check if a kernel page is read-only

[osalvador.vilardaga@gmail.com (Oscar Salvador)]

2016-09-07 15:47 GMT+02:00 Oscar Salvador <osalvador.vilardaga@gmail.com>:

>
>
> 2016-09-06 21:47 GMT+02:00 <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu>:
>
>> On Tue, 06 Sep 2016 13:23:48 +0200, Oscar Salvador said:
>> > I guess I explained it wrong. I'm not writing neither a rootkit nor a
>> > module which is messing with kernel memory. I'm writing a module to be
>> able
>> > to r/w kernel/ user linear memory. It's for a forensic tool.
>>
>> And this, my friends, is an example of why things like this are *really*
>> difficult to do correctly.
>>
>> There are very good reasons why (a) CONFIG_PROC_KCORE exists at all, and
>> (b)
>> why it only provides a read interface, not writing.
>>
>> If the module is "to be able to r/w kernel/user lineal memory", it's only
>> a matter of semantics away from "messing with kernel memory".
>>
>> There's a *long* history of miscreants abusing security/forensic tools
>> (which
>> often run with extended privs) to pwn a system.  For example, there's been
>> multiple holes found in wireshark, where a bugger overflow in one of the
>> protocol dissectors allows the attacker to send a hand-crafted packet
>> which
>> takes over the wireshark process, and hilarity ensues....
>>
>> If you don't believe me...
>>
>> [~/src/metasploit] find . -name '*wires*'
>> ./modules/exploits/multi/misc/wireshark_lwres_getaddrbyname_loop.rb
>> ./modules/exploits/multi/misc/wireshark_lwres_getaddrbyname.rb
>> ./modules/exploits/windows/misc/wireshark_lua.rb
>> ./modules/exploits/windows/misc/wireshark_packet_dect.rb
>> ./modules/exploits/windows/fileformat/wireshark_packet_dect.rb
>> ./modules/exploits/windows/fileformat/wireshark_mpeg_overflow.rb
>> ./modules/auxiliary/dos/wireshark
>>
>> So what *secure* way are you using for your kernel module to tell that a
>> request came from your forensic tool, and not from malware code that's
>> been
>> injected into the forensic tool?  (Hint - checking the return address of
>> the
>> syscall isn't secure, because (a) it will move around every time the
>> binary is
>> rebuilt for new releases, and more importantly (b) the syscall is almost
>> certainly in a function called "probe_memory()" or similar that is called
>> from
>> all over the place, and can't protect against a subverted call.
>>
>> You can't even have probe_memory() use __builtin_return_address(0) to
>> check
>> where it was called from, because the attacker can set up a properly
>> crafted
>> stack, patch the instruction following the call to branch back to malware,
>> and then branch directly to the instruction that does the call....
>>
>> (And yes, having the check done in userspace is broken no matter *how*
>> you do it, because it's trusting a check that's potentially subverted by
>> the attacker)
>>
>
> You are right regarding security stuff, but was not my will either
> bypassing memory protections or crashing the system.
> I wanted to write a module to read from a kernel address or from a virtual
> address space from a certain pid, and write too, but just to those pages
> that can be written. (and even if it's a topical it helped me to
> understand how the memory subsystem is working, since this was one of the
> motivations)
>
> But I get your point, thanks for that.
>
> Nevertheless, I have another question:
>
>
> - I write a user program which allocates a buffer, then writes something
> to it and calls a my module via read/write
> - The driver tries to get the user page of the buffer's address with
> "get_user_pages", then tries to kmap this page and prints the content of
> the returned addr of kmap, so I can read what the userspace was put into
> that buffer. (let's say a "hello!" string)
>
> This only works if the buffer allocated from userspace was allocated with
> some kind of mem_align (like posix_memalign with posix_memalign(&pointer,
> 4096, 4096)), but not without it.
> I guess it's because posix_memalign reserves a whole page for that buffer,
> then the addr that kmap is giving to you points at the beginning, but
> without the mem_align stuff, I guess the content of the buffer is just in
> the "middle" of the page.
>
> is that right?
>
> thanks
>
>
>

I found a way by getting the beginning of the vma and then read from the
offset generated from (my_address - beginning)


>
>> So given all this, why are you bothering with a kernel module which
>> re-invents
>> the wheel already done for you in the /proc/kcore support? :)
>>
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>
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