From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AEB09E674BF for ; Fri, 1 Nov 2024 09:32:21 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=bombadil.20210309; h=Sender: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post: List-Archive:List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:In-Reply-To:References:To:From:Subject: Cc:Message-Id:Date:Mime-Version:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description: Resent-Date:Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID: List-Owner; bh=oLXF06/jvIBvuqJLaJXSu0maBFPetO/kf7XL1wd8kts=; b=g0he4RElXhz4VG Q7V2oNwP9h3vFzZz98GHvPTG3Wfz9A38aZRt0tjt0BQxF7LXi9vMYfEinEJefYnsl15MnsevMLDzW 1YNjZztMm6C5BLGJWfxMwXyhJ2dELudRUnebDLnx5sWBU2oKo81ESOObc1TDLGSDomrGO8SW+W7VU LNJHmBMFJbNj4ImUa+FhuxBlTbp/i4vGXCSYBB4w12CtxzbK6NGwasoZX2a6SwtcHsyroTGSG8YWc cgcANwriTXhUk34iYo8Jxo9jM/YGKIkGB36elfOHcaQ0i1AzgMISU1UFEbeHPx2oyx/pSrcbzx3t4 T9dt96vMRnHjDHAzzhlg==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=bombadil.infradead.org) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.98 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1t6o0y-00000006PlL-2zPL; Fri, 01 Nov 2024 09:32:20 +0000 Received: from nyc.source.kernel.org ([2604:1380:45d1:ec00::3]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.98 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1t6nzh-00000006PP4-3D7l for kexec@lists.infradead.org; Fri, 01 Nov 2024 09:31:03 +0000 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (transwarp.subspace.kernel.org [100.75.92.58]) by nyc.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3F28AA414DA; Fri, 1 Nov 2024 09:29:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C81E9C4CECD; Fri, 1 Nov 2024 09:30:59 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1730453460; bh=E2hqZuQZtN0s10rwxtt69HOZ+Xb8z/BgC9HjxUEaI8I=; h=Date:Cc:Subject:From:To:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=Zkya8/hD7vHw7APlNFmnxhWEkpDonfTxxz8OWZ+5yd6bN6LCtcPcxwsVE4U7z6DDP axnPzOvjCL6gChmB6XulcLUOprx36LAu5iMNXWzVPRXPbDOqKpoLUJ6iduXcDyflT/ MGr+5cRmIRyVpfucy34v+J2ldo2IwS6yp/UXbWLgo3x0F4O1nUVnbJY3WBeqM6aRXF EP7NRCMufh/YmLLTgvYeE4Z82criQF5xuFnk5KcA3VUhhV8BGeltxg2rih8cv0ya7h Fd7aWjWXjLqa6ANGOzuDQQWJu596wZ/9wiXgDCCm/AHABThwJgXn6v4l7PmyqqFSTi q48cT5bH1WOWQ== Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Fri, 01 Nov 2024 11:30:56 +0200 Message-Id: Cc: "Thomas Gleixner" , "Ross Philipson" , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 00/20] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" To: "Jarkko Sakkinen" , "Ard Biesheuvel" X-Mailer: aerc 0.18.2 References: <20240913200517.3085794-1-ross.philipson@oracle.com> <87wmhoulb9.ffs@tglx> <87ldy3vpjh.ffs@tglx> In-Reply-To: X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20241101_023101_939050_6BE509E1 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 42.46 ) X-BeenThere: kexec@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "kexec" Errors-To: kexec-bounces+kexec=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org On Fri Nov 1, 2024 at 11:18 AM EET, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Fri Nov 1, 2024 at 10:50 AM EET, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > > On Fri, 1 Nov 2024 at 01:40, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > > > On Fri Nov 1, 2024 at 2:33 AM EET, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > On Fri Nov 1, 2024 at 1:08 AM EET, Thomas Gleixner wrote: > > > > > On Fri, Nov 01 2024 at 00:37, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > > > On Thu Oct 31, 2024 at 9:25 PM EET, Thomas Gleixner wrote: > > > > > >> So this looks pretty reasonable to me by now and I'm inclined to take it > > > > > >> through the tip x86 tree, but that needs reviewed/acked-by's from the > > > > > >> crypto and TPM folks. EFI has been reviewed already. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Can we make progress on this please? > > > > > > > > > > > > So TPM patches do have bunch of glitches: > > > > > > > > > > > > - 15/20: I don't get this. There is nothing to report unless tree > > > > > > is falling. The reported-by tag literally meaningless. Maybe this > > > > > > is something that makes sense with this feature. Explain from that > > > > > > angle. > > > > > > - 16/20: Is this actually a bug fix? If it is should be before 15/20. > > > > > > - 17/20: the commit message could do a better job explaining how the > > > > > > locality can vary. I'm not sure how this will be used by rest of > > > > > > the patch set. > > > > > > - 18/20: I'm not confident we want to give privilege to set locality > > > > > > to the user space. The commit message neither makes a case of this. > > > > > > Has this been tested to together with bus encryption (just checking)? > > > > > > > > > > Can you please explicitely voice your detailed technical concerns in > > > > > replies to the actual patches? > > > > > > > > - 15/20 looks like a rigged patch. I don't really know why it is done > > > > so it is hard to either suggest how "resolve it". > > > > - 16/20 probably makes sense but if it is a bug fix or part of it is, > > > > the bug fix should have relevant fixes etc tags so that it can be > > > > picked up to stable kernels. > > > > - 17-18/20: I'd speak about this as the "one whole" i.e. here the > > > > privilege to be able change locality during run-time is really > > > > concerning. Could the locality be figured out for the kernel > > > > command-line instead? The sysfs attribute can exist as read-only. > > > > > > > > So yeah, the way I see it 15-16 are the more trivial issue to sort > > > > out (probably) but with 17-18 we have an actual architectural concern > > > > for kernel overall. > > > > > > Further: > > > > > > 15/20: I can accept this without reported-by tag (or changed as > > > suggested-by). It does not harm. > > > 16/20: I'll re-review this with time. I'll try to get this done > > > latest next week. > > > > > > So let's put focus only on 17 and 18. Can this problem be sorted out > > > by kernel command-line parameter? In the case of locality we want to > > > keep regular "chain of trust" i.e. boot-loader makes the decision, > > > *even* in the case of DRTM. I would call this almost as constraint > > > that would be wise to set. > > > > > > > Please don't add a kernel command line parameter for this - the code > > running in the decompressor will be the one setting it and there are > > better ways to pass information between these components (and the > > slaunch stack is already doing that in any case) > > Not sure if I follow this (I don't know what "decompressor" is). Right you refer to the process running GETSEC[SENTER], sorry, in the page with this detail. BR, Jarkko _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec