From: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
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Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 09/18] fs/kernel_read_file: Switch buffer size arg to size_t
Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2020 10:36:11 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e30d07a1-36f3-4dd9-5afb-3c0bdb2b027a@broadcom.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200722193020.2676422-10-keescook@chromium.org>
works.
On 2020-07-22 12:30 p.m., Kees Cook wrote:
> In preparation for further refactoring of kernel_read_file*(), rename
> the "max_size" argument to the more accurate "buf_size", and correct
> its type to size_t. Add kerndoc to explain the specifics of how the
> arguments will be used. Note that with buf_size now size_t, it can no
> longer be negative (and was never called with a negative value). Adjust
> callers to use it as a "maximum size" when *buf is NULL.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
> ---
> fs/kernel_read_file.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------
> include/linux/kernel_read_file.h | 8 ++++----
> security/integrity/digsig.c | 2 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 2 +-
> 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/kernel_read_file.c b/fs/kernel_read_file.c
> index dc28a8def597..e21a76001fff 100644
> --- a/fs/kernel_read_file.c
> +++ b/fs/kernel_read_file.c
> @@ -5,15 +5,31 @@
> #include <linux/security.h>
> #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
>
> +/**
> + * kernel_read_file() - read file contents into a kernel buffer
> + *
> + * @file file to read from
> + * @buf pointer to a "void *" buffer for reading into (if
> + * *@buf is NULL, a buffer will be allocated, and
> + * @buf_size will be ignored)
> + * @buf_size size of buf, if already allocated. If @buf not
> + * allocated, this is the largest size to allocate.
> + * @id the kernel_read_file_id identifying the type of
> + * file contents being read (for LSMs to examine)
> + *
> + * Returns number of bytes read (no single read will be bigger
> + * than INT_MAX), or negative on error.
> + *
> + */
> int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf,
> - loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> + size_t buf_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> {
> loff_t i_size, pos;
> ssize_t bytes = 0;
> void *allocated = NULL;
> int ret;
>
> - if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) || max_size < 0)
> + if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> ret = deny_write_access(file);
> @@ -29,7 +45,7 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf,
> ret = -EINVAL;
> goto out;
> }
> - if (i_size > INT_MAX || (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)) {
> + if (i_size > INT_MAX || i_size > buf_size) {
> ret = -EFBIG;
> goto out;
> }
> @@ -75,7 +91,7 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf,
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file);
>
> int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path, void **buf,
> - loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> + size_t buf_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> {
> struct file *file;
> int ret;
> @@ -87,14 +103,14 @@ int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path, void **buf,
> if (IS_ERR(file))
> return PTR_ERR(file);
>
> - ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, max_size, id);
> + ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, buf_size, id);
> fput(file);
> return ret;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path);
>
> int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path, void **buf,
> - loff_t max_size,
> + size_t buf_size,
> enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> {
> struct file *file;
> @@ -113,13 +129,13 @@ int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path, void **buf,
> if (IS_ERR(file))
> return PTR_ERR(file);
>
> - ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, max_size, id);
> + ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, buf_size, id);
> fput(file);
> return ret;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path_initns);
>
> -int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, loff_t max_size,
> +int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, size_t buf_size,
> enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> {
> struct fd f = fdget(fd);
> @@ -128,7 +144,7 @@ int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, loff_t max_size,
> if (!f.file)
> goto out;
>
> - ret = kernel_read_file(f.file, buf, max_size, id);
> + ret = kernel_read_file(f.file, buf, buf_size, id);
> out:
> fdput(f);
> return ret;
> diff --git a/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h b/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
> index 0ca0bdbed1bd..910039e7593e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
> @@ -36,16 +36,16 @@ static inline const char *kernel_read_file_id_str(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> }
>
> int kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
> - void **buf, loff_t max_size,
> + void **buf, size_t buf_size,
> enum kernel_read_file_id id);
> int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path,
> - void **buf, loff_t max_size,
> + void **buf, size_t buf_size,
> enum kernel_read_file_id id);
> int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path,
> - void **buf, loff_t max_size,
> + void **buf, size_t buf_size,
> enum kernel_read_file_id id);
> int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd,
> - void **buf, loff_t max_size,
> + void **buf, size_t buf_size,
> enum kernel_read_file_id id);
>
> #endif /* _LINUX_KERNEL_READ_FILE_H */
> diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
> index 97661ffabc4e..04f779c4f5ed 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
> @@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path)
> int rc;
> key_perm_t perm;
>
> - rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, 0,
> + rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, INT_MAX,
> READING_X509_CERTIFICATE);
> if (rc < 0) {
> pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> index 602f52717757..692b83e82edf 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
> datap = path;
> strsep(&datap, "\n");
>
> - rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, 0, READING_POLICY);
> + rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, INT_MAX, READING_POLICY);
> if (rc < 0) {
> pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
> return rc;
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-23 17:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-07-22 19:30 [PATCH v2 00/18] Introduce partial kernel_read_file() support Kees Cook
2020-07-22 19:30 ` [PATCH v2 01/18] test_firmware: Test platform fw loading on non-EFI systems Kees Cook
2020-07-23 17:32 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-29 0:48 ` Luis Chamberlain
2020-09-09 22:18 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-22 19:30 ` [PATCH v2 02/18] selftest/firmware: Add selftest timeout in settings Kees Cook
2020-07-23 6:38 ` SeongJae Park
2020-07-23 17:34 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-22 19:30 ` [PATCH v2 03/18] firmware_loader: EFI firmware loader must handle pre-allocated buffer Kees Cook
2020-07-22 19:30 ` [PATCH v2 04/18] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER enum Kees Cook
2020-07-22 19:30 ` [PATCH v2 05/18] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove FIRMWARE_EFI_EMBEDDED enum Kees Cook
2020-07-22 19:30 ` [PATCH v2 06/18] fs/kernel_read_file: Split into separate include file Kees Cook
2020-07-22 19:30 ` [PATCH v2 07/18] fs/kernel_read_file: Split into separate source file Kees Cook
2020-07-22 19:30 ` [PATCH v2 08/18] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove redundant size argument Kees Cook
2020-07-23 17:35 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-22 19:30 ` [PATCH v2 09/18] fs/kernel_read_file: Switch buffer size arg to size_t Kees Cook
2020-07-23 17:36 ` Scott Branden [this message]
2020-07-22 19:30 ` [PATCH v2 10/18] fs/kernel_read_file: Add file_size output argument Kees Cook
2020-07-23 17:36 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-22 19:30 ` [PATCH v2 11/18] LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook Kees Cook
2020-07-23 17:39 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-22 19:30 ` [PATCH v2 12/18] firmware_loader: Use security_post_load_data() Kees Cook
2020-07-22 19:30 ` [PATCH v2 13/18] module: Call security_kernel_post_load_data() Kees Cook
2020-07-22 19:30 ` [PATCH v2 14/18] LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook Kees Cook
2020-07-22 19:30 ` [PATCH v2 15/18] fs/kernel_file_read: Add "offset" arg for partial reads Kees Cook
2020-07-22 22:29 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-23 6:23 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-23 19:17 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-24 5:46 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-23 19:15 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-24 5:41 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-24 18:23 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-24 18:39 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-24 19:03 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-24 19:26 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-22 19:30 ` [PATCH v2 16/18] firmware: Store opt_flags in fw_priv Kees Cook
2020-07-22 19:30 ` [PATCH v2 17/18] firmware: Add request_partial_firmware_into_buf() Kees Cook
2020-07-22 19:30 ` [PATCH v2 18/18] test_firmware: Test partial read support Kees Cook
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