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From: ross.philipson@oracle.com
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, ardb@kernel.org,
	mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com,
	peterhuewe@gmx.de, jgg@ziepe.ca, luto@amacapital.net,
	nivedita@alum.mit.edu, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au,
	davem@davemloft.net, corbet@lwn.net, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	dwmw2@infradead.org, baolu.lu@linux.intel.com,
	kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com,
	trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com, ross.philipson@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 10/19] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support
Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2024 14:47:27 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <d95d73d2-c728-4da2-b68e-d2e39a518ae6@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <D1RI46IG5GSA.17H7M0DIQGRQ0@kernel.org>

On 6/4/24 1:05 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Fri May 31, 2024 at 4:03 AM EEST, Ross Philipson wrote:
>> On Intel, the APs are left in a well documented state after TXT performs
>> the late launch. Specifically they cannot have #INIT asserted on them so
>> a standard startup via INIT/SIPI/SIPI cannot be performed. Instead the
>> early SL stub code uses MONITOR and MWAIT to park the APs. The realmode/init.c
>> code updates the jump address for the waiting APs with the location of the
>> Secure Launch entry point in the RM piggy after it is loaded and fixed up.
>> As the APs are woken up by writing the monitor, the APs jump to the Secure
>> Launch entry point in the RM piggy which mimics what the real mode code would
>> do then jumps to the standard RM piggy protected mode entry point.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
>> ---
>>   arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h      |  3 ++
>>   arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c            | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>>   arch/x86/realmode/init.c             |  3 ++
>>   arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S        |  3 ++
>>   arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S | 32 +++++++++++++++
>>   5 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
>> index 87e5482acd0d..339b48e2543d 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
>> @@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ struct real_mode_header {
>>   #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>>   	u32	machine_real_restart_seg;
>>   #endif
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
>> +	u32	sl_trampoline_start32;
>> +#endif
>>   };
>>   
>>   /* This must match data at realmode/rm/trampoline_{32,64}.S */
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
>> index 0c35207320cb..adb521221d6c 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
>> @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
>>   #include <linux/stackprotector.h>
>>   #include <linux/cpuhotplug.h>
>>   #include <linux/mc146818rtc.h>
>> +#include <linux/slaunch.h>
>>   
>>   #include <asm/acpi.h>
>>   #include <asm/cacheinfo.h>
>> @@ -868,6 +869,56 @@ int common_cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
>>   	return 0;
>>   }
>>   
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
>> +
>> +static bool slaunch_is_txt_launch(void)
>> +{
>> +	if ((slaunch_get_flags() & (SL_FLAG_ACTIVE|SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT)) ==
>> +	    (SL_FLAG_ACTIVE | SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT))
>> +		return true;
>> +
>> +	return false;
>> +}
> 
> static inline bool slaunch_is_txt_launch(void)
> {
> 	u32 mask =  SL_FLAG_ACTIVE | SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT;
> 
> 	return slaunch_get_flags() & mask == mask;
> }

Actually I think I can take your suggested change and move this function 
to the main header files since this check is done elsewhere. And later I 
can make others like slaunch_is_skinit_launch(). Thanks.

> 
> 
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * TXT AP startup is quite different than normal. The APs cannot have #INIT
>> + * asserted on them or receive SIPIs. The early Secure Launch code has parked
>> + * the APs using monitor/mwait. This will wake the APs by writing the monitor
>> + * and have them jump to the protected mode code in the rmpiggy where the rest
>> + * of the SMP boot of the AP will proceed normally.
>> + */
>> +static void slaunch_wakeup_cpu_from_txt(int cpu, int apicid)
>> +{
>> +	struct sl_ap_wake_info *ap_wake_info;
>> +	struct sl_ap_stack_and_monitor *stack_monitor = NULL;
> 
> struct sl_ap_stack_and_monitor *stack_monitor; /* note: no initialization */
> struct sl_ap_wake_info *ap_wake_info;

Will fix.

> 
> 
>> +
>> +	ap_wake_info = slaunch_get_ap_wake_info();
>> +
>> +	stack_monitor = (struct sl_ap_stack_and_monitor *)__va(ap_wake_info->ap_wake_block +
>> +							       ap_wake_info->ap_stacks_offset);
>> +
>> +	for (unsigned int i = TXT_MAX_CPUS - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
>> +		if (stack_monitor[i].apicid == apicid) {
>> +			/* Write the monitor */
> 
> I'd remove this comment.

Sure.

Ross

> 
>> +			stack_monitor[i].monitor = 1;
>> +			break;
>> +		}
>> +	}
>> +}
>> +
>> +#else
>> +
>> +static inline bool slaunch_is_txt_launch(void)
>> +{
>> +	return false;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline void slaunch_wakeup_cpu_from_txt(int cpu, int apicid)
>> +{
>> +}
>> +
>> +#endif  /* !CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH */
>> +
>>   /*
>>    * NOTE - on most systems this is a PHYSICAL apic ID, but on multiquad
>>    * (ie clustered apic addressing mode), this is a LOGICAL apic ID.
>> @@ -877,7 +928,7 @@ int common_cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
>>   static int do_boot_cpu(u32 apicid, int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
>>   {
>>   	unsigned long start_ip = real_mode_header->trampoline_start;
>> -	int ret;
>> +	int ret = 0;
>>   
>>   #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>>   	/* If 64-bit wakeup method exists, use the 64-bit mode trampoline IP */
>> @@ -922,12 +973,15 @@ static int do_boot_cpu(u32 apicid, int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
>>   
>>   	/*
>>   	 * Wake up a CPU in difference cases:
>> +	 * - Intel TXT DRTM launch uses its own method to wake the APs
>>   	 * - Use a method from the APIC driver if one defined, with wakeup
>>   	 *   straight to 64-bit mode preferred over wakeup to RM.
>>   	 * Otherwise,
>>   	 * - Use an INIT boot APIC message
>>   	 */
>> -	if (apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64)
>> +	if (slaunch_is_txt_launch())
>> +		slaunch_wakeup_cpu_from_txt(cpu, apicid);
>> +	else if (apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64)
>>   		ret = apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64(apicid, start_ip);
>>   	else if (apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu)
>>   		ret = apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu(apicid, start_ip);
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
>> index f9bc444a3064..d95776cb30d3 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
>> @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
>>   #include <linux/memblock.h>
>>   #include <linux/cc_platform.h>
>>   #include <linux/pgtable.h>
>> +#include <linux/slaunch.h>
>>   
>>   #include <asm/set_memory.h>
>>   #include <asm/realmode.h>
>> @@ -210,6 +211,8 @@ void __init init_real_mode(void)
>>   
>>   	setup_real_mode();
>>   	set_real_mode_permissions();
>> +
>> +	slaunch_fixup_jump_vector();
>>   }
>>   
>>   static int __init do_init_real_mode(void)
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S
>> index 2eb62be6d256..3b5cbcbbfc90 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S
>> @@ -37,6 +37,9 @@ SYM_DATA_START(real_mode_header)
>>   #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>>   	.long	__KERNEL32_CS
>>   #endif
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
>> +	.long	pa_sl_trampoline_start32
>> +#endif
>>   SYM_DATA_END(real_mode_header)
>>   
>>   	/* End signature, used to verify integrity */
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
>> index 14d9c7daf90f..b0ce6205d7ea 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
>> @@ -122,6 +122,38 @@ SYM_CODE_END(sev_es_trampoline_start)
>>   
>>   	.section ".text32","ax"
>>   	.code32
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
>> +	.balign 4
>> +SYM_CODE_START(sl_trampoline_start32)
>> +	/*
>> +	 * The early secure launch stub AP wakeup code has taken care of all
>> +	 * the vagaries of launching out of TXT. This bit just mimics what the
>> +	 * 16b entry code does and jumps off to the real startup_32.
>> +	 */
>> +	cli
>> +	wbinvd
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * The %ebx provided is not terribly useful since it is the physical
>> +	 * address of tb_trampoline_start and not the base of the image.
>> +	 * Use pa_real_mode_base, which is fixed up, to get a run time
>> +	 * base register to use for offsets to location that do not have
>> +	 * pa_ symbols.
>> +	 */
>> +	movl    $pa_real_mode_base, %ebx
>> +
>> +	LOCK_AND_LOAD_REALMODE_ESP lock_pa=1
>> +
>> +	lgdt    tr_gdt(%ebx)
>> +	lidt    tr_idt(%ebx)
>> +
>> +	movw	$__KERNEL_DS, %dx	# Data segment descriptor
>> +
>> +	/* Jump to where the 16b code would have jumped */
>> +	ljmpl	$__KERNEL32_CS, $pa_startup_32
>> +SYM_CODE_END(sl_trampoline_start32)
>> +#endif
>> +
>>   	.balign 4
>>   SYM_CODE_START(startup_32)
>>   	movl	%edx, %ss
> 
> BR, Jarkko
> 


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  reply	other threads:[~2024-06-04 21:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 116+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-31  1:03 [PATCH v9 00/19] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 01/19] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 18:18   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 20:28     ` ross.philipson
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 02/19] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 03/19] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 04/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 18:21   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 20:31     ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:36       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 23:00         ` ross.philipson
2024-06-05  0:22           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-05  0:27             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-05  2:33             ` ross.philipson
2024-06-05  4:04               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-05 19:03                 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-06  6:02                   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-06 16:49                     ` ross.philipson
2024-06-20  0:18                       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-20 16:55                         ` ross.philipson
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 05/19] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 18:24   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 20:52     ` ross.philipson
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2024-05-31  2:16   ` Eric Biggers
2024-05-31 13:54     ` Eric W. Biederman
2024-08-15 17:38       ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-08-15 19:10         ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-08-16 10:42           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-16 11:01           ` Andrew Cooper
2024-08-16 11:22             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-16 18:41               ` Matthew Garrett
2024-08-19 18:05                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-19 18:24                   ` Matthew Garrett
2024-08-20 15:26                     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-22 18:29           ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-02-20 15:35             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-02-23 23:08               ` Andrew Cooper
2026-02-24  8:25                 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-08-29  3:17           ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-08-29  3:25             ` Matthew Garrett
2024-08-29 17:26               ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-09-05  1:01             ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-09-13  0:34               ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-09-14  3:57                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-09-21 18:36                   ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-09-21 22:40                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-02 14:53                       ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-11-02 16:04                         ` James Bottomley
2024-11-15  1:17                           ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-11-18 18:43                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-18 18:50                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-18 19:12                               ` James Bottomley
2024-11-18 20:02                                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-21 20:11                                   ` ross.philipson
2024-11-21 20:54                                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-21 22:42                                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-22 23:37                                         ` ross.philipson
2024-12-12 19:56                                   ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-12-12 22:30                                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-12-14  2:56                                       ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-05-31 16:18     ` ross.philipson
2024-08-27 18:14     ` Eric Biggers
2024-08-28 20:14       ` ross.philipson
2024-08-28 23:13         ` Eric Biggers
2024-06-04 18:52   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 21:02     ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:40       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 07/19] x86: Add early SHA-256 " Ross Philipson
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 08/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 11:00   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-05-31 13:33     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-05-31 14:04       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-05-31 16:13         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-06-04 17:31         ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 17:24       ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 17:27         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-06-04 17:33           ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 20:54             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-06-04 21:12               ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 17:14     ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 19:56   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 21:09     ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:43       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 09/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 19:58   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 21:16     ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:45       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 19:59   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 21:17     ` ross.philipson
2024-08-12 19:02     ` ross.philipson
2024-08-15 18:35       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 10/19] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 20:05   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 21:47     ` ross.philipson [this message]
2024-06-04 22:46       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 11/19] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 12/19] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 13/19] tpm: Protect against locality counter underflow Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 20:12   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-15 18:52     ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 14/19] tpm: Ensure tpm is in known state at startup Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 20:14   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-15 19:24     ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 15/19] tpm: Make locality requests return consistent values Ross Philipson
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 16/19] tpm: Add ability to set the preferred locality the TPM chip uses Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 20:27   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 22:14     ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:50       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 23:04         ` ross.philipson
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 17/19] tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the preferred locality Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 20:27   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 18/19] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2024-05-31  1:03 ` [PATCH v9 19/19] x86: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 11:09   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-06-04 17:22     ` ross.philipson

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