From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "John Ogness" <john.ogness@linutronix.de>,
"Petr Mladek" <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: "Sergey Senozhatsky" <senozhatsky@chromium.org>,
"Steven Rostedt" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
"Ryan Roberts" <ryan.roberts@arm.com>,
"Breno Leitao" <leitao@debian.org>,
printk@lists.linux.dev,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Baoquan He" <baoquan.he@linux.dev>,
"Mike Rapoport" <rppt@kernel.org>,
"Pasha Tatashin" <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>,
"Pratyush Yadav" <pratyush@kernel.org>,
"Dave Young" <ruirui.yang@linux.dev>,
"Bradley Morgan" <include@grrlz.net>,
"Oleg Nesterov" <oleg@redhat.com>,
"Pavel Tikhomirov" <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
"Petr Pavlu" <petr.pavlu@suse.com>,
"Cen Zhang (Microsoft)" <blbllhy@gmail.com>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH printk v3 6/7] printk: Add unsafe flush points for panic+kexec and emergency_restart
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 23:03:58 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-224169@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261118230345.808560-7-john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential
issue to consider:
- [Medium] printk: nbcon: con->pbufs corruption on hostile takeover in
emergency_restart()
--
commit bc98e7fe84227c1b12eaff8bf1021023be510742
Author: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
printk: Add unsafe flush points for panic+kexec and emergency_restart
This commit adds nbcon_atomic_flush_unsafe(PR_FLUSH_RESTART) calls to
__crash_kexec() and emergency_restart() so that CON_NBCON_ATOMIC_UNSAFE
consoles can flush when permitted by their unsafe policy.
> diff --git a/kernel/reboot.c b/kernel/reboot.c
> index a93c23b9e1948..b26d131c54151 100644
> --- a/kernel/reboot.c
> +++ b/kernel/reboot.c
> @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ void emergency_restart(void)
> */
> nbcon_cpu_emergency_enter();
> printk_trigger_flush();
> + nbcon_atomic_flush_unsafe(PR_FLUSH_RESTART);
>
> machine_emergency_restart();
> }
[Severity: Medium]
Can this corrupt con->pbufs when emergency_restart() performs a hostile
takeover outside of panic()?
When emergency_restart() is invoked directly (for example via SysRq-b)
rather than from panic(), panic_on_this_cpu() is false and other CPUs remain
active. If a console permits unsafe takeover on PR_FLUSH_RESTART (such as
netconsole with NBCON_EMERGENCY_RESTART_FLUSH) while an NBCON_PRIO_NORMAL
context holds it inside an unsafe section, nbcon_context_try_acquire()
performs an unsafe hostile takeover at NBCON_PRIO_EMERGENCY but still
assigns con->pbufs instead of panic_nbcon_pbufs:
kernel/printk/nbcon.c:nbcon_context_try_acquire() {
...
/* Assign the appropriate buffer for this context. */
if (panic_on_this_cpu())
ctxt->pbufs = &panic_nbcon_pbufs;
else
ctxt->pbufs = con->pbufs;
...
}
CPU0 (NBCON_PRIO_NORMAL) CPU1 (emergency_restart)
nbcon_emit_next_record()
nbcon_context_enter_unsafe()
printk_get_next_message()
// writes con->pbufs->outbuf
nbcon_atomic_flush_unsafe(PR_FLUSH_RESTART)
...
nbcon_context_try_acquire_hostile()
ctxt->pbufs = con->pbufs
nbcon_emit_next_record()
printk_get_next_message()
// overwrites con->pbufs->outbuf
con->write_thread()
// reads corrupted con->pbufs->outbuf <-- buffer corruption
Both contexts then concurrently read and write con->pbufs->outbuf and
con->pbufs->scratchbuf. For netconsole_ext, overwriting the formatted
message while send_msg_fragmented() is scanning wctxt->outbuf for the ';'
header delimiter can trigger WARN_ON_ONCE(!msgbody) or match a ';' past
MAX_PRINT_CHUNK, overflowing nt->buf[].
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261118230345.808560-1-john.ogness@linutronix.de?part=6
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-19 23:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-18 23:03 [PATCH printk v3 0/7] Introduce policies for unsafe flushing John Ogness
2026-11-18 23:03 ` [PATCH printk v3 6/7] printk: Add unsafe flush points for panic+kexec and emergency_restart John Ogness
2026-11-19 23:03 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
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