From: ross.philipson@oracle.com
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, ardb@kernel.org,
mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com,
peterhuewe@gmx.de, jgg@ziepe.ca, luto@amacapital.net,
nivedita@alum.mit.edu, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au,
davem@davemloft.net, corbet@lwn.net, ebiederm@xmission.com,
dwmw2@infradead.org, baolu.lu@linux.intel.com,
kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com,
trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com, ross.philipson@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 10/19] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support
Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2024 14:47:27 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <d95d73d2-c728-4da2-b68e-d2e39a518ae6@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <D1RI46IG5GSA.17H7M0DIQGRQ0@kernel.org>
On 6/4/24 1:05 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Fri May 31, 2024 at 4:03 AM EEST, Ross Philipson wrote:
>> On Intel, the APs are left in a well documented state after TXT performs
>> the late launch. Specifically they cannot have #INIT asserted on them so
>> a standard startup via INIT/SIPI/SIPI cannot be performed. Instead the
>> early SL stub code uses MONITOR and MWAIT to park the APs. The realmode/init.c
>> code updates the jump address for the waiting APs with the location of the
>> Secure Launch entry point in the RM piggy after it is loaded and fixed up.
>> As the APs are woken up by writing the monitor, the APs jump to the Secure
>> Launch entry point in the RM piggy which mimics what the real mode code would
>> do then jumps to the standard RM piggy protected mode entry point.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h | 3 ++
>> arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>> arch/x86/realmode/init.c | 3 ++
>> arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S | 3 ++
>> arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S | 32 +++++++++++++++
>> 5 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
>> index 87e5482acd0d..339b48e2543d 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h
>> @@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ struct real_mode_header {
>> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>> u32 machine_real_restart_seg;
>> #endif
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
>> + u32 sl_trampoline_start32;
>> +#endif
>> };
>>
>> /* This must match data at realmode/rm/trampoline_{32,64}.S */
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
>> index 0c35207320cb..adb521221d6c 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
>> @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
>> #include <linux/stackprotector.h>
>> #include <linux/cpuhotplug.h>
>> #include <linux/mc146818rtc.h>
>> +#include <linux/slaunch.h>
>>
>> #include <asm/acpi.h>
>> #include <asm/cacheinfo.h>
>> @@ -868,6 +869,56 @@ int common_cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
>> +
>> +static bool slaunch_is_txt_launch(void)
>> +{
>> + if ((slaunch_get_flags() & (SL_FLAG_ACTIVE|SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT)) ==
>> + (SL_FLAG_ACTIVE | SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT))
>> + return true;
>> +
>> + return false;
>> +}
>
> static inline bool slaunch_is_txt_launch(void)
> {
> u32 mask = SL_FLAG_ACTIVE | SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT;
>
> return slaunch_get_flags() & mask == mask;
> }
Actually I think I can take your suggested change and move this function
to the main header files since this check is done elsewhere. And later I
can make others like slaunch_is_skinit_launch(). Thanks.
>
>
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * TXT AP startup is quite different than normal. The APs cannot have #INIT
>> + * asserted on them or receive SIPIs. The early Secure Launch code has parked
>> + * the APs using monitor/mwait. This will wake the APs by writing the monitor
>> + * and have them jump to the protected mode code in the rmpiggy where the rest
>> + * of the SMP boot of the AP will proceed normally.
>> + */
>> +static void slaunch_wakeup_cpu_from_txt(int cpu, int apicid)
>> +{
>> + struct sl_ap_wake_info *ap_wake_info;
>> + struct sl_ap_stack_and_monitor *stack_monitor = NULL;
>
> struct sl_ap_stack_and_monitor *stack_monitor; /* note: no initialization */
> struct sl_ap_wake_info *ap_wake_info;
Will fix.
>
>
>> +
>> + ap_wake_info = slaunch_get_ap_wake_info();
>> +
>> + stack_monitor = (struct sl_ap_stack_and_monitor *)__va(ap_wake_info->ap_wake_block +
>> + ap_wake_info->ap_stacks_offset);
>> +
>> + for (unsigned int i = TXT_MAX_CPUS - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
>> + if (stack_monitor[i].apicid == apicid) {
>> + /* Write the monitor */
>
> I'd remove this comment.
Sure.
Ross
>
>> + stack_monitor[i].monitor = 1;
>> + break;
>> + }
>> + }
>> +}
>> +
>> +#else
>> +
>> +static inline bool slaunch_is_txt_launch(void)
>> +{
>> + return false;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline void slaunch_wakeup_cpu_from_txt(int cpu, int apicid)
>> +{
>> +}
>> +
>> +#endif /* !CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH */
>> +
>> /*
>> * NOTE - on most systems this is a PHYSICAL apic ID, but on multiquad
>> * (ie clustered apic addressing mode), this is a LOGICAL apic ID.
>> @@ -877,7 +928,7 @@ int common_cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
>> static int do_boot_cpu(u32 apicid, int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
>> {
>> unsigned long start_ip = real_mode_header->trampoline_start;
>> - int ret;
>> + int ret = 0;
>>
>> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>> /* If 64-bit wakeup method exists, use the 64-bit mode trampoline IP */
>> @@ -922,12 +973,15 @@ static int do_boot_cpu(u32 apicid, int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
>>
>> /*
>> * Wake up a CPU in difference cases:
>> + * - Intel TXT DRTM launch uses its own method to wake the APs
>> * - Use a method from the APIC driver if one defined, with wakeup
>> * straight to 64-bit mode preferred over wakeup to RM.
>> * Otherwise,
>> * - Use an INIT boot APIC message
>> */
>> - if (apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64)
>> + if (slaunch_is_txt_launch())
>> + slaunch_wakeup_cpu_from_txt(cpu, apicid);
>> + else if (apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64)
>> ret = apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64(apicid, start_ip);
>> else if (apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu)
>> ret = apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu(apicid, start_ip);
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
>> index f9bc444a3064..d95776cb30d3 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c
>> @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
>> #include <linux/memblock.h>
>> #include <linux/cc_platform.h>
>> #include <linux/pgtable.h>
>> +#include <linux/slaunch.h>
>>
>> #include <asm/set_memory.h>
>> #include <asm/realmode.h>
>> @@ -210,6 +211,8 @@ void __init init_real_mode(void)
>>
>> setup_real_mode();
>> set_real_mode_permissions();
>> +
>> + slaunch_fixup_jump_vector();
>> }
>>
>> static int __init do_init_real_mode(void)
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S
>> index 2eb62be6d256..3b5cbcbbfc90 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S
>> @@ -37,6 +37,9 @@ SYM_DATA_START(real_mode_header)
>> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>> .long __KERNEL32_CS
>> #endif
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
>> + .long pa_sl_trampoline_start32
>> +#endif
>> SYM_DATA_END(real_mode_header)
>>
>> /* End signature, used to verify integrity */
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
>> index 14d9c7daf90f..b0ce6205d7ea 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
>> @@ -122,6 +122,38 @@ SYM_CODE_END(sev_es_trampoline_start)
>>
>> .section ".text32","ax"
>> .code32
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
>> + .balign 4
>> +SYM_CODE_START(sl_trampoline_start32)
>> + /*
>> + * The early secure launch stub AP wakeup code has taken care of all
>> + * the vagaries of launching out of TXT. This bit just mimics what the
>> + * 16b entry code does and jumps off to the real startup_32.
>> + */
>> + cli
>> + wbinvd
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * The %ebx provided is not terribly useful since it is the physical
>> + * address of tb_trampoline_start and not the base of the image.
>> + * Use pa_real_mode_base, which is fixed up, to get a run time
>> + * base register to use for offsets to location that do not have
>> + * pa_ symbols.
>> + */
>> + movl $pa_real_mode_base, %ebx
>> +
>> + LOCK_AND_LOAD_REALMODE_ESP lock_pa=1
>> +
>> + lgdt tr_gdt(%ebx)
>> + lidt tr_idt(%ebx)
>> +
>> + movw $__KERNEL_DS, %dx # Data segment descriptor
>> +
>> + /* Jump to where the 16b code would have jumped */
>> + ljmpl $__KERNEL32_CS, $pa_startup_32
>> +SYM_CODE_END(sl_trampoline_start32)
>> +#endif
>> +
>> .balign 4
>> SYM_CODE_START(startup_32)
>> movl %edx, %ss
>
> BR, Jarkko
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-06-04 21:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 116+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-05-31 1:03 [PATCH v9 00/19] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 01/19] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 18:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 20:28 ` ross.philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 02/19] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 03/19] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 04/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 18:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 20:31 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:36 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 23:00 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-05 0:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-05 0:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-05 2:33 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-05 4:04 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-05 19:03 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-06 6:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-06 16:49 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-20 0:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-20 16:55 ` ross.philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 05/19] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 18:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 20:52 ` ross.philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 2:16 ` Eric Biggers
2024-05-31 13:54 ` Eric W. Biederman
2024-08-15 17:38 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-08-15 19:10 ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-08-16 10:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-16 11:01 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-08-16 11:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-16 18:41 ` Matthew Garrett
2024-08-19 18:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-19 18:24 ` Matthew Garrett
2024-08-20 15:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-22 18:29 ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-02-20 15:35 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-02-23 23:08 ` Andrew Cooper
2026-02-24 8:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-08-29 3:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-08-29 3:25 ` Matthew Garrett
2024-08-29 17:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-09-05 1:01 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-09-13 0:34 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-09-14 3:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-09-21 18:36 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-09-21 22:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-02 14:53 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-11-02 16:04 ` James Bottomley
2024-11-15 1:17 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-11-18 18:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-18 18:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-18 19:12 ` James Bottomley
2024-11-18 20:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-21 20:11 ` ross.philipson
2024-11-21 20:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-21 22:42 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-11-22 23:37 ` ross.philipson
2024-12-12 19:56 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-12-12 22:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-12-14 2:56 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-05-31 16:18 ` ross.philipson
2024-08-27 18:14 ` Eric Biggers
2024-08-28 20:14 ` ross.philipson
2024-08-28 23:13 ` Eric Biggers
2024-06-04 18:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 21:02 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 07/19] x86: Add early SHA-256 " Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 08/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 11:00 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-05-31 13:33 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-05-31 14:04 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-05-31 16:13 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-06-04 17:31 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 17:24 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 17:27 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-06-04 17:33 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 20:54 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-06-04 21:12 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 17:14 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 19:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 21:09 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 09/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 19:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 21:16 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 19:59 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 21:17 ` ross.philipson
2024-08-12 19:02 ` ross.philipson
2024-08-15 18:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 10/19] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 20:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 21:47 ` ross.philipson [this message]
2024-06-04 22:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 11/19] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 12/19] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 13/19] tpm: Protect against locality counter underflow Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 20:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-15 18:52 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 14/19] tpm: Ensure tpm is in known state at startup Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 20:14 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-08-15 19:24 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 15/19] tpm: Make locality requests return consistent values Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 16/19] tpm: Add ability to set the preferred locality the TPM chip uses Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 20:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 22:14 ` ross.philipson
2024-06-04 22:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-04 23:04 ` ross.philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 17/19] tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the preferred locality Ross Philipson
2024-06-04 20:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 18/19] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 1:03 ` [PATCH v9 19/19] x86: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2024-05-31 11:09 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-06-04 17:22 ` ross.philipson
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