Re: [PATCH v13 11/12] x509, pkcs7: Limit crypto combinations that may be used for module signing

David Howells
2026-01-20T23:19:06Z

Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> wrote:

> > +static const struct public_key_restriction public_key_restrictions[] = {
> > + /* algo encoding hash */
> > + { "rsa", "pkcs1", "sha256" },
> > + { "rsa", "pkcs1", "sha384" },
> > + { "rsa", "pkcs1", "sha512" },
> > + { "rsa", "emsa-pss", "sha512" },
> > + { "ecdsa", "x962", "sha256" },
> > + { "ecdsa", "x962", "sha384" },
> > + { "ecdsa", "x962", "sha512" },
> > + { "ecrdsa", "raw", "sha256" },
> > + { "ecrdsa", "raw", "sha384" },
> > + { "ecrdsa", "raw", "sha512" },
>
> Why such hash choice? Aren't it should be streebog256 and streebog512?

Maybe? I don't have any example ecrdsa (assuming you're talking about that
specifically), nor does it seem that it was added to the choice of module
signing. Possibly I should drop the encoding column - or just have a list of
hashes that we accept - but we might want to limit the hashes that can use
with ML-DSA more strictly (ie. only allow SHA512).

David