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From: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
To: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org, "Ondrej Kozina" <okozina@redhat.com>,
	"Milan Broz" <gmazyland@gmail.com>,
	"Thomas Staudt" <tstaudt@de.ibm.com>,
	"Daniel P . Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
	"Kairui Song" <ryncsn@gmail.com>,
	"Jan Pazdziora" <jpazdziora@redhat.com>,
	"Pingfan Liu" <kernelfans@gmail.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	"Vitaly Kuznetsov" <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/7] Support kdump with LUKS encryption by reusing LUKS volume keys
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2024 18:06:18 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZmLbmriQYol2JHKe@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240523050451.788754-1-coxu@redhat.com>

Hi Coiby,

On 05/23/24 at 01:04pm, Coiby Xu wrote:
> LUKS is the standard for Linux disk encryption. Many users choose LUKS
> and in some use cases like Confidential VM it's mandated. With kdump
> enabled, when the 1st kernel crashes, the system could boot into the
> kdump/crash kernel and dump the memory image i.e. /proc/vmcore to a
> specified target. Currently, when dumping vmcore to a LUKS
> encrypted device, there are two problems,

I am done with this round of reviewing. The overall approach looks good
to me, while there are places to improve or fix. I have added comment on
all things I am concerned about, please check. Thanks for the effort.

By the way, do you get confirmation on the solution from encryption/keys
developer of redhat internally or upstream? With my understanding, it
looks good. It may need their confirmation or approval in some ways.

Thanks
Baoquan


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  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-06-07 10:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-23  5:04 [PATCH v4 0/7] Support kdump with LUKS encryption by reusing LUKS volume keys Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  5:04 ` [PATCH v4 1/7] kexec_file: allow to place kexec_buf randomly Coiby Xu
2024-06-04  7:41   ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:26     ` Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  5:04 ` [PATCH v4 2/7] crash_dump: make dm crypt keys persist for the kdump kernel Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  7:21   ` Greg KH
2024-05-25  7:57     ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-04  8:51   ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:27     ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-10  2:00       ` Baoquan He
2024-10-18  1:44         ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-05  8:22   ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:27     ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-10  1:18       ` Baoquan He
2024-10-18  1:02         ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-06  3:11   ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:26     ` Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  5:04 ` [PATCH v4 3/7] crash_dump: store dm keys in kdump reserved memory Coiby Xu
2024-05-24  3:17   ` kernel test robot
2024-06-04 13:54     ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:26       ` Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  5:04 ` [PATCH v4 4/7] crash_dump: reuse saved dm crypt keys for CPU/memory hot-plugging Coiby Xu
2024-06-04 13:52   ` Baoquan He
2024-05-23  5:04 ` [PATCH v4 5/7] crash_dump: retrieve dm crypt keys in kdump kernel Coiby Xu
2024-06-07  9:50   ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:27     ` Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  5:04 ` [PATCH v4 6/7] x86/crash: pass dm crypt keys to " Coiby Xu
2024-06-07  9:57   ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:27     ` Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  5:04 ` [PATCH v4 7/7] x86/crash: make the page that stores the dm crypt keys inaccessible Coiby Xu
2024-06-07 10:00   ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:27     ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-07 10:06 ` Baoquan He [this message]
2024-06-07 12:26   ` [PATCH v4 0/7] Support kdump with LUKS encryption by reusing LUKS volume keys Coiby Xu
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2024-06-07 12:26 Coiby Xu
2024-06-08  1:26 ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-08  9:10   ` Greg KH

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