From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: matthew.garrett@nebula.com, Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>,
d.kasatkin@samsung.com, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, ebiederm@xmission.com,
hpa@zytor.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/16] [RFC PATCH] Signed kexec support
Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2013 10:28:52 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130916142852.GB20753@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1379010250.9796.118.camel@dhcp-9-2-203-236.watson.ibm.com>
On Thu, Sep 12, 2013 at 02:24:10PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
[..]
> > > So existing IMA does not seem to have been written for an environment
> > > where all the user space is not signed we don't trust root and root can
> > > attack a signed binary. And my patches try to fill that gap.
> >
> > It sounds like your changes should go into the IMA core code to resolve
> > the issues there, as I'm sure they want to also protect from the issues
> > you have pointed out here. Have you talked to those developers about
> > this?
>
> IMA assumes a different threat model and performance tradeoffs. The
> solutions suggested for the kexec, single userspace application threat
> model, presumably wouldn't scale very well.
Hi Mimi,
Does IMA trust root or not? I got a feeling that IMA is assuming that
root is trusted. Otherwise root can do raw writes to disk and bypass
all the logic related to appraisal result caching.
In fact on my system root disk belongs to group "disk". So any user in
"disk" group seems to be a trusted user for IMA to work.
Thanks
Vivek
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-09-16 14:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-09-10 21:44 [PATCH 00/16] [RFC PATCH] Signed kexec support Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 01/16] mm: vm_brk(), align the length to page boundary Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 02/16] integrity: Add a function to determine digital signature length Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 03/16] ima: Allow adding more memory locking metadata after digital signature v2 Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 04/16] integrity: Allow digital signature verification with a given keyring ptr Vivek Goyal
2013-09-11 17:34 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 05/16] integrity: Export a function to retrieve hash algo used in digital signature Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 06/16] ima: export new IMA functions for signature verification Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 07/16] mm: Define a task flag MMF_VM_LOCKED for memlocked tasks and don't allow munlock Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 08/16] binfmt_elf: Elf executable signature verification Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 09/16] ima: define functions to appraise memory buffer contents Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 10/16] keyctl: Introduce a new operation KEYCTL_VERIFY_SIGNATURE Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 11/16] ptrace: Do not allow ptrace() from unsigned process to signed one Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 12/16] binfmt_elf: Do not mark process signed if binary has elf interpreter Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 13/16] kexec: Allow only signed processes to call sys_kexec() in secureboot mode Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 14/16] kexec: Export sysfs attributes for secureboot and secure modules to user space Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 22:40 ` Greg KH
2013-09-11 13:44 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 22:57 ` Josh Boyer
2013-09-11 13:51 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 15/16] bootparam: Pass acpi_rsdp pointer in bootparam Vivek Goyal
2013-09-10 22:52 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-11 11:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2013-09-11 13:45 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-09-11 14:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2013-09-12 7:34 ` Dave Young
2013-09-12 12:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2013-09-12 13:19 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-09-12 14:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2013-09-12 14:34 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-12 14:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2013-09-13 7:12 ` Dave Young
2013-09-13 11:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2013-09-10 21:44 ` [PATCH 16/16] mount: Add a flag to not follow symlink at the end of mount point Vivek Goyal
2013-09-12 3:40 ` [PATCH 00/16] [RFC PATCH] Signed kexec support Greg KH
2013-09-12 11:43 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-09-12 16:17 ` Greg KH
2013-09-12 18:24 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-09-16 14:28 ` Vivek Goyal [this message]
2013-09-18 14:51 ` Andrea Adami
2013-09-23 17:15 ` Vivek Goyal
2013-09-16 14:24 ` Vivek Goyal
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