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charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "kexec" Errors-To: kexec-bounces+kexec=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org LUKS is the standard for Linux disk encryption. Many users choose LUKS and in some use cases like Confidential VM it's mandated. With kdump enabled, when the 1st kernel crashes, the system could boot into the kdump/crash kernel and dump the memory image i.e. /proc/vmcore to a specified target. Currently, when dumping vmcore to a LUKS encrypted device, there are two problems, - Kdump kernel may not be able to decrypt the LUKS partition. For some machines, a system administrator may not have a chance to enter the password to decrypt the device in kdump initramfs after the 1st kernel crashes; For cloud confidential VMs, depending on the policy the kdump kernel may not be able to unseal the keys with TPM and the console virtual keyboard is untrusted. - LUKS2 by default use the memory-hard Argon2 key derivation function which is quite memory-consuming compared to the limited memory reserved for kdump. Take Fedora example, by default, only 256M is reserved for systems having memory between 4G-64G. With LUKS enabled, ~1300M needs to be reserved for kdump. Note if the memory reserved for kdump can't be used by 1st kernel i.e. an user sees ~1300M memory missing in the 1st kernel. Besides users (at least for Fedora) usually expect kdump to work out of the box i.e. no manual password input is needed. And it doesn't make sense to derivate the keys again in kdump kernel which seems to be redundant work. This patch set addresses the above issues by make the LUKS volume keys persistent for kdump kernel with the help of cryptsetup's new APIs (--link-vk-to-keyring/--volume-key-keyring). Here is the life cycle of this kdump copy of LUKS volume keys, 1. After the 1st kernel loads the initramfs during boot, systemd use an user-input passphrase or TPM-sealed key to de-crypt the LUKS volume keys and then save the volume keys to specified keyring (using the --link-vk-to-keyring API) and the key will expire within specified time. 2. A user space tool (kdump initramfs builder) writes a key description to /sys/kernel/crash_dm_crypt_keys to inform the 1st kernel to record the key while building the kdump initramfs 3. The kexec_file_load syscall read the volume keys by recored key descriptions and then save them key to kdump reserved memory and wipe the copy. 4. When the 1st kernel crashes and the kdump initramfs is booted, the kdump initramfs asks the kdump kernel to create a user key using the key stored in kdump reserved memory by writing to to /sys/kernel/crash_dm_crypt_keys. Then the LUKS encrypted devide is unlocked with libcryptsetup's --volume-key-keyring API. 5. The system gets rebooted to the 1st kernel after dumping vmcore to the LUKS encrypted device is finished After libcryptsetup saving the LUKS volume keys to specified keyring, whoever takes this should be responsible for the safety of these copies of keys. The keys will be saved in the memory area exclusively reserved for kdump where even the 1st kernel has no direct access. And further more, two additional protections are added, - save the copy randomly in kdump reserved memory as suggested by Jan - clear the _PAGE_PRESENT flag of the page that stores the copy as suggested by Pingfan This patch set only supports x86. There will be patches to support other architectures once this patch set gets merged. v4 - rebase onto latest Linus tree so Baoquan can apply the patches for code review - fix kernel test robot warnings v3 - Support CPU/memory hot-plugging [Baoquan] - Don't save the keys temporarily to simplify the implementation [Baoquan] - Support multiple LUKS encrypted volumes - Read logon key instead of user key to improve security [Ondrej] - A kernel config option CRASH_DM_CRYPT for this feature (disabled by default) - Fix warnings found by kernel test robot - Rebase the code onto 6.9.0-rc5+ v2 - work together with libscryptsetup's --link-vk-to-keyring/--volume-key-keyring APIs [Milan and Ondrej] - add the case where console virtual keyboard is untrusted for confidential VM - use dm_crypt_key instead of LUKS volume key [Milan and Eric] - fix some code format issues - don't move "struct kexec_segment" declaration - Rebase the code onto latest Linus tree (6.7.0) v1 - "Put the luks key handling related to crash_dump out into a separate file kernel/crash_dump_luks.c" [Baoquan] - Put the generic luks handling code before the x86 specific code to make it easier for other arches to follow suit [Baoquan] - Use phys_to_virt instead of "pfn -> page -> vaddr" [Dave Hansen] - Drop the RFC prefix [Dave Young] - Rebase the code onto latest Linus tree (6.4.0-rc4) RFC v2 - libcryptsetup interacts with the kernel via sysfs instead of "hacking" dm-crypt - to save a kdump copy of the LUKS volume key in 1st kernel - to add a logon key using the copy for libcryptsetup in kdump kernel [Milan] - to avoid the incorrect usage of LUKS master key in dm-crypt [Milan] - save the kdump copy of LUKS volume key randomly [Jan] - mark the kdump copy inaccessible [Pingfan] - Miscellaneous - explain when operations related to the LUKS volume key happen [Jan] - s/master key/volume key/g - use crash_ instead of kexec_ as function prefix - fix commit subject prefixes e.g. "x86, kdump" to x86/crash Coiby Xu (7): kexec_file: allow to place kexec_buf randomly crash_dump: make dm crypt keys persist for the kdump kernel crash_dump: store dm keys in kdump reserved memory crash_dump: reuse saved dm crypt keys for CPU/memory hot-plugging crash_dump: retrieve dm crypt keys in kdump kernel x86/crash: pass dm crypt keys to kdump kernel x86/crash: make the page that stores the dm crypt keys inaccessible arch/x86/kernel/crash.c | 15 +- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 7 + arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 21 ++ include/linux/crash_core.h | 9 +- include/linux/crash_dump.h | 2 + include/linux/kexec.h | 6 + kernel/Kconfig.kexec | 8 + kernel/Makefile | 1 + kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c | 319 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/kexec_file.c | 15 ++ kernel/ksysfs.c | 22 ++ 11 files changed, 423 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c base-commit: de7e71ef8bed222dd144d8878091ecb6d5dfd208 -- 2.45.0 _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec