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Mon, 06 Apr 2026 17:45:04 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: by 2002:a17:90a:d2ce:b0:35b:8d89:719b with SMTP id 98e67ed59e1d1-35de678fc27mr13201139a91.1.1775522704261; Mon, 06 Apr 2026 17:45:04 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost ([209.132.188.88]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 98e67ed59e1d1-35dbe623d94sm20615062a91.7.2026.04.06.17.45.02 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 06 Apr 2026 17:45:03 -0700 (PDT) Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2026 08:44:39 +0800 From: Coiby Xu To: Sourabh Jain Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org, stable@vger.kernel.org, Andrew Morton , Baoquan He , Vivek Goyal , Dave Young , open list Subject: Re: [PATCH] crash_dump: Fix potential double free and UAF of keys_header Message-ID: References: <20260403100126.1468200-1-coxu@redhat.com> <972b9a73-d066-4a38-8a4b-fe7d1ba2944b@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <972b9a73-d066-4a38-8a4b-fe7d1ba2944b@linux.ibm.com> X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-MFC-PROC-ID: 2hdvfAWW6CksLBrGHeWDy0H19NmzXZkzN6gr5O5oNZc_1775522705 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20260406_174511_759518_5BB9DD83 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 31.65 ) X-BeenThere: kexec@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "kexec" Errors-To: kexec-bounces+kexec=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org On Fri, Apr 03, 2026 at 07:48:29PM +0530, Sourabh Jain wrote: >Hello Coiby, Hi Sourabh, > >On 03/04/26 15:31, Coiby Xu wrote: >>If kexec_add_buffer fails, keys_header will be freed. And depending on >>/sys/kernel/config/crash_dm_crypt_key/reuse, it will lead to the >>following two problems if the kexec_file_load syscall is called again, >> 1. Double free of keys_header if reuse=false >> 2. UAF of keys_header if reuse=true >> >>Address these problems by setting keys_header to NULL after freeing >>kbuf.buffer and re-building keys_header when necessary respectively. >> >>Fixes: 479e58549b0f ("crash_dump: store dm crypt keys in kdump reserved memory") >>Fixes: 9ebfa8dcaea7 ("crash_dump: reuse saved dm crypt keys for CPU/memory hot-plugging") >>Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org >>Cc: Andrew Morton >>Reported-by: Sourabh Jain >>Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu >>--- >> kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c | 3 ++- >> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >> >>diff --git a/kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c b/kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c >>index a20d4097744a..92eebef27156 100644 >>--- a/kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c >>+++ b/kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c >>@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ int crash_load_dm_crypt_keys(struct kimage *image) >> return -ENOENT; >> } >>- if (!is_dm_key_reused) { >>+ if (!is_dm_key_reused || !keys_header) { >> image->dm_crypt_keys_addr = 0; >> r = build_keys_header(); >> if (r) >>@@ -433,6 +433,7 @@ int crash_load_dm_crypt_keys(struct kimage *image) >> r = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf); >> if (r) { >> kvfree((void *)kbuf.buffer); >>+ keys_header = NULL; >> return r; >> } >> image->dm_crypt_keys_addr = kbuf.mem; >> >>base-commit: d8a9a4b11a137909e306e50346148fc5c3b63f9d > >Sashiko raised seven concerns on this patch. Most of them are >not directly related to the changes introduced here, but I >think they can be addressed along with this fix. > >https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260403100126.1468200-1-coxu%40redhat.com Thanks for pointing me to the Sashiko's code review and also sharing your meticulous analysis! > > >1. build_keys_header() does not release key_header memory on >   error. This can cause incorrect keys to be loaded for the >   kdump kernel in subsequent system calls. > >Can be addressed by releasing keys_header on error path. I'll address this issue! Thanks for the suggestion! > >2–3. get_keys_header_size() uses key_count to find the size of >key_header buffer, which can lead to out-of-bounds access >at two places. >  a. Around kexec_add_buffer() >  b. In build_keys_header() > >I think there is one more place where this applies is: >  c. In get_keys_from_kdump_reserved_memory() at memcpy > >I agree with solution provided by Sashiko of using keys_header->total_keys >instead. Thanks for showing me where out-of-bounds accesses can happen! I'll do some testing to see if using keys_header->total_keys is sufficient. > >4. get_keys_from_kdump_reserved_memory() may run into issues >   if kexec_crash_image->dm_crypt_keys_addr is larger than a >   page size during memcpy. Because kmap_local_page only maps >   one page. > >How about moving this in a loop and do map and copy page by page? Yeah, looping over the pages should be a robust solution. > >5. Related to releasing the keyring_ref reference count, but >   I did not fully understand this concern. My latest test already covers the case where there are two keys to iterate over. I'll dig more into keyring_ref to see if Sashiko's concerns is valid. > >6. restore_dm_crypt_keys_to_thread_keyring() does not release >   previously allocated keys_header, leading to a memory leak. Thanks for raising the concern! Although we can assume the system will reboot soon after vmcore dumping is finished, it's better to free keys_header. > >As per kdump.rst, restore was introduced to handle CPU and >memory hotplug cases. Is it needed when there is no in-kernel >update to the kdump image on CPU or memory hotplug events? > >But in that case, we rely on a udev rule to reload the kdump image >again. > >I am confused about when exactly we need to restore. To clarify, reuse other than restore is needed for non in-kernel update when handing CPU/memory hotplugging. Yes, a udev rule is also needed in this case. For restore, it's to restore dm-crypt keys in kdump kernel. I'll see if I can update the documentation to improve clarity. > > >7. Possible memory leak and data races due to concurrent kexec loads. > >I think we can ignore this because both kexec system calls are protected >by the same lock. I agree, this concern can be dismissed. > >I also noticed that kdump.rst still says CONFIG_CRASH_DM_CRYPT is >only supported on x86_64 for now. With the patch series below, >this needs to change, right? >https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260225060347.718905-1-coxu@redhat.com/ Yes, the documentation will need to updated. Thanks for the reminder! > >- Sourabh Jain > > > > -- Best regards, Coiby