From: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
To: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v6 3/4] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature
Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2022 10:14:31 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YlzJh8SE8pV1Et+O@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220414014344.228523-4-coxu@redhat.com>
On 04/14/22 at 09:43am, Coiby Xu wrote:
> Currently, a problem faced by arm64 is if a kernel image is signed by a
> MOK key, loading it via the kexec_file_load() system call would be
> rejected with the error "Lockdown: kexec: kexec of unsigned images is
> restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7".
>
> This happens because image_verify_sig uses only the primary keyring that
> contains only kernel built-in keys to verify the kexec image.
>
> This patch allows to verify arm64 kernel image signature using not only
> .builtin_trusted_keys but also .platform and .secondary_trusted_keys
> keyring.
>
> Fixes: 732b7b93d849 ("arm64: kexec_file: add kernel signature verification support")
Cc stable?
Otherwise, LGTM,
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
> Cc: kexec at lists.infradead.org
> Cc: keyrings at vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-security-module at vger.kernel.org
> Cc: stable at kernel.org
> Co-developed-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
> Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
> ---
> arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c | 11 +----------
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
> index 9ec34690e255..5ed6a585f21f 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
> @@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
> #include <linux/kexec.h>
> #include <linux/pe.h>
> #include <linux/string.h>
> -#include <linux/verification.h>
> #include <asm/byteorder.h>
> #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
> #include <asm/image.h>
> @@ -130,18 +129,10 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *image,
> return NULL;
> }
>
> -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
> -static int image_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
> -{
> - return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, NULL,
> - VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
> -}
> -#endif
> -
> const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_image_ops = {
> .probe = image_probe,
> .load = image_load,
> #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
> - .verify_sig = image_verify_sig,
> + .verify_sig = kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig,
> #endif
> };
> --
> 2.34.1
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-04-18 2:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-04-14 1:43 [PATCH v6 0/4] use more system keyrings to verify arm64 and s390 kexec kernel image signature Coiby Xu
2022-04-14 1:43 ` [PATCH v6 1/4] kexec: clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig Coiby Xu
2022-04-14 3:44 ` Baoquan He
2022-04-15 9:37 ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-18 1:40 ` Baoquan He
2022-04-14 1:43 ` [PATCH v6 2/4] kexec, KEYS: make the code in bzImage64_verify_sig generic Coiby Xu
2022-04-18 1:53 ` Baoquan He
2022-04-18 5:42 ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-14 1:43 ` [PATCH v6 3/4] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature Coiby Xu
2022-04-18 2:14 ` Baoquan He [this message]
2022-04-18 5:46 ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-14 1:43 ` [PATCH v6 4/4] kexec, KEYS, s390: Make use of built-in and secondary keyring for signature verification Coiby Xu
2022-04-18 2:11 ` Baoquan He
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=YlzJh8SE8pV1Et+O@MiWiFi-R3L-srv \
--to=bhe@redhat.com \
--cc=kexec@lists.infradead.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox