From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-path: Received: from mail-pj1-f65.google.com ([209.85.216.65]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1jWoxu-0006w7-2i for kexec@lists.infradead.org; Thu, 07 May 2020 22:26:03 +0000 Received: by mail-pj1-f65.google.com with SMTP id y6so3289644pjc.4 for ; Thu, 07 May 2020 15:26:01 -0700 (PDT) Date: Thu, 7 May 2020 22:25:58 +0000 From: Luis Chamberlain Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] kernel: add panic_on_taint Message-ID: <20200507222558.GA11244@42.do-not-panic.com> References: <20200507180631.308441-1-aquini@redhat.com> <20200507182257.GX11244@42.do-not-panic.com> <20200507184307.GF205881@optiplex-lnx> <20200507184705.GG205881@optiplex-lnx> <20200507203340.GZ11244@42.do-not-panic.com> <20200507220606.GK205881@optiplex-lnx> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20200507220606.GK205881@optiplex-lnx> List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "kexec" Errors-To: kexec-bounces+dwmw2=infradead.org@lists.infradead.org To: Rafael Aquini Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Takashi Iwai , Jeff Mahoney , bhe@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net, Laura Abbott , dyoung@redhat.com, Ann Davis , Richard Palethorpe , keescook@chromium.org, Jiri Kosina , cai@lca.pw, Adrian Bunk , Tso Ted , Jessica Yu , Greg Kroah-Hartman , rdunlap@infradead.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, Linus Torvalds On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 06:06:06PM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote: > On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 08:33:40PM +0000, Luis Chamberlain wrote: > > I *think* that a cmdline route to enable this would likely remove the > > need for the kernel config for this. But even with Vlastimil's work > > merged, I think we'd want yet-another value to enable / disable this > > feature. Do we need yet-another-taint flag to tell us that this feature > > was enabled? > > > > I guess it makes sense to get rid of the sysctl interface for > proc_on_taint, and only keep it as a cmdline option. That would be easier to support and k3eps this simple. > But the real issue seems to be, regardless we go with a cmdline-only option > or not, the ability of proc_taint() to set any arbitrary taint flag > other than just marking the kernel with TAINT_USER. I think we would have no other option but to add a new TAINT flag so that we know that the taint flag was modified by a user. Perhaps just re-using TAINT_USER when proc_taint() would suffice. Luis _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec