From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 30/34] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2017 12:03:45 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170615100345.76pn5ruf6cm3ktpe@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170607191827.28645.93989.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>
On Wed, Jun 07, 2017 at 02:18:27PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Provide support so that kexec can be used to boot a kernel when SME is
> enabled.
>
> Support is needed to allocate pages for kexec without encryption. This
> is needed in order to be able to reboot in the kernel in the same manner
> as originally booted.
>
> Additionally, when shutting down all of the CPUs we need to be sure to
> flush the caches and then halt. This is needed when booting from a state
> where SME was not active into a state where SME is active (or vice-versa).
> Without these steps, it is possible for cache lines to exist for the same
> physical location but tagged both with and without the encryption bit. This
> can cause random memory corruption when caches are flushed depending on
> which cacheline is written last.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/init.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h | 8 ++++++++
> arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
> arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c | 12 ++++++++----
> include/linux/kexec.h | 14 ++++++++++++++
> kernel/kexec_core.c | 6 ++++++
> 8 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h
> index 474eb8c..05c4aa0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h
> @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ struct x86_mapping_info {
> unsigned long page_flag; /* page flag for PMD or PUD entry */
> unsigned long offset; /* ident mapping offset */
> bool direct_gbpages; /* PUD level 1GB page support */
> + unsigned long kernpg_flag; /* kernel pagetable flag override */
> };
>
> int kernel_ident_mapping_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *pgd_page,
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
> index 70ef205..e8183ac 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
> @@ -207,6 +207,14 @@ struct kexec_entry64_regs {
> uint64_t r15;
> uint64_t rip;
> };
> +
> +extern int arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages,
> + gfp_t gfp);
> +#define arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages
> +
> +extern void arch_kexec_pre_free_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages);
> +#define arch_kexec_pre_free_pages arch_kexec_pre_free_pages
> +
> #endif
>
> typedef void crash_vmclear_fn(void);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> index ce8cb1c..0f326f4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> @@ -213,6 +213,7 @@ enum page_cache_mode {
> #define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_ENC)
> #define PAGE_KERNEL_RO __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_RO | _PAGE_ENC)
> #define PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC | _PAGE_ENC)
> +#define PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC_NOENC __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC)
> #define PAGE_KERNEL_RX __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_RX | _PAGE_ENC)
> #define PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE | _PAGE_ENC)
> #define PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE __pgprot(__PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE | _PAGE_ENC)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
> index 6f5ca4e..35e069a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
> @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ static int init_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image, pgd_t *pgd)
> set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(__pa(pte) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
> }
> pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, vaddr);
> - set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC));
> + set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC_NOENC));
> return 0;
> err:
> free_transition_pgtable(image);
> @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ static int init_pgtable(struct kimage *image, unsigned long start_pgtable)
> .alloc_pgt_page = alloc_pgt_page,
> .context = image,
> .page_flag = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC,
> + .kernpg_flag = _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC,
> };
> unsigned long mstart, mend;
> pgd_t *level4p;
> @@ -602,3 +603,35 @@ void arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres(void)
> {
> kexec_mark_crashkres(false);
> }
> +
> +int arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages, gfp_t gfp)
> +{
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (sme_active()) {
What happened to flipping the logic and saving an indentation level here?
> + /*
> + * If SME is active we need to be sure that kexec pages are
> + * not encrypted because when we boot to the new kernel the
> + * pages won't be accessed encrypted (initially).
> + */
> + ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, pages);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + if (gfp & __GFP_ZERO)
> + memset(vaddr, 0, pages * PAGE_SIZE);
> + }
This is still zeroing the memory a second time. That function has missed
all my comments from last time.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-15 10:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 93+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-07 19:13 [PATCH v6 00/34] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13 ` [PATCH v6 01/34] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13 ` [PATCH v6 02/34] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13 ` [PATCH v6 03/34] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:13 ` [PATCH v6 04/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 10:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 05/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 16:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 06/34] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 16:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 07/34] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 08/34] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 09/34] x86/mm: Simplify p[gum]d_page() macros Tom Lendacky
2017-06-10 10:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:14 ` [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3 Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 22:06 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 13:42 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 20:51 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 21:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 21:17 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 22:01 ` [Xen-devel] " Andrew Cooper
2017-06-09 18:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 18:43 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-09 18:54 ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-09 18:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 19:42 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-06-08 6:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-08 22:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-09 18:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-09 21:20 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 7:39 ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH v6 11/34] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH v6 12/34] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH v6 13/34] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-06-10 15:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH v6 14/34] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2017-06-10 16:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-12 13:31 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:15 ` [PATCH v6 15/34] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 16/34] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 17/34] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 18/34] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-11 19:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 19/34] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 4:24 ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 20/34] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 17:06 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 17:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:16 ` [PATCH v6 21/34] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 22/34] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 23/34] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 16:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 24/34] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 19:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 5:53 ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-08 21:09 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 7:58 ` Christoph Hellwig
2017-06-08 23:04 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 16:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 19:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 9:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 13:23 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 2:38 ` Nick Sarnie
2017-06-08 14:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-14 17:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-14 20:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 9:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 14:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 15:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 16:33 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-19 17:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-15 20:13 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
[not found] ` <20170621153721.GP30388@8bytes.org>
2017-06-21 16:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 18:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:17 ` [PATCH v6 27/34] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18 ` [PATCH v6 28/34] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18 ` [PATCH v6 29/34] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 9:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-07 19:18 ` [PATCH v6 30/34] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-15 10:03 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2017-06-15 17:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18 ` [PATCH v6 31/34] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:18 ` [PATCH v6 32/34] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:19 ` [PATCH v6 33/34] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments Tom Lendacky
2017-06-07 19:19 ` [PATCH v6 34/34] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-08 2:40 ` [PATCH v6 00/34] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Nick Sarnie
2017-06-08 16:14 ` Tom Lendacky
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