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From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>, kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
	Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] lockdown: kexec_file: prevent unsigned kernel image when KEXEC_SIG not enabled
Date: Tue, 03 Jan 2023 09:42:26 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <bd1d2f66bffb25fd80b2dd2464f8cda24f68c249.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221230065850.897967-1-coxu@redhat.com>

Hi Coiby,

On Fri, 2022-12-30 at 14:58 +0800, Coiby Xu wrote:
> A kernel builder may not enable KEXEC_SIG and some architectures like
> ppc64 simply don't have KEXEC_SIG. In these cases, unless both
> IMA_ARCH_POLICY and secure boot also enabled, lockdown doesn't prevent
> unsigned kernel image from being kexec'ed via the kexec_file_load
> syscall whereas it could prevent one via the kexec_load syscall. Mandate
> signature verification for those cases.

The phrase "unless both IMA_ARCH_POLICY and secure boot also enabled"
doesn't reflect the code.  IMA could contain a custom policy rule which
requires the kexec kernel image signature verification as well.  Refer
to the comment now in mandate_signature_verification().

thanks,

Mimi


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      parent reply	other threads:[~2023-01-03 17:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-12-30  6:58 [PATCH v3 1/2] lockdown: kexec_file: prevent unsigned kernel image when KEXEC_SIG not enabled Coiby Xu
2022-12-30  6:58 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] selftests/kexec: enable lockdown tests Coiby Xu
2023-01-03 13:48   ` Mimi Zohar
2023-01-03 14:42 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]

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