L660 > or most (all) of the maintainers just ban him. The change acceptance is varying for various reasons by the involved contri= butors. Regards, Markus -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kernel-janitors" = in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html