From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Jarkko Sakkinen Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 15:36:22 +0000 Subject: Re: [RFC 6/7] doc: keys: Document usage of TEE based Trusted Keys Message-Id: <20190614153622.GG11241@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit List-Id: References: <1560421833-27414-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> <1560421833-27414-7-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> <20190613153414.GG18488@linux.intel.com> In-Reply-To: To: Sumit Garg Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Jens Wiklander , corbet@lwn.net, dhowells@redhat.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, Ard Biesheuvel , Daniel Thompson , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, Linux Kernel Mailing List , tee-dev@lists.linaro.org On Fri, Jun 14, 2019 at 11:07:23AM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote: > On Thu, 13 Jun 2019 at 21:04, Jarkko Sakkinen > wrote: > > > > On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 04:00:32PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote: > > > Provide documentation for usage of TEE based Trusted Keys via existing > > > user-space "keyctl" utility. Also, document various use-cases. > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg > > > > Sorry missed this patch. Anyway, I don't think we want multiple trusted > > keys subsystems. You have to fix the existing one if you care to get > > these changes in. There is no really other way around this. > > > > I understand your point. > > When I initially looked at trusted key implementation, it seemed to be > tightly coupled to use TPM device. So I implemented a parallel > implementation to get initial feedback (functionality-wise) on this > new approach. Yeah, I completely get this. My feedback this is: we can definitely consider TEE based trusted keys, and I know that trusted.ko is a mess, but still that is the only right long-term path. Think about the positive side: if you as a side-effect can make it cleaner and more versatile, your patch set will improve the quality of the kernel as a whole i.e. you benefit larger audience than just TEE user base :-) > I will work on abstraction of trusted key apis to use either approach. > But is it fine with you if I send if I send a separate RFC patch for > abstraction and later once reviewed I will incorporate that patch in > this patch-set. > > It will be really helpful if you could help to test that abstraction > patch with a real TPM device as I doesn't posses one to test. I can, yes. /Jarkko