From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
To: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
David Hildenbrand <david@kernel.org>,
Lorenzo Stoakes <ljs@kernel.org>,
"Liam R. Howlett" <liam@infradead.org>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@kernel.org>,
Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>, Baoquan He <baoquan.he@linux.dev>,
Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>,
Pratyush Yadav <pratyush@kernel.org>,
Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>,
Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, rmikey@meta.com, riel@surriel.com,
kernel-team@meta.com, Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] kexec: keep the next kernel off hardware-poisoned pages
Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2026 19:32:41 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ann9Kcesyb4T9Z8b@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260810-kexec_posioned-v5-1-95e1b5e2e656@debian.org>
Hi Breno,
On Mon, Aug 10, 2026 at 06:32:04AM -0700, Breno Leitao wrote:
> Memory failures (such as unrecoverable ECCs errors) are getting more and
> more common. The kernel knows how to handle it while running, marking it
> as poisoned (and SIGBUS user tasks).
>
> Poisoned memory is removed from the buddy allocator, but, not from
> other places. A current problem is that kexec will load new kernel
> on top of a bad/poisoned memory, which is undesirable.
>
> If the next kernel's image, initrd or purgatory lands on poisoned frame,
> the relocation copy writes to the bad memory and the machine checks
What does the machine check here? ;-)
> during the kexec.
>
> Skip hardware-poisoned frames when placing segments: check them in the
> kexec_file hole finder so it lays the next kernel down on good memory,
> and reject a poisoned destination in sanity_check_segment_list() for
> the kexec_load path, which cannot relocate.
>
> The two hole finders walk in opposite directions, so each asks for the
> end of the poison it has to clear: the top-down walk for the first
> poisoned page in the window, the bottom-up walk for the last. A poisoned
> hugetlb folio counts in full, as hugetlb keeps the flag on the folio and
> the poisoned subpages on its raw hwpoison list.
I had hard time parsing these two paragraphs. Can you please add more human
touch to them?
> Suggested-by: Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
>
> diff --git a/kernel/kexec_core.c b/kernel/kexec_core.c
> index dc770b9a6d053..7ee8c9f078f6b 100644
> --- a/kernel/kexec_core.c
> +++ b/kernel/kexec_core.c
> @@ -212,6 +212,16 @@ int sanity_check_segment_list(struct kimage *image)
> }
> #endif
>
> + /*
> + * Reject destinations that land on hardware-poisoned memory: the
> + * relocation copy would machine-check on the bad frame.
Would cause machine-check exception?
> + */
> + for (i = 0; i < nr_segments; i++) {
> + if (range_first_hwpoison(image->segment[i].mem,
> + image->segment[i].memsz) != PHYS_ADDR_MAX)
> + return -EHWPOISON;
> + }
> +
> /*
> * The destination addresses are searched from system RAM rather than
> * being allocated from the buddy allocator, so they are not guaranteed
> diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
> index 59fb9d71e9d86..9ba6cc01af929 100644
> --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
> +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
> @@ -475,6 +475,7 @@ static int locate_mem_hole_top_down(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
> {
> struct kimage *image = kbuf->image;
> unsigned long temp_start, temp_end;
> + phys_addr_t poison;
>
> temp_end = min(end, kbuf->buf_max);
> temp_start = temp_end - kbuf->memsz + 1;
> @@ -504,6 +505,15 @@ static int locate_mem_hole_top_down(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
> continue;
> }
>
> + poison = range_first_hwpoison(temp_start, kbuf->memsz);
> + if (poison != PHYS_ADDR_MAX) {
> + /* we hit a poisoned page */
> + if (poison < kbuf->memsz)
> + return 0;
Won't we break out on the next iteration boundaries check? I.e.
if (temp_start < start || temp_start < kbuf->buf_min)
return 0;
> + temp_start = poison - kbuf->memsz;
> + continue;
> + }
> +
> /* We found a suitable memory range */
> break;
> } while (1);
> @@ -520,6 +530,7 @@ static int locate_mem_hole_bottom_up(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
> {
> struct kimage *image = kbuf->image;
> unsigned long temp_start, temp_end;
> + phys_addr_t poison;
>
> temp_start = max(start, kbuf->buf_min);
>
> @@ -546,6 +557,13 @@ static int locate_mem_hole_bottom_up(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
> continue;
> }
>
> + poison = range_last_hwpoison(temp_start, kbuf->memsz);
> + if (poison != PHYS_ADDR_MAX) {
> + /* we hit a poisoned page */
> + temp_start = poison + PAGE_SIZE;
> + continue;
> + }
> +
> /* We found a suitable memory range */
> break;
> } while (1);
> diff --git a/mm/memory-failure.c b/mm/memory-failure.c
> index a8b03e2920ba8..f3875680e7955 100644
> --- a/mm/memory-failure.c
> +++ b/mm/memory-failure.c
> @@ -96,6 +96,47 @@ void num_poisoned_pages_sub(unsigned long pfn, long i)
> memblk_nr_poison_sub(pfn, i);
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Return the first or the last hardware-poisoned online page in [start,
> + * start + size), or PHYS_ADDR_MAX if the range is clean.
> + */
> +static phys_addr_t range_hwpoison(phys_addr_t start, unsigned long size,
> + bool first)
> +{
> + phys_addr_t poison = PHYS_ADDR_MAX;
> + unsigned long pfn, end_pfn;
> +
> + if (!size || !atomic_long_read(&num_poisoned_pages))
> + return poison;
> +
> + end_pfn = PHYS_PFN(start + size - 1);
> + for (pfn = PHYS_PFN(start); pfn <= end_pfn; pfn++) {
> + struct page *page = pfn_to_online_page(pfn);
> +
> + cond_resched();
cond_resched() for every pfn is too much, isn't it?
> +
> + if (!page || !is_page_hwpoison(page))
> + continue;
> +
> + if (first)
> + return PFN_PHYS(pfn);
> +
> + poison = PFN_PHYS(pfn);
> + }
> +
> + return poison;
> +}
> +
> +phys_addr_t range_first_hwpoison(phys_addr_t start, unsigned long size)
> +{
> + return range_hwpoison(start, size, true);
> +}
> +
> +phys_addr_t range_last_hwpoison(phys_addr_t start, unsigned long size)
> +{
> + return range_hwpoison(start, size, false);
> +}
> +
> /**
> * MF_ATTR_RO - Create sysfs entry for each memory failure statistics.
> * @_name: name of the file in the per NUMA sysfs directory.
>
> ---
> base-commit: c5e32e86ca02b003f86e095d379b38148999293d
> change-id: 20260727-kexec_posioned-72bb0a4143a0
>
> Best regards,
> --
> Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
>
--
Sincerely yours,
Mike.
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-10 16:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-10 13:32 [PATCH v5] kexec: keep the next kernel off hardware-poisoned pages Breno Leitao
2026-08-10 14:01 ` Pratyush Yadav
2026-08-10 14:42 ` Bradley Morgan
2026-08-10 14:59 ` Kiryl Shutsemau
2026-08-10 16:32 ` Mike Rapoport [this message]
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