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Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2012 18:09:13 +0100
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: Kdump with signed images
Message-ID: <20121023170913.GA796@srcf.ucam.org>
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To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org, horms@verge.net.au, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>, Khalid Aziz <khalid@gonehiking.org>

On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 10:03:37AM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> writes:
> 
> > On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 09:19:27AM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> >> No.  UEFI secure boot has absolutely nothing todo with this.
> >> 
> >> UEFI secure boot is about not being able to hijack the code EFI runs
> >> directly.  Full stop.
> >
> > No. It's about ensuring that no untrusted code can be run before any OS 
> > kernel, which means that no untrusted code can run *in* any OS kernel.
> 
> Hogwash.

Well, I don't think this conversation's going to go any further in a 
productive manner.

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org

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