From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-path: Received: from fgwmail6.fujitsu.co.jp ([192.51.44.36]) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.80.1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1Vjf2I-0002Sd-3w for kexec@lists.infradead.org; Fri, 22 Nov 2013 00:55:55 +0000 Received: from m2.gw.fujitsu.co.jp (unknown [10.0.50.72]) by fgwmail6.fujitsu.co.jp (Postfix) with ESMTP id 405393EE0B6 for ; Fri, 22 Nov 2013 09:55:32 +0900 (JST) Received: from smail (m2 [127.0.0.1]) by outgoing.m2.gw.fujitsu.co.jp (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2B71F45DE54 for ; Fri, 22 Nov 2013 09:55:32 +0900 (JST) Received: from s2.gw.fujitsu.co.jp (s2.gw.nic.fujitsu.com [10.0.50.92]) by m2.gw.fujitsu.co.jp (Postfix) with ESMTP id 132B945DE4D for ; Fri, 22 Nov 2013 09:55:32 +0900 (JST) Received: from s2.gw.fujitsu.co.jp (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by s2.gw.fujitsu.co.jp (Postfix) with ESMTP id F243A1DB803E for ; Fri, 22 Nov 2013 09:55:31 +0900 (JST) Received: from m1000.s.css.fujitsu.com (m1000.s.css.fujitsu.com [10.240.81.136]) by s2.gw.fujitsu.co.jp (Postfix) with ESMTP id A4CD21DB803A for ; Fri, 22 Nov 2013 09:55:31 +0900 (JST) Message-ID: <528EAB73.9010700@jp.fujitsu.com> Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2013 09:55:15 +0900 From: HATAYAMA Daisuke MIME-Version: 1.0 Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] kexec: A new system call to allow in kernel loading References: <1384969851-7251-1-git-send-email-vgoyal@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <1384969851-7251-1-git-send-email-vgoyal@redhat.com> List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; Format="flowed" Sender: "kexec" Errors-To: kexec-bounces+dwmw2=twosheds.infradead.org@lists.infradead.org To: Vivek Goyal Cc: mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, greg@kroah.com, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, ebiederm@xmission.com, hpa@zytor.com (2013/11/21 2:50), Vivek Goyal wrote: > Current proposed secureboot implementation disables kexec/kdump because > it can allow unsigned kernel to run on a secureboot platform. Intial > idea was to sign /sbin/kexec binary and let that binary do the kernel > signature verification. I had posted RFC patches for this apparoach > here. > > https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/9/10/560 > > Later we had discussion at Plumbers and most of the people thought > that signing and trusting /sbin/kexec is becoming complex. So a > better idea might be let kernel do the signature verification of > new kernel being loaded. This calls for implementing a new system call > and moving lot of user space code in kernel. > > kexec_load() system call allows loading a kexec/kdump kernel and jump > to that kernel at right time. Though a lot of processing is done in > user space which prepares a list of segments/buffers to be loaded and > kexec_load() works on that list of segments. It does not know what's > contained in those segments. > > Now a new system call kexec_file_load() is implemented which takes > kernel fd and initrd fd as parameters. Now kernel should be able > to verify signature of newly loaded kernel. > > This is an early RFC patchset. I have not done signature handling > part yet. This is more of a minimal patch to show how new system > call and functionality will look like. Right now it can only handle > bzImage with 64bit entry point on x86_64. No EFI, no x86_32 or any > other architecture. Rest of the things can be added slowly as need > arises. In first iteration, I have tried to address most common use case > for us. > > Any feedback is welcome. > So, ultimately on this design direction, user-land kexec command someday will no longer be used at all? Or is there any feature you will keep in user-land side? I think it big change if one component in kdump will disappear. -- Thanks. HATAYAMA, Daisuke _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec