From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>,
Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
"Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>, Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCHv5 10/16] x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec
Date: Sat, 23 Dec 2023 02:52:02 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231222235209.32143-11-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231222235209.32143-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
TDX guests allocate shared buffers to perform I/O. It is done by
allocating pages normally from the buddy allocator and converting them
to shared with set_memory_decrypted().
The second kernel has no idea what memory is converted this way. It only
sees E820_TYPE_RAM.
Accessing shared memory via private mapping is fatal. It leads to
unrecoverable TD exit.
On kexec walk direct mapping and convert all shared memory back to
private. It makes all RAM private again and second kernel may use it
normally.
The conversion occurs in two steps: stopping new conversions and
unsharing all memory. In the case of normal kexec, the stopping of
conversions takes place while scheduling is still functioning. This
allows for waiting until any ongoing conversions are finished. The
second step is carried out when all CPUs except one are inactive and
interrupts are disabled. This prevents any conflicts with code that may
access shared memory.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 119 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 2 +
arch/x86/kernel/crash.c | 6 ++
arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c | 13 ++++
4 files changed, 138 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
index 8a49484a2917..5c64db168edd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
@@ -6,8 +6,10 @@
#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/kexec.h>
#include <asm/coco.h>
#include <asm/tdx.h>
#include <asm/vmx.h>
@@ -15,6 +17,7 @@
#include <asm/insn.h>
#include <asm/insn-eval.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
+#include <asm/set_memory.h>
/* MMIO direction */
#define EPT_READ 0
@@ -41,6 +44,9 @@
static atomic_long_t nr_shared;
+static atomic_t conversions_in_progress;
+static bool conversion_allowed = true;
+
static inline bool pte_decrypted(pte_t pte)
{
return cc_mkdec(pte_val(pte)) == pte_val(pte);
@@ -726,6 +732,14 @@ static bool tdx_tlb_flush_required(bool private)
static bool tdx_cache_flush_required(void)
{
+ /*
+ * Avoid issuing CLFLUSH on set_memory_decrypted() if conversions
+ * stopped. Otherwise it can race with unshare_all_memory() and trigger
+ * implicit conversion to shared.
+ */
+ if (!conversion_allowed)
+ return false;
+
/*
* AMD SME/SEV can avoid cache flushing if HW enforces cache coherence.
* TDX doesn't have such capability.
@@ -809,12 +823,25 @@ static bool tdx_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages, bool enc)
static int tdx_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
bool enc)
{
+ atomic_inc(&conversions_in_progress);
+
+ /*
+ * Check after bumping conversions_in_progress to serialize
+ * against tdx_shutdown().
+ */
+ if (!conversion_allowed) {
+ atomic_dec(&conversions_in_progress);
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
+
/*
* Only handle shared->private conversion here.
* See the comment in tdx_early_init().
*/
- if (enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc))
+ if (enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc)) {
+ atomic_dec(&conversions_in_progress);
return -EIO;
+ }
return 0;
}
@@ -826,17 +853,102 @@ static int tdx_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
* Only handle private->shared conversion here.
* See the comment in tdx_early_init().
*/
- if (!enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc))
+ if (!enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc)) {
+ atomic_dec(&conversions_in_progress);
return -EIO;
+ }
if (enc)
atomic_long_sub(numpages, &nr_shared);
else
atomic_long_add(numpages, &nr_shared);
+ atomic_dec(&conversions_in_progress);
+
return 0;
}
+static void tdx_kexec_stop_conversion(bool crash)
+{
+ /* Stop new private<->shared conversions */
+ conversion_allowed = false;
+ barrier();
+
+ /*
+ * Crash kernel reaches here with interrupts disabled: can't wait for
+ * conversions to finish.
+ *
+ * If race happened, just report and proceed.
+ */
+ if (!crash) {
+ unsigned long timeout;
+
+ /*
+ * Wait for in-flight conversions to complete.
+ *
+ * Do not wait more than 30 seconds.
+ */
+ timeout = 30 * USEC_PER_SEC;
+ while (atomic_read(&conversions_in_progress) && timeout--)
+ udelay(1);
+ }
+
+ if (atomic_read(&conversions_in_progress))
+ pr_warn("Failed to finish shared<->private conversions\n");
+}
+
+static void tdx_kexec_unshare_mem(void)
+{
+ unsigned long addr, end;
+ long found = 0, shared;
+
+ /*
+ * Walk direct mapping and convert all shared memory back to private,
+ */
+
+ addr = PAGE_OFFSET;
+ end = PAGE_OFFSET + get_max_mapped();
+
+ while (addr < end) {
+ unsigned long size;
+ unsigned int level;
+ pte_t *pte;
+
+ pte = lookup_address(addr, &level);
+ size = page_level_size(level);
+
+ if (pte && pte_decrypted(*pte)) {
+ int pages = size / PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ /*
+ * Touching memory with shared bit set triggers implicit
+ * conversion to shared.
+ *
+ * Make sure nobody touches the shared range from
+ * now on.
+ */
+ set_pte(pte, __pte(0));
+
+ if (!tdx_enc_status_changed(addr, pages, true)) {
+ pr_err("Failed to unshare range %#lx-%#lx\n",
+ addr, addr + size);
+ }
+
+ found += pages;
+ }
+
+ addr += size;
+ }
+
+ __flush_tlb_all();
+
+ shared = atomic_long_read(&nr_shared);
+ if (shared != found) {
+ pr_err("shared page accounting is off\n");
+ pr_err("nr_shared = %ld, nr_found = %ld\n", shared, found);
+ }
+}
+
void __init tdx_early_init(void)
{
struct tdx_module_args args = {
@@ -896,6 +1008,9 @@ void __init tdx_early_init(void)
x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required = tdx_cache_flush_required;
x86_platform.guest.enc_tlb_flush_required = tdx_tlb_flush_required;
+ x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_stop_conversion = tdx_kexec_stop_conversion;
+ x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_unshare_mem = tdx_kexec_unshare_mem;
+
/*
* TDX intercepts the RDMSR to read the X2APIC ID in the parallel
* bringup low level code. That raises #VE which cannot be handled
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
index c9503fe2d13a..3196ff20a29e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
@@ -154,6 +154,8 @@ struct x86_guest {
int (*enc_status_change_finish)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
bool (*enc_tlb_flush_required)(bool enc);
bool (*enc_cache_flush_required)(void);
+ void (*enc_kexec_stop_conversion)(bool crash);
+ void (*enc_kexec_unshare_mem)(void);
};
/**
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
index c92d88680dbf..b99bd28ad22f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
#include <asm/intel_pt.h>
#include <asm/crash.h>
#include <asm/cmdline.h>
+#include <asm/tdx.h>
/* Used while preparing memory map entries for second kernel */
struct crash_memmap_data {
@@ -107,6 +108,11 @@ void native_machine_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs)
crash_smp_send_stop();
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
+ x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_stop_conversion(true);
+ x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_unshare_mem();
+ }
+
cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization();
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
index 830425e6d38e..16dde83df49a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/objtool.h>
#include <linux/pgtable.h>
+#include <linux/kexec.h>
#include <acpi/reboot.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@
#include <asm/realmode.h>
#include <asm/x86_init.h>
#include <asm/efi.h>
+#include <asm/tdx.h>
/*
* Power off function, if any
@@ -716,6 +718,14 @@ static void native_machine_emergency_restart(void)
void native_machine_shutdown(void)
{
+ /*
+ * Call enc_kexec_stop_conversion() while all CPUs are still active and
+ * interrupts are enabled. This will allow all in-flight memory
+ * conversions to finish cleanly.
+ */
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) && kexec_in_progress)
+ x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_stop_conversion(false);
+
/* Stop the cpus and apics */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_IO_APIC
/*
@@ -752,6 +762,9 @@ void native_machine_shutdown(void)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
x86_platform.iommu_shutdown();
#endif
+
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) && kexec_in_progress)
+ x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_unshare_mem();
}
static void __machine_emergency_restart(int emergency)
--
2.41.0
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-12-22 23:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-12-22 23:51 [PATCHv5 00/16] x86/tdx: Add kexec support Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:51 ` [PATCHv5 01/16] x86/acpi: Extract ACPI MADT wakeup code into a separate file Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:51 ` [PATCHv5 02/16] x86/apic: Mark acpi_mp_wake_* variables as __ro_after_init Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:51 ` [PATCHv5 03/16] cpu/hotplug: Add support for declaring CPU offlining not supported Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:51 ` [PATCHv5 04/16] cpu/hotplug, x86/acpi: Disable CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:51 ` [PATCHv5 05/16] x86/kvm: Do not try to disable kvmclock if it was not enabled Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:51 ` [PATCHv5 06/16] x86/kexec: Keep CR4.MCE set during kexec for TDX guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:51 ` [PATCHv5 07/16] x86/mm: Make x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_*() return errno Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:52 ` [PATCHv5 08/16] x86/mm: Return correct level from lookup_address() if pte is none Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:52 ` [PATCHv5 09/16] x86/tdx: Account shared memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:52 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2024-01-05 19:38 ` [PATCHv5 10/16] x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-06 0:59 ` kirill.shutemov
2024-01-06 1:12 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-01-15 10:53 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-01-16 7:28 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-16 8:01 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-01-16 10:45 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-16 10:53 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:52 ` [PATCHv5 11/16] x86/mm: Make e820_end_ram_pfn() cover E820_TYPE_ACPI ranges Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:52 ` [PATCHv5 12/16] x86/acpi: Rename fields in acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup structure Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:52 ` [PATCHv5 13/16] x86/acpi: Do not attempt to bring up secondary CPUs in kexec case Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-22 23:52 ` [PATCHv5 14/16] x86/smp: Add smp_ops.stop_this_cpu() callback Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-12-25 8:05 ` [PATCHv5.1 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-08 3:04 ` Huang, Kai
2024-01-08 10:15 ` kirill.shutemov
2024-01-09 3:04 ` Huang, Kai
2023-12-22 23:52 ` [PATCHv5 15/16] x86/mm: Introduce kernel_ident_mapping_free() Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-08 3:13 ` Huang, Kai
2024-01-08 3:30 ` Huang, Kai
2024-01-08 10:17 ` kirill.shutemov
2024-01-08 13:13 ` Huang, Kai
2024-01-08 13:35 ` kirill.shutemov
2023-12-22 23:52 ` [PATCHv5 16/16] x86/acpi: Add support for CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup method Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-01-15 13:19 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-01-16 6:50 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
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