From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-path: Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.90_1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1gXEg8-0000wf-Lk for kexec@lists.infradead.org; Thu, 13 Dec 2018 00:16:38 +0000 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098399.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id wBD0EHAS053941 for ; Wed, 12 Dec 2018 19:16:21 -0500 Received: from e35.co.us.ibm.com (e35.co.us.ibm.com [32.97.110.153]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2pbasqn0wx-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Wed, 12 Dec 2018 19:16:20 -0500 Received: from localhost by e35.co.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Thu, 13 Dec 2018 00:16:20 -0000 References: <20181208202705.18673-2-nayna@linux.ibm.com> <20181209044849.825-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> From: Thiago Jung Bauermann Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/7] integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring In-reply-to: <20181209044849.825-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2018 22:15:56 -0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <871s6mffib.fsf@morokweng.localdomain> List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "kexec" Errors-To: kexec-bounces+dwmw2=infradead.org@lists.infradead.org To: Nayna Jain Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, mpe@ellerman.id.au, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com, seth.forshee@canonical.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, ebiederm@xmission.com, jforbes@redhat.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, vgoyal@redhat.com Nayna Jain writes: > On secure boot enabled systems, a verified kernel may need to kexec > additional kernels. For example, it may be used as a bootloader needing > to kexec a target kernel or it may need to kexec a crashdump kernel. In > such cases, it may want to verify the signature of the next kernel > image. > > It is further possible that the kernel image is signed with third party > keys which are stored as platform or firmware keys in the 'db' variable. > The kernel, however, can not directly verify these platform keys, and an > administrator may therefore not want to trust them for arbitrary usage. > In order to differentiate platform keys from other keys and provide the > necessary separation of trust, the kernel needs an additional keyring to > store platform keys. > > This patch creates the new keyring called ".platform" to isolate keys > provided by platform from keys by kernel. These keys are used to > facilitate signature verification during kexec. Since the scope of this > keyring is only the platform/firmware keys, it cannot be updated from > userspace. > > This keyring can be enabled by setting CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING. > > Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain > Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar > Acked-by: Serge Hallyn > --- > security/integrity/Kconfig | 11 +++++ > security/integrity/Makefile | 1 + > security/integrity/digsig.c | 48 +++++++++++++++------- > security/integrity/integrity.h | 3 +- > .../integrity/platform_certs/platform_keyring.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++ > 5 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/platform_keyring.c Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann -- Thiago Jung Bauermann IBM Linux Technology Center _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec